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Abstract:
This thesis uses Bakhtinian theory, in particular the chronotope, as well 
as insights into my personal writing and other texts to look at the representation 
of madness in contemporary black literature. The representation of madness is 
reflected in three texts by writers of African descent: Breath, Eyes, Memory by 
Edwidge Danticat; Orange Laughter by Leone Ross and Paradise by Toni 
Morrison.
I look at how madness as an instance of rupture and trauma relates to 
language used within the texts. I draw on Bakhtin’s theories on language as a 
basis on which claims to madness in language, or text, are made. Bakhtin’s 
theories are useful as he attempted to define social aspects of language in a 
way that illuminated the psycho-social in texts. In an attempt to further define 
aspects of the chronotope -  which relates to the correlation between space and 
time within aspects of literature -  it became useful to add the definition of the 
“mad” chronotope to aspects of language so that the literature in question could 
be seen through a new definition that was pertinent to the subject.
The writers, Danticat, Ross and Morrison, all approach madness from 
differing viewpoints that help to emphasise the relationship between madness 
and the chronotope. This relationship is explored throughout the following 
chapters and helps to define the new concept of the “mad chronotope” as an 
aspect of language useful to the interpretation of texts.
I analyse my personal writing by looking at madness and other relevant 
themes in relation to the novel and by relating ideas on Bakhtinian theory, 
notably the mad chronotope, to the creative process. In the second part of the 
novel, the protagonist suffers with schizophrenia within an extended period of 
time. At this point, the novel attempts to mirror the concerns of the thesis in 
relation to the mad chronotope and other themes relevant to the thesis so that 
there is a correlation between the two pieces of work.
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Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to accommodate the notion that there is such a 
thing as the representation of madness in black literature and that it is a feasible 
area to study. At first my trips to the British Library to look for the black literary 
experience of madness were only marked by the finding of Claudia Tate’s book 
on psychoanalysis and the protocols of race and its use of psychoanalysis in 
studying historical fiction, but was soon encouraged by other texts about 
madness and how it has been reflected in literature, the arts and society 
throughout the ages.
What was of specific interest was how to define madness and the field 
of black literature so that I could begin to think about the representation 
madness in contemporary black literature. I found it most useful to look at a 
definition of schizophrenia since it represented the actions of most of the mad 
characters, and thus enabled me to constrain discussion of the range of mental 
breakdown featured in the novels to this aspect. Most of the characters are 
suffering with a break from reality and some form of hallucination (mostly 
auditory hallucinations). The characters’ minds are fragmented and the 
delusions help to reduce an awareness of reality (Lyttle 1986: 11). Also 
relevant is the “flatness of affect” described by Louis A Sass in Chapter One of 
this thesis, whereby an individual becomes void of emotional stimulation and 
the fact that reality becomes transformed by the images and voices that appear 
in the mind, also discussed in Chapter One. This break with reality becomes 
important to the structure and plot of the novels in question and as such proves 
essential in an evaluation of the rationale behind the definition of madness in 
this context. Madness is the point at which reality becomes subjugated by
delusional fantasy in this instance and it is at this point that the characters’ 
actions influence structure and plot. This influence is represented in the way 
the characters report the contents of their psyches to others and how this break 
from reality for the character pertains to a break from reality for the reader. 
Therefore, madness is represented by delusion and the hallucinatory which in 
turn influences the character and plot of the novel in question.
The definition of madness goes some way to describe the way in which 
characters’ symptoms are represented in the novels. For example, Sophie’s 
mother Martine in Breath, Eyes, Memory is described with this flatness of affect 
just before she commits suicide, also killing her unborn child. Tony in Orange 
Laughter is completely commanded by the images and voices in his mind to the 
extent that his sense of reality is compromised. The character of Mavis in 
Morrison’s Paradise suffers with rupture and disorder in the psyche following 
the death of her babies and like the other protagonists described here is 
portrayed as at odds with reality. Therefore, the characters are portrayed in a 
particular stylistic manner that takes into consideration the aspects of madness 
described in my definition in their representation.
Black literature, or that chosen for this project, is borne of dissension 
due to its slave narrative beginnings, written by writers from the African 
Diaspora, and takes on subjects integral to the black experience, such as 
racism, social inequity and injustice. African American, African Caribbean and 
Black British literatures come under the auspices of African Diasporic literatures 
and as such have a claim to a connectedness in terms of these experiences. 
This connectedness is by no means complete -  culture has its place as the
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underlying structure within which identity, place and the social play a part in 
defining each experience, so that the African American experience can never 
be a full explanation of a Black British encounter or, even more tellingly, the 
African Caribbean experience cannot fully describe what the Black British have 
lived through because of differences in culture. Therefore, the literatures of the 
African Diaspora are named by their similarities and differences that become 
apparent when one attempts to make a claim solely for their associations. 
Disparate ideas are evoked in the range of books covered in this thesis, but 
also the connectedness are apparent. One such example of this relates to the 
representation of madness in black literature. It is apparent in reading black 
literature that has madness as a theme that, for the most part, the pathology of 
the disease is not discussed by any of the characters, and that the illness itself 
is not treated by any medical intervention so that the characters live in a “mad 
bubble” through which their view of the world is orchestrated to name the 
alternate nature of their circumstance. This alternate nature, like the alternate 
nature of the literature itself, has a voice of its own, a way of speaking that is 
different and a way of enunciating difference that is in keeping with an 
alternative view of things. For example, I am struck by how the novels 
discussed in this thesis are able to form these views of the world as other in 
ways that build on the notion of the literature itself as being alternate and 
somehow interrogative. For example, in Breath, Eyes, Memory, the shared 
knowledges practised by the community and within a familial context are party 
to the larger political machinations that are abroad in the country. This allows 
the literature an interrogative standpoint from which it can explore the alternate 
within this context. In this way, the writers of black literature differ from their 
white counterparts in that nosology, the classification of the disease(s), is far
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from their minds and it is this alternate space that the writer becomes more 
involved with.
My original contribution to the study of the field of representations of 
madness in black literature concerns the introduction of the mad chronotope. I 
look at the chronotope in Bakhtinian theory and at ways in which it could be 
utilised within the theme of madness. In The Dialogic Imagination, Bakhtin 
defines the chronotope as: “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial 
relations that are artistically expressed in literature” (Holquist 1981: 84). Drawn 
rather loosely from Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, Bakhtin felt that the 
inseparability described between time and space was somehow manifest in the 
representation of time and space in the novel. And despite the rather vague 
interpretation of this “intrinsic connectedness” by Bakhtin, it is possible to 
construct a way to describe the interrelationship between time and space in the 
depiction of the mad character by pinpointing time lapses in the text, textual 
synergies in the relationship between madness and sanity, mad language as 
well as what I see as the “carving out” of the mad character -  the way the mad 
character is represented in the text in terms of character development and the 
nature of madness in this context. Therefore the originality of the study stems 
from a Bakhtinian theory of time/space that provides an alternate view of the 
mad persona through language and elements of literary theory.
The representation of madness in black literature provides a place 
within which the issue of madness can be discussed at an intellectual level 
whilst offering an alternative to the position that black people are somehow 
being pathologised by the whole idea of representations of madness. In this
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study, race is by no means pathologised as the writings discussed represent a 
small number of texts written on the subject by black writers and there is a 
sense that the characters speak out as an exceptional idea of the alternate 
rather than the rule. The field of study is further contextualised by what I think is 
the growing interest in the psychological in black writing, hence the publication 
of Tate’s work. This means that there is a growing awareness of the role of 
madness as an alternative way of viewing the world, if not as a discourse as I 
do not believe that there is a complete discourse of madness due to its unstable 
link to reality and truth. Discourse in this context relates to an extended 
communication dealing with a particular topic. This extended communication 
can only be realised up to a point as madness itself is not realised in reality but 
instead distorts that reality to form its own truth. This truth is compromised by 
its unstable beginnings and, as such, does not act in the way that a discourse 
should. Therefore, madness is a legitimate field of study because of the interest 
in its manifestation in black literature and its relevance as an alternative to the 
sanity of reality and truth. The number of fictional works with the theme of 
madness within them is growing, judging by the three contemporary works 
studied for this thesis and the works of other writers concerned with the subject, 
such as John Edgar Wideman (US), Erna Brodber (Caribbean) and Caryl 
Phillips (UK). Therefore the interests divulged by the mad chronotope have the 
scope and interpretative means necessary to evoke new ways of seeing 
madness in literature through language and theory.
The Bakhtinian concept of the chronotope is a relevant source of theory 
to study black literature because of its own alternate history. A Russian thinker 
who was at odds with the traditional Formalist view of literary theory, Bakhtin
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was able to produce concepts that differ from western European and Anglo- 
American philosophy in their source and ideas and which can be seen as an 
alternative to using western concepts in the study of black literature, which can 
at times prove to be a contentious point. The theory itself, and its reliance on 
time/space congruence is an interesting concept to bring to bear on black 
literature with its strong links to historical time and space. Time from an African 
Diasporic perspective in literature is suggested to work in a cyclical fashion 
rather than the wholly western linear form. Therefore, as the western 
perspective marks its progress in linear, progressive time, the African- 
influenced view replenishes itself in a manner that takes into consideration 
growth, death and re-growth, to put it simply. This position on time is by no 
means divorced from the western influence as the Diasporic populations are 
mainly based in the west and, as Bonnie Barthold suggests, have become 
contingent in their use of time due to “...the threat of temporal dispossession” 
(1981: 27) and have come to use the linear/progressive timescale also. Cyclical 
time has its place, however, even if only as a nostalgic play for things in the 
African past.
Therefore time, the dominant component of the chronotope, can be 
read as an integral element in the study of literature and, in this context, the 
research into madness in literature. That the cyclical concept of time is 
essential to a reading of madness is best described by the manner in which it 
influences moments of madness; these moments of madness are arbitrary and 
random, yet in their randomness there is a sense that there is a beginning and 
an end which then goes on to replenish itself with the ongoing thoughts of the 
character. This relationship between time and madness is quite central to the
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use of the chronotope in this thesis as it presupposes a pattern of events in the
psyche and demonstrates their evolvement into delusion. Bakhtinian theory in
the context of this thesis is taken quite literally with regards to the chronotope’s
representational importance.
Time becomes, in effect, palpable and visible; 
the chronotope makes narrative events concrete, 
makes them take on flesh, causes blood to flow in 
their veins. An event can be communicated, it becomes 
information, one can give precise data on the place 
and time of its occurrence. But the event does not 
become a figure [obraz]. It is precisely the chronotope 
that provides the ground essential for the showing forth, 
the representability of events. And this is so thanks 
precisely to the special increase in density and 
concreteness of time within well-delineated spatial areas.
(Holquist 1981: 250)
The chronotope here takes on a corporeal essence that goes some way to flesh 
out the rather sketchy denotation of the chronotope in Bakhtin’s writings. The 
concrete nature of time and its ability to be designated to spatial areas is a 
provocative statement for me at this stage in my writing, as it suggests that you 
can afford to attribute literary events and occurrences to specific literary 
moments within which the theory of madness and otherness can be realised as 
interrogative. Therefore, this otherness, or alternate nature, has the ability to be 
denoted in historical time and be given a place in literary history. By this I mean 
that the literature of madness or otherness works within the time and spatial 
frameworks set up by the chronotope and as such can be examined in a literary 
context. Also evident from this quotation is the relevance of the chronotope as 
central to this thesis. The chronotope itself has the ability to provide a sense of 
significance and drama to an event and when coupled with notions of madness, 
it is able to increase the significance of delusion. This ensures that time and 
space share clearly delineated fields of enquiry which may be centred on the
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madness of the character. This, in turn, provides a dramatic significance to 
structure and plot which illustrates that space and time have relevance. The 
“representability of events” that is spoken of in the quotation suggests the 
importance of the chronotope to providing the basis for a demonstration of an 
event, be it mad delusions or otherwise in this context. The event itself is 
heightened due to the chronotope and this allows for the characters to become 
more central and vital. Therefore the chronotope becomes central to the 
concept of the thesis because it has the ability to provide significant moments of 
drama and to heighten the sense of delusion in the characters.
One of the questions this research asks is whether it is possible to 
theorise otherness and the discourse of the other and it is with this in mind that 
one finds the above quotation from Bakhtin telling. This alterity becomes 
clearer from what is not elaborated on in the writing by Bakhtin, that the 
chronotope, and the mad chronotope in this context, can be formulated along 
the lines of that which denotes time within the motif of madness and can have 
an interrelationship with other chronotopes that complement it or agitate it, such 
as the chronotopes of home and encounter, as long as the components within 
each chronotope remain separate. Therefore, my writing on this subject will 
look at the temporal and spatial nature of the chronotope in relation to madness 
and how this can be validated, deconstructed or elucidated by other 
chronotopes and the issue of an alternate voice or discourse. I have decided to 
make the concept of the mad chronotope the key critical idea in the thesis 
because its originality and representability appear important to a reading of 
madness in literature, particularly because of the time element that gives it 
historical acuity. The importance of the reader and author to the texts 
complements the discussion on the chronotope as this helps to foreground the
premise of madness within Bakhtinian theory by representing outside of the text 
as well as within it.
I chose the three texts within which to discuss the mad chronotope for 
a number of reasons. Breath, Eyes, Memory by Edwidge Danticat (1994) was 
chosen because I thought the bildungsroman at the heart of the novel would 
prove to be an important literary device within which to look at the mad 
chronotope as the spatial environment would prove instrumental in describing 
the contingencies of the story. For example, the relationship between mother 
and daughter in the novel could be seen in its incremental stages, allowing the 
reader to follow the plotting of the story. Also the central character of the novel 
grows up in subsequent chapters, as my own protagonist does in “No More 
Yellow” and I thought it would be crucial to see how both of the characters 
manage to negotiate madness, either that they are suffering themselves or that 
seen around them. Due to the time and setting shifts within the novel there is 
an abundance of material for the discussion of the chronotope. Also, the fact 
that the writer touches on Caribbean and American culture is an important 
evocation of the African Diasporic writerly exercise. In choosing the first novel 
of a young writer, I also thought it was important to investigate how such a 
subject as madness can be written about successfully.
The second novel chosen, Orange Laughter by Leone Ross (1999), 
was a clearer choice despite the mixing of nationalities and settings. A black 
British writer, Ross writes about the civil rights era in the deep south of America 
and its aftermath. Her protagonist is schizophrenic, suffering with auditory and 
visual hallucinations about events in his harrowing past. The madness is 
pronounced here, and because of the switches between eras and the polarised
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settings, is an equally profuse novel within which to discuss the mad 
chronotope. There is a sense with this particular novel that madness is at its 
furthest reach from what is sane and acceptable as the protagonist removes 
himself from social adequacy and so thoroughly relinquishes a sense of himself 
to the point that he becomes a “wildman”. This is in contrast to the sideways 
glance at madness of the first novel studied and foregrounds the chronotope to 
greater effect.
The third novel, Toni Morrison’s Paradise (1998) has a number of mad 
characters who live within two distinct communities, one that accepts madness 
and one that does not. The distinct settings of these communities has 
chronotopic relevance as they become polarised because of their differences, 
yet time/space reality suggests they are closer to each other than one might 
expect. Morrison has a literary history of writing about madness in her texts and 
her work was included because of the normalising quality of the treatment of 
madness; the mad protagonists are treated by those around them as if they are 
sane in a way that Morrison and other African American writers have depicted 
that suggests a move away from pathologising individuals and the community 
from which they come to a recognition of the dialectic between sanity and 
madness.
The fact that I have chosen to write about three women writers was not 
initially intentional, but has become significant due to the types of protagonists 
they portray in their work. What has become apparent is the domestic 
relationships these characters have with others and how madness is relayed 
within those relationships. Therefore, the mother/daughter relationship between 
Martine and Sophie in Breath, Eyes, Memory is significant because it posits the
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notion of madness within a domestic setting, giving rise to the more political 
aspects of the writing. The domestic here is seen as convivial to notions of 
unreliability in the text as it provides a place of silences and misunderstandings 
around the subject of madness. This is true also of the character Tony in 
Orange Laughter who replaces plush domesticity above ground for the 
interlinking subway underworld of the disenfranchised. Here, domesticity is re­
enacted by the character and his girlfriend yet his cyclical bouts of madness 
have the effect of upsetting the arrangements so carefully put into place, yet 
provides a comforting backdrop to his encroaching delusions. In Paradise the 
characters Mavis and Sweetie have “difficult” relationships with their children 
either through their own or their children’s illnesses. Morrison provides a 
domestic setting that suggests female intuition and guile is relevant to the 
recounting of madness, yet like the other two writers supports the notion that 
the madness seen in the male and female protagonists is not something just 
relevant to a woman’s reading of madness, but is universal. Therefore, the 
significance of an exclusive focus on women writers, though initially 
unintentional, provides an interesting insight into the domestic arena 
surrounding the evocation of madness.
The novel “No More Yellow” relates to the thesis in a number of ways. 
The thesis’ main argument is that there is such a thing as a mad chronotope 
and that this can be utilised in literary explication. The theme of madness is 
one of the running topics in the novel and as such lends itself to a reading of the 
mad chronotope, which will be undertaken throughout the course of the thesis. 
Otherness and the alternate are also important to a reading of the novel as the
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protagonist of “No More Yellow” comes across situations in which she feels 
distinctly separate or disengaged as an individual from those around her as well 
as feeling part of a racially charged environment in which she is the outsider. 
The alternate nature of the literature under discussion is reflected in the novel 
by way of the themes and characters realised within its pages and as such acts 
as a mirror of the thesis in its replication of an era. The novel acts as the 
foregrounded material that reflects the concerns of the thesis in a practical, 
literary evocation of the facts under discussion but this does not mean that it 
simply replicates the arguments in the thesis. Instead, there is a careful look at 
race matters, otherness, the alternate that make up the novel.
There are certain subjects under discussion in the thesis that move 
away from the original concept of the mad chronotope and instead thematise 
another aspect of literary theory that compliments it. Therefore, the mad 
chronotope, otherness and the alternate are not the only matters under 
discussion. There are supplementary arguments to do with other chronotopes, 
the expression of the dialogue between mother and daughter, inner genres, 
witnessing and implosion, dialogics and dialectics that are important to the 
discussion and in relation to the main premise and their links to the chronotope. 
They relate to the central argument because they reflect on the mad chronotope 
and the alternate nature of the literature in interesting ways that privilege the 
main argument whilst adding to the breadth of the thesis.
I believe that the arguments put forward in this thesis will provide a 
platform from which to discuss innovative and creative ideas in black literature.
I do not see this thesis as a static thing, something that does not have any 
sense of outreach and performance about it. Instead I see it as a way into
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literature that privileges the creative and provides an opening for further 
discussion on madness in an interesting and informative way. I see this thesis 
as contributing to the study of the relationship between creative work, literary 
theory and representations of madness. Readers of my work will be able to find 
the correlation between the creative work and the literary theory and how the 
novel compliments the thesis by touching on subjects, notably madness, 
discussed in some details in the thesis.
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Chapter One: Trauma and Madness in Edwidge Danticat’s Breath, Eyes, 
Memory
The story of trauma, then, as the narrative of a belated experience, far from telling of an escape 
from reality -  the escape from a death, or from its referential force -  rather attests to its endless 
impact on a life.
Cathy Caruth (1996)
This ‘authoring’ of the self necessarily involves a ‘projection’ into the consciousness of the other. 
After this moment of projection, one can return to one’s own ideological horizon and situate 
oneself socially, temporally and spatially in relation to other subjects in the social world. The 
other, therefore, exists in a dialectical relation to one’s own consciousness as both subject and 
object, and is therefore an inseparable component of our being-in-the-world.
M. M. Bakhtin (1992)
According to Louis A Sass, in his look at the reactions of schizophrenic 
patients to their illness in Madness and Modernism, reality is transformed by the 
images and voices that appear in the mind (1998: 282) and takes the form of a 
new reality, one that is secured by the feeling of telepathic messages being 
transmitted and by believing that one is inhabiting the lives of great men. For 
many, this transformed reality acts as a buffer against the “sane” reality of the 
outside world and can be comforting at times, horrific at others. This dual-faced 
state is seldom treated in African Caribbean fiction; either side of this duality 
may be permitted an airing but rarely both at once. I’m reminded of the first 
time I read the poem (then heard it performed) by Jean Binta Breeze “Riddym 
Ravings: The Mad Woman’s Poem” in an anthology of reggae poetry called 
Wheel and Come Again (1998). The poem told the story of a woman taken to 
Bellevue for an undetermined length of time each time she commits a social 
faux pas that could only mean she is mad. She talks about the doctor and the 
landlord “... tek(ing) de radio outa mi head” (49) and how she reinstates it as 
soon as she is out of their reach. Her lament is told with an underlying humour, 
a wry look at how madness can be satisfying for the sufferer as a new skin is 
stepped into each time"... de DJ fly up eena mi head” (49), yet it is a reminder 
of how the comic is often used to engender empathy for a character in African
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Caribbean fiction and poetry. This is not true of all African Caribbean fiction, as 
this view is surely challenged in Erna Brodber’s novel Jane and Louisa Will 
Soon Come Home (1980) for example, but the humorous, as depicted in Olive 
Senior’s short story of misapprehensions in the collection Discerner of Hearts 
(1995), becomes a familiar method with which to broach the subject of madness 
in African Caribbean literature. The transformed reality in these instances of the 
comic becomes named by the humour and there is a sense that these 
protagonists’ lives are self-serving and not at all dangerous. African American 
writers, on the other hand, have systematically stripped the comic and 
wistfulness from their evocations of madness; in Toni Morrison’s Sula (1974), 
and, arguably, in Richard Wright’s Native Son (1940), for example, madness 
ends in the ultimate abstraction from freedom -  death. Imbedded within these 
novels are a sense of social exclusion and the dangerous nature of altered 
states that is missing from African Caribbean fiction. Edwidge Danticat’s 
Breath, Eyes, Memory (1994) appears to straddle these two concepts of 
madness, the African American obliteration and the Caribbean optimism, and is 
mindful of each approach, providing insight into the shared public knowledge of 
trauma and madness within this method. This chapter will look at the 
determinacy of this “shared knowledge”, using Foucault’s term, how reality 
features as problematic to this shared knowledge in madness, and how this 
facilitates dialogue in the text. However, and most importantly, the idea of the 
mad chronotope will be investigated in order to look at how madness is 
represented in this novel and how the mad characters move through time and 
space.
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The Mad Chronotope and Shared Knowledges
“The nightmares, have they stopped?” [Sophie]
“I didn’t tell you what I had decided. I am going 
to get it out of me.” [Martine]
“When did you decide?” [Sophie]
“Last night when I heard it speak to me.”
“Are you sure?”
“Yes. I am sure, it spoke to me. It has a man’s 
voice, so now I know it’s not a girl. I am going to 
get it out of me. I am going to get it out of me, as 
the stars are my witness.”
“Don’t do anything rash.” (Danticat 1995: 217)
Misapprehensions, as Senior found in her short story, have a way of 
making the mad appear sane. In the above encounter between mother and 
daughter (Martine being the mother), Danticat allows the severe condition of the 
mother’s mental health a chance to be spoken and understood -  to a point. 
Bakhtin talks of the chronotope of encounter as one with a dominant temporal 
faculty and a “...higher degree of intensity in emotions and values” (Holquist 
1981: 243). This encounter certainly constitutes a heightening of emotions and 
motives and as such shows the close relationships, riddled with 
misapprehensions, between the two women. The mad chronotope, however, 
looks at this heightened emotional state from the point of view that it is by no 
means static and that, like madness itself, is open to variability and alterations 
that bring about a denouement. In order to discuss this further, it is important to 
state that the above quotation appears close to the end of the novel, after 
character traits have been established and plot lines furthered. The story, 
based on the protagonist Sophie’s point of view, only fleetingly discusses the 
mother’s madness throughout the novel, but when it does, the subject is 
readable through the mad chronotope. Life alters for Martine in irrevocable 
ways because of her illness, and it is these changes that monitor the progress 
of her madness. Having said this, it is the end of the novel that one is
concerned with at the moment, as it is the culmination of years of trauma and 
misapprehension that result in death.
At the beginning of the quotation, Sophie mentions the nightmares she 
had become accustomed to hearing her mother suffer with during her 
childhood. Her question goes unanswered, as her mother’s preoccupation with 
her unborn child takes precedence. However, it is the nightmares and the 
trauma they imbue that is instrumental to the whole exchange between mother 
and daughter. As Cathy Caruth states in her epigrammatic beginning, “the 
narrative of a belated experience, far from telling of an escape from reality ... 
rather attests to its endless impact on a life." It is this “endless impact” that 
Martine suffers with, having been raped in the cane fields by who she 
considered to be a Tonton Macoute, conceiving Sophie in the process. The 
“belated experience” becomes engorged by the past, yet in this encounter, 
Martine does not indicate that this is the case. For her the child is one problem, 
the nightmares had been another. Here the mad chronotope is signified by the 
variability of emotions in the two instances -  the nightmares and the unborn 
child -  and by misapprehension. Martine feels nothing for the nightmares now 
and we can only assume that they have become part of her history, a belated 
experience, only surpassed by the feeling that the unborn child inside of her will 
have the face of the rapist. This disengagement from the past, which suggests 
what Sass calls the “flatness of affect” in a schizophrenic so that emotions are 
altogether void (1998: 23), impacts on the mad chronotope’s emotional 
variability and engages us in the world of the flatness. For as Martine speaks to 
Sophie about the unborn child, there is a sense that there is a dullness of 
feeling behind the words, as if Martine cannot find it within herself to escape this
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feeling of alienation. She does not cry, shout or scream at her daughter, and it 
is this coldness towards the notion of what she is about to do that fuels the 
misapprehension between the two women. Martine believes her daughter 
knows what she is referring to when she states “I am going to get it out of me...” 
(1995: 217), whereas Sophie, telling her mother not to do anything drastic, has 
no real comprehension of what is to come. This lack of understanding between 
the two women is considered to be an aspect of the mad chronotope, as it is the 
incomprehensibility of madness that is alluded to and which, in my opinion, 
marks the encounters between mother and daughter, aunt and niece, 
grandmother and aunt in this text.
Therefore, the mad chronotope is able to distinguish between the 
comprehensible and the incomprehensible, the stable and instability (in 
emotions) yet has not indicated a temporal or spatial feature in its make up. 
Given the high concentration of the temporal in the encounter chronotope, this 
is addressed by seizing on the indeterminacy of the encounter itself; after years 
of misapprehensions and compromises, mother and daughter speak to each 
other sporadically, to the point whereby Sophie feels uninhibited enough to 
speak about her mother’s nightmares in a conversation after years of silence 
and advocacy. The disclosure at the heart of this encounter feels like an end to 
an issue, no matter how it is carried out, and temporally is marked by the ellipsis 
before the encounter, in speech and action, between mother and daughter.
That they both live in the States by the end of the novel and are partitioned only 
by border crossings, tells us much about their spatial capacity for reconciliation, 
but this temporal and spatial reckoning is under the auspices of the mad 
chronotope, where very little appears as it first seems.
21
In order to look at these aspects of the chronotope more closely, it is 
necessary to give a brief summation of what the novel is about to place this 
conversation in context. Then, I will look at shared knowledges and how this 
impacts on the chronotope. Sophie begins the book as a child living with her 
Tante Atie and Grandmother Ife in Croix-des-Rosets in Haiti. Her mother has 
left for New York to escape her trauma. Sophie eventually leaves the security 
of Haiti to live with her mother in New York and encounters her mother 
experiencing nightmares. She grows up, slightly alienated from those around 
her and suffers the symptoms of bulimia. Sophie meets her husband Joseph 
when he is their neighbour, and when her mother learns of this, she tests 
Sophie’s virginity. This causes Sophie to run away with Joseph, and they have 
a daughter. Because of her alienation, Sophie runs away from Joseph to Haiti 
where she becomes reconciled with her mother. On her return to New York, 
she has the above conversation with her mother.
In a Foucauldian sense, which marries the past with the philosophical, 
shared knowledge is made clear by public acts of disclosure in the marketplace, 
workplace or around a dining room table, for example, and is bound to the 
history and naming of madness due to the public perception of renunciation.
For example, a heretic could only be considered one once she or he had made 
their heresy public knowledge. As a moment of history, and in the context of 
the Caribbean, this idea of shared knowledge takes on a modernist sensibility, 
as the legitimacy of history, I believe, has not been undermined for the sake of 
postmodernism (Gikandi1992: 8). Kathleen Renk notes in Caribbean Shadows 
and Victorian Ghosts, that in the English speaking Antilles “Victorian institutions
and discourses shaped colonial subjectivities” (1999: 2). Therefore, Caribbean
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mental institutions would have implemented the psychiatric knowledge formed 
in parallel Victorian establishments of the time; the Barbados mental hospital in 
St. Michael was founded in 1893 (Fisher 1985: 63) and practiced psychiatry 
according to the doctrines set out in Europe. The discourse would have been of 
punishment with care as the shackles had long come off in Pinel’s name, as 
advocated in his Parisian asylums of the 1800s (1988: 242), a move which 
hugely influenced asylum doctrine throughout the West and the colonies, yet 
the need to exclude, expunge and debilitate the mad, as Lawrence Fisher notes 
in his description of Barbadian madness (Fisher 1985: 244-5), appeared to be 
maintained. The then political knowledge, though exhorting exclusion from the 
community, would have its social referents in that community so that what 
Foucault terms the “political conditions” that form the “domains of knowledge” 
(Faubion 2001: 15) are in fact subject to social and communal reification 
through story-telling, gossip and anecdotal evidence -  what Jurgen Habermas 
calls “alternative knowledge” (Kelly 1994: 92). Therefore, the community would 
be the point at which political or governmental knowledge becomes 
reconstituted. This reconstitution might take the form of social parody, as in the 
form of a comic interlude such as carnival or mere comic utterance, and can 
manifest itself as the community’s answer to political control. The alternative 
knowledge, as practised by the community, would then have the ability to re­
invent itself in the way that political agency cannot -  through public effort. 
Foucault’s concept of power is one that takes into consideration the hierarchical 
structure of knowledge, so that there are winners and also-rans in the race for 
an idealised truth. Habermas notes that if one takes Foucault’s theory of 
knowledge to its logical conclusion in terms of ideological people power, one 
would need at least to think of the relevance of counterpower “... that grants
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cognitive privilege on the basis of a philosophy of history” (Kelly 1994: 93). This 
counterpower, that suggests some community activity based on power 
dynamics, is also subject to subjugation in Foucauldian terms as it only has 
relevance on the basis of the political and hegemonic powers-that-be as they 
set the parameters within which the political knowledge is based. Therefore, 
this shared subjugated knowledge in Caribbean literature, peripheral to 
scientific discourse and of the people, acts as the subjected, invalid, illegitimate 
discourse of a community that, by Habermas’ summation, has the ability to form 
its own cognitive discourse. This has particular relevance to questions of 
legitimacy of language and its relation to reality that is “alternate”.
Shared knowledge in this context, that which is alternate and has its own
discourse, plays a pivotal role in the Black community in shaping and measuring
madness, and is opposed to the historical white Creole solitude most potently
illustrated in the character of Antoinette Cosway in Jean Rhys’ The Wide
Sargasso Sea (1966) -  a re-reading of Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre (1847).
The community, or what Edward Braithwaite sentimentally calls “the folk” of
Caribbean culture (Donnell 1996: 275), acts as a focal point for change,
whether through positive or destructive behaviour, and regeneration is depicted
as a shared responsibility, something articulated to more than one person to the
overall benefit of the “mad”. Such an instance occurs in “You Think I Mad,
Miss?”, a short story by Jamaican writer Olive Senior:-
“But is that Elfraida Campbell, that’s who. The one that did 
say me did grudge her Jimmy Watson. Then you nuh 
remember her? Is she and her mother burn bad candle 
for me mek me buck mi foot and fall... Say the light 
changing? You gone? God bless you, my precious 
daughter.” (Senior 1995: 77)
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The mad, begging protagonist tells part of her tale to a different passing 
driver; each telling is a structured part of a narrative but to the drivers each 
telling is disjunctive and unreliable. The protagonist has her own sense of 
reality re-enforced by the telling if not by any reciprocal conversation. In this 
instance, shared knowledges are shown to act as moments of disclosure that 
facilitate repetition or dialogic reasoning to the point of forming a reality.
Aspects of mental disorder are articulated and repeated so that they remain real 
to the interlocutor, whether the other shares this reality or not. Looking at the 
novel Breath, Eyes, Memory and considering the way in which public 
knowledge of Martine’s illness is obliterated by the family’s silence and her own 
obduracy, one is challenged to find an instance of community bearing on what 
is a personal act of rebellion. In Martine’s case, her trauma is engaged in a 
tussle with notions of nation, identity and belonging. She is raped while a young 
girl by someone who she suspects is a Tonton Macoute and consequently 
conceives Sophie, her only daughter. She leaves Haiti for America having 
struggled to keep her sanity in the land of her debasement. She does not 
accept hospitalisation as an option, nor does she seek any other medical 
assistance for her illness -  this is why the shared knowledges are communally 
based rather than solely a matter of a power relation between state and 
individual, which would be the case once taking part in institutionalised care.
Her daughter, the narrator, hears of her mother’s past through stories told by 
her aunt and grandmother and comes to realise the impact this has had on her 
mother’s sense of reality.
I believe that you can trace the misapprehensions throughout the novel 
through looking at the silence engendered by the family and the surreptitious
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revelations exposed to Sophie as a child. What little shared knowledge there is 
appears to stay amongst the family as there is little discussion of a community 
in Croix-des-Rosets. Therefore, the communal shared knowledges that mark 
the power relationship in the Caribbean, through the comic to the Calypsonian, 
for example, are silenced here and we are left with an isolated case of rape in a 
solitary family dealing with divisive issues. How does this relate to the mad 
chronotope? The shared knowledge of the public utterance is of great 
importance to the mad chronotope and it is only through illustrating its use in 
Olive Senior’s short story that one can compare it with what happens in Breath, 
Eyes, Memory. The conversation Martine has with Sophie is the only example 
of a public utterance of her illness (apart from when she had nightmares) and as 
such is a temporal sign of the ellipsis in the rest of the text. The conversation 
occurs after Sophie and her husband Joseph go to visit Martine and her partner 
Marc. Spatially, there is a cosy, warm feeling to their setting as Sophie 
describes the smells of the house and there is a sense that they are confined to 
this space during their stay. The temporal ellipsis is broken at this point as 
mother and daughter begin to reform their relationship and comes to a close 
once they have their telephone conversation after Sophie arrives back home 
from her visit. As time moves through the modern novel in both a linear and 
cyclical fashion, the mad character in Breath, Eyes, Memory is marked by the 
cyclical movements made in time; Martine is ill, recovers for a while, then is ill 
again in a circular motion that suggests the impact on a life that the past may 
have and the temporal sense of renewal in keeping with many African 
Caribbean mad characters.
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Nation and Societal Dysfunction as Familial Disorder
Monika Kaup notes that while it is common in Western literature to define 
the mad as isolated, it is equally usual to come across the Black mad 
protagonist in a communal context and one that necessitates reflection on the 
community from which the protagonist evolved: “Their madness is indicative of 
the larger-than-personal crisis of their communities, local history, culture, and 
aspirations for the future.” (Kaup 1993: 210).
This reflection, “a mirror of the disease” (210) is important in the 
realisation of the dysfunction in the country at large, within the family and in the 
individual. In reading Breath, Eyes, Memory, one is surprised by how these 
aspects of nurture and rupture inherent in relationships are clearly points at 
which dysfunction external to their relationships are visited; that is, the 
underlying disorder in the country and within the wider family relationships, 
become apparent also. Tante Atie displays aspects of depression that 
accentuate this. “I don’t even need to talk about Atie. She is carrying on 
like she has got a pound of rocks on her chest. Sadness is now her way of life.” 
(1995: 142).
The disorder is made clear when Grandmother Ife in Haiti relates the death of 
Dessalines onto a tape recorder for Sophie’s mother, Martine, to listen to in 
New York. Tante Atie’s condition is relayed as yet another sufferance that 
illuminates the disruptive nature of aspects of nurture. The relevance of 
nurture and rupture also suggests that the mirroring function, so relevant to 
mother/daughter relationships, is a complex figuration that does not merely rely 
on the specular as authentic, in the sense that the mirror image appears real, as
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this idea has direct implications for Sophie and Martine’s relationship; the 
mirroring function has aspects of disassociation interwoven within its premise 
that permits a disrupted focus. This post-structuralist idea of the specular 
image and its flawed authenticity is linked to the belief that disassociations have 
disruptive foci and are unbalanced elements. Bhabha, a post-structuralist 
thinker, has had similar thoughts on the partial presence of the reflected double 
and the inherent rupture (1994: 85) that reasserts the notion of a break but 
considers it intrinsic to a specular site, placing ideas on nation building and 
dysfunction, these “larger-than-personal crises”, within the figurative language 
of the text. The narrative expression, in the form of metaphors, and its textual 
depiction, in the portrayal of mother/daughter relationships that are unsound, 
provide intertextual moments that suggest the disassociative and multiplicity of 
dialogic reasoning. This disassociative nature takes on aspects of the 
misapprehensions within the mad chronotope and feeds on the lack of 
coherence within an individual, between individuals, between communities 
within a nation. Kaup’s summation on Black madness suggests a dialogic 
response; by this I refer to Bakhtin and P. N. Medvedev’s conclusion that inner 
genres are a function of the human consciousness as it articulates aspects of 
inner speech and utterances within a given ideological environment.
Literature occupies an important place in this ideological 
environment. As the plastic arts give width and depth to the 
visual realm and teach our eye to see, the genres of literature 
enrich our inner speech with new devices for the awareness 
and conceptualisation of reality. (Pearce 1994: 179)
Pearce argues that Bakhtin and Medvedev refer to the ideological 
environment as consciousness and what surrounds social human beings at 
every level. It is suggested that we are subject to our own consciousness, so
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that consciousness is evolved from multiple signs and objects external to our 
selves, such as sounds and writing, religion, the arts and the sciences, and it is 
these elements in their totality that make up the ideological environment. It is 
equally clear that human beings are conscious of that ideological environment 
through language, as it is the word that defines our sense of reality.
Such utterances are complexes that provide ways of seeing and 
conceptualising reality (Pearce 1994: 178). And while it is the culture of the folk 
that defines the inner genres of the time, it is also possible to state that the 
metaphors for dysfunction are emblematic of shared knowledges within that 
culture.
Danticat indicates dysfunction and the impact of shared knowledges with 
the murder of Dessalines: ’’Dessalines has died. Macoutes kill him. Do you 
remember him? He was the coal man.” (Danticat 1998: 141). Grandmother Ife 
tells Martine via cassette what has happened to Dessalines and the talk of such 
an event shakes Sophie. She is staying with her grandmother and Tante Atie 
having run away with her baby from her husband in America. The event 
presents an opportunity for Sophie to recall, firstly, the rape of her mother, that 
left Martine “half insane”, (139) and, secondly, the gulf between herself and her 
mother: “My mother does not concern herself with where I am.” (141)
The disaffection present in the country acts as a backdrop to the familial 
disorder suggested, and works intertextually as political irony. Intertextuality is 
articulated through the symbiosis of ideas, genres and styles from a variety of 
literary sources into one text and is in itself an act of textual regeneration. The
29
fact that Dessalines has the same name as one of the leaders of the San 
Domingo slave revolt of the Iate1800s that initiated the first Black republic in the 
Caribbean, suggests a historical reading of the dysfunction that places violent 
political agency and unrest within a postmodernist discourse with the 
reconstitutive power of the subject (Pearce 1994: 9). This is mitigated by the 
fact that there is a suggested sense of insurgency after Dessalines’ death, and 
Grandmother Ife doesn’t let Sophie go out of the house with her daughter until 
he is buried. The elder character intimates that Dessalines is a “restless spirit” 
(138) after his violent death at the hands of the quasi militia and his death, and 
its insurgent powers, mark the point of a more personal tragedy. The focus 
then moves on to Tante Atie’s dissatisfaction, who states “Maybe a good death 
would save me from all this,” which suggests that Dessalines’ death is not 
merely a political construction on a metaphoric level, but also a deeply personal, 
articulated act that has an impact within the familial context; Tante Atie,
Sophie’s aunt, is moved to mention her own disillusionment with life, and in 
terming it a “good” death, goes further to suggest that Dessalines’ murder was 
beyond destruction and had recuperative qualities for the community, despite 
her mother’s reservations. The mad chronotope, at this stage, is disrupted by 
Tante Atie’s depression and takes on board the wide open spaces of Haiti as a 
spatial setting whilst demonstrating a linear time span to the character’s 
disillusionment. Her perpetual depression does little to reinvent itself, and so 
works on a linear timescale that suggests a beginning, middle and an end to her 
disillusionment if not a full blown cycle. This linear movement in Tante Atie’s life 
is mirrored by the state of the nation; as men are killed, time marches 
inexorably on, never repeating itself fully, but pushing forward towards an 
ultimate conclusion. Not solely linear, there is a cyclical element to this that
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allows for the death in the community to become a site for renewal and 
reaffirmation by communal effort.
“I usually ate random concoctions: frozen dinners, samples 
from global cookbooks, food that was easy to put together 
and brought me no pain. No memories of a past that at 
times was cherished and at others despised.” -  Sophie 
(Danticat 1994: 151)
“I am not having the short breath anymore, but every so 
often, I do find myself dreaming the bad dreams. I thought 
it would end, but lately it seems to be beginning all over 
again.” -  Martine (135)
Tante Atie’s feet pounded the porch a few minutes later. 
“Would you read me something?” asked my grand­
mother.
“I am empty, old woman,” she said. “As empty as a dry 
calabash.” -  Tante Atie (126)
The above quotations relate to moments of transition for each of the 
three characters. Sophie has run away from her husband in America and is 
vague about her own future, Martine is suffering with hallucinations after a 
remission period, and Tante Atie suffers a lump on her calf. Different aspects of 
their lives that determine their outlook on society and familial ties disturb 
Martine, Sophie and Tante Atie. While Martine and Tante Atie see their 
absolution in death, Sophie’s bulimic tendencies suggest a similar, unarticulated 
reference. Even though the character does not state this absolution in death it 
is clear that she is a highly distressed individual with residual neurotic 
tendencies; but Sophie’s search for help outside the family is indicative of a 
disassociation from the family tradition. Danticat, writing within a Caribbean and 
African American literary tradition which, although an African Diasporic 
perspective, have points of departure from each other such as those discussed 
at the beginning of this chapter, reassembles notions of fracture so that they are 
posed at different levels of discourse. Therefore, Tante Atie’s dysfunction is
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placed at a median, between what is life-threatening and what is bearable for 
the character. Her life is a series of repetitive days spent doing housework or 
with her friend Louise that are peppered by moments of self-absorption and 
contemplation. Martine’s behaviour, which eventually becomes erratic and 
delusional, offers itself as a sharp contrast to her sister’s repulsion; her loud 
nightmares and insomnia that eventually lead to auditory hallucinations and 
acute paranoia, place her at a point of self-absorption that mediates between 
material reality and ulterior reality. Sophie, the catalyst for change, is seen as 
an inheritor of this disaffection with there being a suggestion that she is a 
product of her own environment as well as hereditary deviance. This offers a 
multi-layered site for the exploration of disassociations in which the idea of 
mental dysfunction is rendered symbolic and metaphorical. An example of the 
symbolic and metaphorical in the text would be the use of mental illness as a 
measure of disassociations for each of the three characters in the three 
quotations highlighted; their roles become symbolic of breakdown at a profound 
level and of the metaphorical nature of that premise -  that mental illness 
equates to dysfunction in a number of areas at a number of levels. At this level, 
the literary discourse around the issue of madness forms its own pattern of links 
and ruptures, finally settling on a dual resolution in destruction, in the violent 
suicide of Martine, and absolution through Sophie’s re-visit to the cane fields of 
her conception after her mother’s death.
As has been discussed earlier in the chapter, there is a connection in 
Breath, Eyes, Memory between nation and familial disaffection, particularly as 
seen through the characters of Tante Atie and Martine, which in turn is 
suggestive of a discussion on nation building because of that connection. Homi
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Bhabha implies that such a “production” of disassociations discussed above can 
be derived from an “articulation of cultural differences and identifications” 
(Bhabha 1990: 292) in nation building that is much more complex than binary or 
hierarchical structures. Therefore, aspects of family, politics, gender, race and 
class that may be diffused within the situation depicted are epitomised by their 
discontinuities and uncertainties within the polyphonic process. Bhabha’s 
reflections on cultural differences prove to be instructional as they impress the 
idea of difference being coterminous with identity which suggests that notions of 
hybridity have their intertextual referent in more than an idea of culture as an 
extraneous concept, but in possible mediation between ideological 
environments at a subliminal level. He makes his point by attacking the binary 
concepts of social antagonisms whilst extolling the virtues of hybridity in relation 
to difference -  in race, class and gender -  which supports the idea that we 
interact at a level that takes hybridity as its social referent and, in turn, relate 
this to each other in a manner that suggests the similarities and differences in 
our outlook. Whilst Bhabha does not discuss the ideological environment, he 
implies that there is a point at which difference becomes a measure of our 
identity and it is at this point in Bakhtin’s concept of the ideological environment 
that this identity becomes expressed. As Bakhtin contends that ideology itself 
“... stands for something lying outside itself (Gardiner 1992: 13) and so accepts 
difference as a point of clarity within the concept of self, identity appears to be 
Bhabha’s postcolonial reading of difference within. Thus, difference and identity 
appear to coincide yet do not use the same language as applied by the two 
theorists. At this point, the theorists meet the text at a metaphorical level as the 
polyphonic process appears at the level of production and intertextually as 
representative of diversity. This diversity equates itself with ideas of nationhood
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and its multiple meanings and, for Bhabha, results in transgression, a casualty 
of the diversification process as it suggests a moving away from rather than a 
commitment to what had gone before.
Therefore, identity and nation are discrete subjects which become 
intertwined by the concept of hybridity and, with direct relevance to the text, the 
shared knowledges of the characters. The ideological environment is the point 
at which such knowledges are constructed to form the basis of a social and 
cultural definition identified by a particular concept in Bakhtinian theory that 
becomes relevant to the structure.
It is equally possible to see nation as narration, in Bhabha’s words,
nation as a form that has its foundation in the irrepressibility of myth yet is
confounded by irrefutable decompositions during its life span. It would be
feasible to see the nation of Haiti as the narration metaphor in the context of the
novel, and to suggest that Martine’s madness is a motif of national
disassociations as such links were discussed previously in this chapter. This
could be translated as a country at odds with itself, and its people questioning
their familial context within that structure. Identity and difference fuse to
become articulations of the self in this metaphoric context and form a framework
within which the mad chronotope, with its particularly useful positioning within a
textual reading, can be engaged.
Somehow Dessalines’ death brought to mind all those frightening 
memories. My grandmother would not let me take Brigitte outside 
until Dessalines was laid to rest in the ground. (Danticat 1995: 140)
... the name chronotope (literally, “time space”) [is given] to the intrinsic 
connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that 
are artistically expressed in literature... we are borrowing it for 
literary criticism almost as a metaphor. (Holquist 1981: 84)
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This diffusion of the mad chronotopic moment is suggestive of key motifs 
in the text. The chronotope, with its insistence on relative physical and 
geographical space marked by historical time, applies itself to localised fear and 
psychological loss in a number of ways. The geographical space of the novel is 
not broad, taking place in New York and Croix-des-Rosets in Haiti. The writer 
describes the people and places in each location, finding the environment in 
Croix-des-Rosets alternately prosaic or nurturing and New York a hub of 
hybridity. The “hero” moves from the beginning to the end of the novel within a 
psychological chronotope in which she grows from innocence to awareness, 
from an accepted reality to a disaffected vision. As the chronotope is defined by 
time, space, plot and history, so death acts as a referent within this framework 
in the hero’s life as well as other protagonists. While the death of Dessalines 
acts as a catalyst for remembering the past, including her mother’s rape, Sophie 
is but part of the communal dread that takes place. The individual 
consciousness is roused by the political nature of his death and what is a 
national dilemma becomes a localised, specific anguish that is named by 
communal cautiousness. Time “takes on flesh” (84) and thickens to the point 
that it fuses with plot and history. Death, and its chronotopic framework, moves 
stealthily through the plot, taking form in the presence of character 
disassociations and dysfunctions as well as the discourse of the nation: “(My 
mother) tried to kill herself several times when I was a baby. The nightmares 
were just too real.... Somehow Dessalines’s death brought to mind all those 
frightening memories.” (1995: 139-140). The loss to Sophie of her mother as a 
confidante is a subtext that acts as an underlying critical motif. Loss, both 
familial and psychological, is re-generational in that it allows re-memory the
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outlet it requires and acts as a point of reassessment -  with re-memory used 
here in its African American literary context of trauma re-lived and reconstituted. 
The loss is crucial in that it undermines then refocuses a family connection that 
is distinctly traumatic and, as such, re-works the pattern of trauma to resolutely 
rest with Sophie, the daughter.
Ideas on difference/identity, nation/narration, hybridity/ideological 
environment and the chronotope appear as narrated motifs in the text. Such 
aspects exist as relational moments in my own work whereby the narrative 
takes on these ideas and narrativises the state of the ordinary within them. This 
narrativisation is clearly a point at which the text makes claim to what Maureen 
Whitebrook calls “interconnections” between narrative identity and the politics of 
the narrative (2001: 3). In this instance, I would like to add memory to any 
discussion on politics as it is at this point in the text that the narrative makes the 
interconnections Whitebrook speaks about, as well as at a political level. The 
politics of the narrative takes into consideration the politics of the self and acts 
of memory that relate to Whitebrook’s intimations on “memory and 
remembrance” which, she states are "... key elements in studies of identity” 
(2001: 105). Martine’s re-memory of her rape is a point of interconnection that 
maps her adult identity, implies the state of the nation and suggests her 
difference from her family, particularly the experiences of her sister, Tante Atie. 
Martine’s re-memory, which suggests a repetitive action as opposed to the 
singular, fleeting notion of memory, is a distinctly political gesture, narrated as 
self-absorption. Her re-memory is political in the sense that it marks the point in 
history at which a country was at odds with itself through a very human 
narrative yet manages to exemplify a woman’s sense of self under such
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circumstances. Memory, in its singular capacity, occurs to Sophie as she hears 
of Dessalines’ murder and remembers being told of her mother’s attempted 
suicides when Sophie was a baby. Juxtaposed with her mother’s persistent 
retelling of events in her own mind and the dissatisfaction of telling -  the 
thoughts merely repeat themselves over and over again -  the narrative reduces 
motifs into their interconnected formations, as answerable in the ideological 
environments of the individuals. The politics of the self, in Martine’s instance, is 
subsumed into the politics of the outside world as she relates to that politics in a 
certain way -  through disaffection, confusion and obfuscation. The act of 
rememory is not merely an act of repetition, but, as critics note, signifies the 
belatedness of memory as well as the individual and collective nature of 
memory. Narration in this instance is interconnected to certain motifs in the 
text, and in particular the confusion and obfuscation of acts of forgetting. As is 
clear in a critical reading of my own work also, rememory relates significantly to 
forgetting as it is after this initial attempt to confuse the self into forgetting actual 
events that the rememory of truth realises itself. For Martine, rememory occurs 
after years of careful forgetting and, as Toni Morrison found when researching 
her novel Beloved, opens up ideas around nurturance and murder (King 2000: 
161).
The mad chronotope, in this context, is open to revision as its position on 
memory has not been made clear up to this point. The memory’s ability to 
reinvent itself through recapitulation and reiteration should clearly be a part of 
the mad chronotope, as it is this function that imbeds the notion of the belated 
being revisited in the mind. My own reading of this is that, as in Martine’s case, 
years of disassembling thoughts in the mind can lead to an unwelcome return to
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them that can prove lethal. The dangerous nature of the mind at this point is 
part of the mad chronotope’s components that make up its figurative whole.
Thus Martine’s rape is signified as an experience refracted through a 
chronotopic motif that typifies the violence in Haiti, and signifies the Dessalines 
episode as re-constituted antagonisms. Sophie’s estrangement from her 
mother is re-visioned in Dessalines’ demise as descriptive of societal 
breakdown; if the description of Dessalines’ murder is anecdotal, Sophie’s 
detachment provides the premise on which its depiction rests. This reflection 
from community, or nation, to individual operates as the cleaving of what is 
normative within a national context to what is derivative. What are intertextually 
complicit here are the political antagonisms that inform the text both temporally 
and spatially; time is measured chronologically, yet there are areas of diffusion 
in the text and the two locations act alternately as places of stark innocence and 
chaotic, coercive despondency.
Martine leaves the young Sophie in Haiti after the rape with her Tante 
Atie and grandmother Ife. Sophie learns to rely on the two women as the only 
visible signs of family but becomes used to the audiotaped messages sent for 
them by her mother. When her mother eventually sends for Sophie, she leaves 
behind a world in which she had been safe and secure in the knowledge that 
they, Tante Atie and grandmother Ife, would not disappear. She moves to New 
York and lives with Martine whose trauma revisits her at night; Sophie learns to 
soothe her mother during these times and takes it upon herself to be her 
mother’s guardian. In this way, the young Sophie witnesses trauma and the 
cumulative disruption that ensues and the reversal of roles problematises the
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nurturance she receives from her mother as she becomes the nurturer too. 
Sophie develops her own disorder, bulimia, as she grows older, having become 
puzzled and confused by her mother’s illness. Her feelings of self-hatred and 
betrayal on the part of her mother become acute and she in turn becomes more 
introspective. That Sophie ate processed foods that would not provide a link to 
her past with her mother (1994: 151) is indicative of her relationship with food 
and the relevance of her mother to this relationship. The bulimia is part of yet 
another act of forgetting that forces itself back into rememory two years after 
Sophie leaves her mother’s house and they meet again on the island of Haiti. 
Sophie’s hurt begins in childhood memory, however, and it is here that fear, 
loss and, importantly, encounter act as suggestive tropes to the notions of 
nation and belonging at the heart of her identity and trauma. The two 
quotations below go some way to describe nation and identity in relation to 
Sophie:
The streets along Flatbush Avenue reminded me of home.
My mother took me to Haiti Express, so I could see the 
place where she sent our money orders and cassettes from.
(Danticat 1995: 50)
The nation fills the void left in the uprooting of communities 
and kin, and turns that loss into the language of metaphor.
Metaphor, as the etymology of the word suggests, transfers 
the meaning of home and belonging, across...cultural 
difference, that span the imagined community of nation- 
people. (Bhabha 1990: 291)
As mentioned previously, nation and its myth-making discontinuities 
are articulated in the text through polyphonic reasonings: for instance, the 
nation is seen as dysfunctional on a number of levels, through its political 
machinations and as a contested structure for familial unity. These elements 
are layered in the text as supplementary factors that denote functionality and
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disruption. The idea of nation’s articulation itself is a heteroglossic one, with its
premise consolidated by the concept of belonging. Official and unofficial
languages are derivative of nation states’ arbitrary focus on those that belong
and those that are in exile and are useful barometers of shifting patterns of
migration. Bhabha makes reference to the fact that these individual and
collective voices need to give their experiences “narrative authority” (293). This
is denoted in a specific way in the text. Belonging is referred to as significantly
social and national, and the language that Sophie inherits as one of contrition; it
becomes clear that Sophie is determined to take on her new surroundings with
the same strength of character shown by her mother and her aunt in their own
difficult circumstances. The character is undermined by tales of bullying and
prejudice by native African Americans when in contact with Haitians in New
York. It is the threat of the supposed encounter with hostility while at school
that helps to misappropriate her intentions and consolidates a fear felt for her
mother and her nightmares, and for herself. This is made clear in the text by
Sophie’s fear of her fellow students at school:
My mother said it was important that I learn English
quickly. Otherwise, the American students would
make fun of me or, even worse, beat me. (Danticat 1995: 51)
Without mentioning race, the scapegoating of migrant Haitians in New 
York is described as a metaphor for nation and its dysfunctional qualities. 
Sophie’s contrition is an act of survival that bears relevance to the autonomy of 
the official language and her reliance on it. There are subjective reasonings 
that form the basis of conceptual feelings of belonging to a nation (Westwood 
2000: 11); Sophie’s rupture is a loss that is contrived as a moment of nation 
building. Her self-identity is fashioned by the need to belong, peripherally, 
rather than a need to adapt. The streets that remind her of home are a
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reflection of her ability for social congruence in the face of adversity and it is the
migrant community of Haitians who support any sense of belonging in the way
that Bhabha means it. This communal belonging is suggested in the text, but
more strident than this is the level of communication between mother and
daughter and how the narrator, Sophie, perceives this communication. This is
made clearer if one looks briefly at intersubjective time.
“I don’t sleep very much at night,” she said. “Otherwise this 
would be very hard work to do.”
I felt sorry for her. She looked very sad. Her face was cloudy 
with fatigue even though she kept reapplying the cream she 
had bought to lighten her skin. (Danticat 1994: 58)
Fabian’s argument relies on a bid for ‘Intersubjective Time’ 
in anthropology, which refuses any absolute distinction between 
the temporalities of one culture and another, and relies instead 
on the dynamics of human interaction and communication.
(Kanneh 1998: 9)
Johannes Fabian’s ‘Intersubjective Time’ (1983) in anthropology 
suggests that time, in a given situation, is peopled by interaction in which 
coevalness must be created. This reading is useful at this point as it introduces 
the notion of temporal subjectivities as acts of communication rather than 
cultural anomalies. Fabian’s insistence on a shared time does not take into 
consideration multiple evolutions and otherness, except when coupled with 
language and communication, thus providing a relatively monolithic view of 
shared human experience. Kadiatu Kanneh invokes aspects of confrontation 
to describe the friction and ambiguity between cultures rather than suggest 
coevalness around the subject. This is relevant to acts of communication in the 
novel as Sophie observes her mother’s degeneration and maintains a third 
voice, a telling not through contrition or innocence, but a mounting critical 
subjectivity. As Bhabha notes, this is not merely descriptive of oppositional 
contentions, but:
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The very possibility of cultural contestation, the ability to 
shift the ground of knowledges, or to engage in the ‘war of 
position’, marks the establishment of new forms of meaning 
and strategies of identification. (Bhabha 1994: 162)
Bhabha’s suggestion that subjective knowledges are moveable and re­
interpretable finds credence in the migrant experience as it marks the distance 
between identity and knowledge. The broader contentions and antagonisms 
that manifest themselves as dominant and other respectively lead to a change 
in purpose and identity. This change, or re-generation, is one of the major 
cultural properties within which aspects of dysfunction are shown to be 
paradoxically subversive. Sophie’s change occurs as a re-alignment of identity 
and purpose; she feels sorry for her mother as she continues to suffer 
nightmares and insomnia and is moved to mention Martine’s pallor under the 
skin lightening cream she uses. Sophie’s identity is in a state of flux; the 
relativity of home and belonging is a transferable phenomenon, she believes, 
that has engaged her mother to the point that she needs to lighten her skin. 
Without condemning Martine, she experiences the shift in position as an act of 
physical disfigurement. This engenders the use of the third voice to articulate 
notions of loss and encounter; the former is articulated in the form of 
condescension, the latter expressed by altered images -  Sophie encounters her 
mother in much the same way as one would encounter a stranger, with a 
critical, subjective eye. This marks a turning point in Sophie’s development 
from childhood innocence to a growing awareness of adult concerns. With this 
awareness comes a relationship with trauma and the realisation that others’ 
reality differs from hers and she must re-phrase it.
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Reality and Trauma
Later that night, I heard that same voice screaming as 
though someone was trying to kill her. I rushed over, but 
my mother was alone thrashing against the sheets. I shook 
her and finally woke her up. When she saw me, she quickly 
covered her face with her hands and turned away. (Danticat 1995: 48)
The above quotation relates to Cathy Caruth’s suggestion in Trauma: 
Explorations in Memory (1995: 4) that post-traumatic stress disorder, to use the 
contested psychiatric term for Martine’s dysfunction, relates to the character’s 
possession of images of an event rather than simply reality distorted and 
disrupted, or reality ignored in an act of forgetting, or as a suppression of a past 
wish. What occurs is the actual event revisited, not as a reconstituted 
suggestion. Caruth calls the disorder a “symptom of history” (5) and as history 
is constructed with immutable ties to the question of truth and notions of reality, 
what becomes problematic is the relevance of the listener and the traumatised; 
can the listener believe everything said by the traumatised and can the 
traumatised differentiate between what is hallucinatory and reality? This is 
clearly important to Sophie’s understanding of her mother’s trauma and, as 
such, relates to the level of communication between the two characters, as 
discussed in relation to intersubjective time. This also informs the mad 
chronotope as it makes no attempt to make sense of what is happening, but 
instead relates the state of play through its own insistence on misapprehensions 
and dissassociative states.
Part of this discussion relates to Martine’s relationship with her 
appearance. Paul Gilroy posits the notion that history as experienced by black 
people is informed by “an absolute break” in “immutable ethnic differences”
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(Gilroy 1993: 2), thus suggesting that there is an anomaly between the 
experiential notion of history and its cultural bias. This creates a heteroglossic 
notion of the language of history and identity; what is considered the official 
version of history becomes bifurcated by unofficial discourse. Martine’s 
disaffection is marked not only by an event in the past but is challenged by the 
cultural connotations of Western dominance in her adopted home and how 
these aspects relate to her thoughts about herself and her appearance.
Therefore, the trauma re-visited by Martine is a real experience that is re­
constituted in dreams and hallucinations and functions as the crisis of truth.
She is locked into an apocryphal tale that is forever narrated through another, 
as she becomes receiver of Sophie’s discourse and a silent interlocutor. 
Textually, Sophie is the narrator of the tale and this could be described, in 
Bakhtinian terms, as double-voiced discourse as it professes to speak through 
character genres with authorial intent -  whereby the character is perceived by 
the author as being someone else -  keeping the character’s singularity intact 
(Morris 1994: 102). However, the first person narrative that keeps Sophie’s 
concerns uppermost for the reader can only be referential to the plight of a 
textually subordinated character. Despite the double-voiced integrity of the 
author, Martine’s dysfunction is ordered as secondary to the thoughtful narrative 
of the daughter and, in this sense, she is provocatively silenced. This is 
provocatively so, as it is Martine’s madness that elevates the text to its symbolic 
and analogous articulation. Historically, Martine’s trauma is the product of an 
event and image unequalled in her psyche. This event, the rape, proves to be 
instructive of the nation’s anarchy, at a symbolic and literal level of 
interpretation, and its dysfunctional consciousness during violent times. Re-
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articulation is the basis of trauma for, as Caruth notes, it is re-visited precisely
because it cannot be known in its immediacy, only in belatedness (Caruth 1996:
4). The history of that trauma "... is not fully perceived as it occurs” (18)
therefore history, and Martine’s evocation of it, can only be uttered through
distance. Sophie bears witness to this trauma through Martine’s voicing of her
experience and is traumatised by this articulation, notably in her inability to eat
successfully. Thus, Martine’s discourse acutely affects Sophie’s consciousness
to the point of dysfunction and, although Martine is a silent interlocutor
throughout much of the text, she is a central figure as the re-visiting trauma
victim. Martine’s problematic affect on her daughter is not only due to her own
trauma, however. Martine’s insistence on “testing” Sophie’s virginity proves
equally disturbing:
”l hated the tests,” I said. “It is the most horrible thing 
that ever happened to me. When my husband is with 
me now, it gives me such nightmares that I have to bite 
my tongue to do it again.”
“With patience, it goes away”.
“No Grandme Ife, it does not.” (Danticat 1994: 156)
When Sophie is eighteen and becomes involved with Joseph, a musician 
who lives next door, Martine becomes suspicious and decides to “test” her 
daughter’s virginity on a regular basis. This “test” involves inserting a finger into 
Sophie’s vagina to make sure the hymen is not broken. In this way, Martine 
restores a Haitian ritual of the past within a new cultural setting that has already 
cast its own notions of ritual in Sophie’s mind. This has a traumatic effect on 
Sophie, who uses a pestle to violently burst her hymen then elopes with 
Joseph. Sophie’s reality is ruptured by contradictory messages from her mother 
who humiliates her under the guise of maternal protection and asserts her 
power over her daughter. What has been referred to as the “partition of space”
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(Ardener 1981: 11) -  that is, the codified perimeters in which we create worlds 
and cope with encroaching problems -  is for Sophie the physical world and the 
social reality that corresponds with it interacting violently. The event repeats 
itself in nightmares and when Sophie has a sexual encounter with her husband. 
This interpretation of a past event is an historical reality and, as such, is less a 
symptom of the unconscious than a symptom of history. Sophie views her 
mother’s “test” as an unhealthy intrusion to her physical world but it is perceived 
by others, in particular the grandmother as noted in the above quotation, as a 
cultural more with significant importance to warrant its use. Sophie’s identity as 
her mother’s daughter is, therefore, caught up in the social definitions of 
mother/daughter relationships, which marks Martine’s behaviour as culturally 
ambivalent to her daughter’s trauma. Sophie as witness could be termed, in 
Shoshana Felman’s words, as involuntary (Caruth 1995: 15), as her mother 
imposes the witnessing upon her, but there is a sense that she is chosen by her 
mother for this task and, as such, is able to speak with her mother about the 
rape -  to be a witness of trauma. Sophie’s traumatic “testing” is witnessed by 
all of the women in the family as it had been for generations of girl children in 
Haiti; here the act of repetition originates in the premise of a cultural more and 
becomes pathologically reconstituted as trauma.
Freud refers to a dream scenario to describe trauma repetition in his later 
work: a man’s son dies and is left in another room with an old man to attend to 
his body. The father goes to sleep and, whilst dreaming, hears his son say 
“Father, don’t you see I’m burning?” The man wakes up to find the old man 
asleep and the candle by the boys bed has set light to the bedclothes and the 
body. Freud interprets this as a delaying tactic to avoid waking up to reality. 
Lacan states that the dream represents awakening as a point of trauma. As
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Caruth notes in Lacan’s interpretation of Freud’s traumatic repetition the identity 
of the person having the nightmares is consistently relational to (an)Other 
(Caruth 1996: 99). Thus, when reality is awakened by a call heard only in 
sleep, rather than this being a non-occurrence, it is an alternate reading of 
reality and can rely on (an)Other’s interpretation of events. Therefore, it is 
possible to see Martine’s trauma, and Sophie’s witnessing of it, as reality 
repeated in a shared forum in which alliances are re-phrased; as the man is 
awakened only by a call he could hear in sleep, so Martine is aroused from her 
nightmares by a call she could only hear on waking, placing the young Sophie 
in the considered position as the community bearer in as much as she is 
witness to and communicates to others her mother’s debilitation. In this 
instance, the mad chronotope interprets trauma and its belated faculties as part 
of the disassociative state inherent in its premise. The act of witnessing, like 
shared knowledges, is communally based and acts as a sign of the temporal 
and spatial connection to the outside world of an inner anguish. The mad 
chronotope is able to reflect this and take on board the fact that reality for the 
mad is not often what it seems.
Mother/Daughter Conversations and Dialogic Speech
The “testing” forms the basis of rupture within the mother/daughter 
relationship. As stated earlier, Martine is the receiver of Sophie’s discourse and 
as such, absorbs her daughter’s longings within the narrative as an authoring 
other in Bakhtinian terms (Gardiner 1992: 32). As much as Sophie pleads for 
the mother/daughter absorption to stop, Martine doesn’t have the power to 
effect change. This idea is presented through the distancing of the relationship 
between the two and the subsequent re-uniting. Such events require
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conversations in the narrative concerning appropriation, loss, trauma and 
powerlessness, which form the basis of dialogue between the two women and 
between the narrative persona and the reader, as is indicated in the quotation 
below:
“What if there is something left in me and when 
the child comes out it has that other face?”
“You mean what if it looks like me?”
“No, that is not what I mean.” (Danticat 1995: 217)
Sophie feels that she appropriates the space of the rapist because of her 
similar appearance to him. She confronts her mother with this knowledge, who 
repudiates it and it is within this conversation between mother and daughter that 
the period of rupture begins to heal itself. Here, Danticat suggests that the 
fissure within the mother/daughter relationship during Sophie’s childhood and 
her adult disconnection from her mother is linked to the trauma appropriated by 
both women and forms an indefinite chain of despair. With Sophie epitomised 
as the face of the rapist and Martine the persistent victim, the characters 
provide a framework for inner speech that is dialogically construed as it admits 
an addressee, the reader. Martine’s inner speech can only be guessed at as 
this novel has a consistent first person narrative throughout, but it is possible to 
surmise much from Sophie’s conversations with her mother -  held towards the 
end of Martine’s life -  and by the reception of novelistic techniques which lead 
the reader to read within both a literary context and a social one (Eagleton 
1996:89).
Throughout Bakhtin’s discussions on dialogics run concerns about the 
other and opposing views which maintain a special view of whoever the subject 
may be. The dialogics of the situation suggests the enabling point for reciprocal
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dialogue. This dialogue is not indicative of a two-way construction that is only 
enabled by binary notions of communications, but is created by multivocality 
and conflicting voices; it is possible to see the correlation here between 
dialogics and polyphony as they both have a multivoiced role. Bakhtin’s 
discourse on dialogics suggests that multivocality as a concept can appear in a 
novel’s narrative, and in the case of this novel, it occurs as the language of 
appropriation, loss, trauma and powerlessness. In my own novel, it also 
appears as the underlying language of greed. Free indirect discourse, or, in 
Bakhtinian terms, inner speech, was referred to earlier to suggest the complicity 
between author and reader in relation to the text. The characters’ complicity 
here is apparent, based on the relationship between interlocutors in the 
dialogue. According to Vygotsky, dialogue is enabled by “the commonality of 
the interlocutors’ ‘apperceptive mass’” (Cheyne 1999: 8), meaning the self and 
the other share an ideological environment in terms of art, science and the 
personal; the use of the term unconscious thinking in terms of external reality 
relates to the notion of psychotic episodes appearing as a likeness of reality, 
thus superseding the conscious thought patterns of the individual. This is 
contrary to Bakhtinian thinking which focuses on the "... community of different 
and often conflicting voices that may not be resolved into one comprehensive 
self (8). Therefore, “the ideological environment is constantly in the active 
dialectical process of generation” (Medvedev 1978: 14). This “generation” 
appears in language as dialogue and, in the case of Martine and Sophie, 
oppositional dialectics manifests itself during the conversation held in Haiti 
during their reconciliation. What would be useful, here, would be to compare 
this conversation with those held between the two characters just before 
Martine’s suicide. During the time of the reconciliation, power lies with the
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mother, who has the ability to soothe her daughter by explaining away her part 
in the “testing”. Martine’s role is complex here as she is both the arbiter of the 
situation as she was of the “testing” procedure, yet she has the capacity to 
answer her daughter, Sophie, while, at the same time, build bridges. This she 
does by insisting that mother and daughter stay friends despite what has 
happened between them. In the conversations just before the suicide, Martine’s 
power is lost to the debilitation of mental disorder and disruption. While still 
holding largely coherent conversations with her daughter, what becomes 
apparent is the loss of Martine’s functioning reason. She carries her boyfriend 
Marc’s child but becomes obsessed by the idea that it may have the face of the 
rapist. It is suggested here that although the men in these women’s lives are 
reasonable and ordered, they possess the capacity for harm in a fundamental 
way and that crucially they possess the same autocratic values as the rapist. 
Martine’s obsessive thoughts carry with them the weight of subjugation, tyranny 
and implosion and as such she loses her power to commit to change -  and 
refuses any medical intervention. Presuppositions come from different horizons 
in this instance with Sophie committed to “cure” her mother while Martine gets 
ready to kill the unborn child she believes has been speaking to her:
“I didn’t tell you what I have decided. I am going 
to get it out of me.”
“When did you decide?”
“Last night when I heard it speak to me.” (Danticat 1995: 217)
Here, the interaction between the ideological environments falters 
because of Martine’s condition, and the conversations have an underlying 
monologic life to them, one that possesses instances of Martine’s inner speech 
and unrepresentative articulation. What Bakhtin calls the (O)ther’s dialectical
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relation to consciousness as subject and object (Gardiner 1992: 32) is realised 
here at the point of interaction as Martine relays her fears of trauma revisited to 
her daughter; Martine’s character remains Othered as her consciousness and 
its dialectical relation becomes secondary. The shared knowledges of the 
community -  that is, Sophie and the others who know about the mother’s 
condition -  become the alternative knowledges of the folk which in turn are 
realised as the official language of communication as there is no other 
articulation, such as a medical voice, apart from Martine’s unreliable one to 
presuppose logical interaction. The narrative device that enables Sophie’s 
official language to supersede Martine’s communication places the telling of 
trauma in a difficult position; as Martine becomes the unreliable source of 
recounting, the reader is left with Sophie’s removed account as central. 
Martine’s peripheral position becomes problematic, as her alternative 
knowledge remains subjugated.
The madness is all-consuming as it is conveyed through the character’s 
thinking and organising patterns of experience (Neuringer 1982: xi), thus 
interpreting the world and Martine’s place in it as alien. Her unconscious 
fantasy interrupts her conscious thinking which, through experience and its 
repetitive quality, has not learnt to deal successfully with such disruption. 
Martine’s external reality has become that of her unconscious, internal thinking 
and, as such, appears dysfunctional. Joan Busfield describes mental disorder 
as having:
... a referent that has an ontological reality, and...
that reality is mediated through diverse constructions
or discourses which give it meaning. (Busfield 1996: 60)
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Therefore, bearing in mind the non-essentialist view of reality, the 
ideological environment functions as mediator of experiences channelled 
through the psyche. Martine’s sense of reality is challenged by auditory 
hallucinations that gender the unborn child and imply that she must get rid of it. 
Such hallucinations challenge the dialectic between the two women as both 
take their own sense of reality as a position from which to talk about their 
trauma; in Martine’s instance, Sophie cannot know the level of psychic trauma 
to which the unborn child has brought her mother. Therefore, 
misapprehensions confuse their exchange -  Sophie believes her mother will 
have an abortion, not kill herself and the child. Thus, contradictory messages 
around appropriation, loss, trauma and powerlessness are inextricably linked to 
dialogue in the text and specifically that between mother and daughter. At this 
point, Sophie’s rephrasing of trauma is articulated through these contradictory 
messages and her ideological environment; Martine’s re-memory and Sophie’s 
testing form a wider reading of the narrative that includes such messages as 
well as the idea that Sophie is in the process of re-evaluating her ideas around 
the issue of the testing and re-memory, and coming up with a communal 
alternative as time moves on. Thus, the above is a recounting of the 
characters’ progression through ideas such as the ideological 
environment/shared knowledges, identity/chronotope, re-memory/trauma as 
well as the failure to understand the re-enactment of the past, which is surely a 
rememory the mad chronotope is well versed in.
That the site for reconciliation between the two women is the Caribbean 
as opposed to New York is relevant to the political healing process it was hoped 
the island of Haiti itself would experience and antithetical to the notion of the
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signified Caribbean tempest in Western literature. Cross-cultural socialisation is 
evidently part of the re-visioning of Sophie, the character having experienced 
competing concepts of home. As stated previously, the Caribbean and its 
imagining in Sophie’s mind is prefigured by instances of possible verbal abuse 
by African Americans aimed at the migrant Haitian community. Such instances 
function as indicative of the cultural anomaly the characters face in their new 
home and suggest that the idealisation of the American dream by Martine is 
worthless without cultural integration from closer quarters and psychological re­
generation.
It is the Caribbean as home to which Sophie must return to bury her 
mother and to cry her sorrow into the canefields in which she was conceived 
because it is the Caribbean that holds Sophie’s sense of an uncompromised 
national belonging. It is her therapist that suggests that she return to the field 
and vent her anger at the cane shoots and it is the women in her family that 
facilitate this; suggested here is the re-opening of a traumatic situation for its 
imminent closure -  an act of cleaving and re-generation; the destructive 
ultimately becoming beneficial. In literary theory concerning the Renaissance, 
the act of madness, or folly, is often considered correlative to acts of 
insightfulness. Martine’s act of release falls short of this idealised notion of 
madness that is still prevalent in contemporary literature, as she is the mother 
as mad victim, the social pariah disabled by nation and its permeations. Having 
her language re-phrased by the community around her and competing with the 
shared knowledge about her condition and what she herself feels, Martine’s 
character becomes the articulation of madness itself -  she is its source, its 
action and its manifestation. Her violent suicide places the rendition of
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traumatic mental disorder firmly within the African American tragedy genre, yet 
Sophie’s expected rehabilitation is a Caribbean/ postmodernist African 
American extension of mad discourse and facilitates the notion that this work 
cannot be firmly placed within one particular genre. What is clear is the re­
framing of Caribbean sensibilities within an adopted canon that places the novel 
within its own “hybrid” framework.
‘No More Yellow’ and the Mad Chronotope
The mad chronotope is evident in ‘No More Yellow’, my own novel, at the
outset when the protagonist, Ella, speaks of her imaginary friend, Frankie, and
describes the changes this character is going through, from a beneficent friend
to an encroaching ogre,
Frankie was my imaginary friend (I hate to 
even think about it now) that I thought through 
at nights. When I say that she was my friend I 
use the term loosely as she had started to become 
a bitch to me that summer, asking things of me that 
even I balked at. (1)
This turning point, from goodness to danger, is crucial to a reading of the 
mad chronotope that allows for the disruptive in life to form part of an 
individual’s reality. The misapprehensions at the core of Breath, Eyes, Memory 
are part of the make up of ‘No More Yellow’, as the protagonist tries to come to 
terms with an unpleasant realisation about her grandfather -  he is in fact her 
father -  and attempts to reconcile this in her own mind without the assistance of 
those around her until she is older.
Temporally, the novel takes several instances in the protagonist’s life and 
makes them count as moments of clarity; the summer of 1981, her seventeenth
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birthday, the birth and growing up of her son, and being left alone. The summer 
takes up part one of the novel and as such is a cyclical recount of a season that 
has a profound effect on Ella. What makes up part two of the novel is as if in 
answer to part one: what indeed was the inevitable outcome of a past riddled 
with inconsistencies and disaffection. At a spatial level, the novel stays within 
the confines of the homes of the protagonist during that summer and other 
familiar places to the protagonist -  the park, Grace’s flat, Mrs Major’s home, Mr 
Oguntoye’s shop -  that suggest a community of sorts and one that Ella readily 
admits to but cannot fathom its relevance.
In ‘No More Yellow’, the other major concerns in this chapter, such as
shared knowledges, reality, nation, family relationships and identity are also
metaphorical exchanges that occur within the text but at different levels. For
instance, the shared knowledges around mental illness and Ella, the
protagonist, are virtually non-existent as the main link to the community, her
mother Millicent, leaves her for a summer with her Grandma Lillian, who
eventually leaves her, and there is silence around the issue rather than the
shared articulations of Sophie and Martine.
“Why did we have to move here? Right next 
to Grandma. She doesn’t even like me. And 
he hates me.”
“Oh hush yuh noise. I ‘in see him kissing my 
tail either, but he still my father. Just stay out 
a his way and he’ll stay out of yours.” (11)
The fact that these shared knowledges in Danticat’s work act as a bridge 
between mother and daughter is accentuated in my own work by its absence. 
Silencing in a wider context is crucial here, as it is clear that some bond is 
maintained via cassette between mother and daughter while Martine makes a 
life for herself in New York, yet during her short trip to Barbados, Millicent
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makes no attempt to contact her daughter, Ella, moving the protagonist to 
remark “She does not even know who I am”. In Breath, Eyes, Memory the 
anecdotal is the only source of information gathering as there is no official voice 
or medical understanding of Martine’s condition. In ‘No More Yellow’ the official 
voice is present and supplements Ella’s understanding of her condition in part 
two of the novel. This does not become a shared knowledge, as she does not 
tell her mother of her condition. Caruth’s ideas on witnessing are less clearly 
defined in my own work, as Millicent does not allow her daughter into her world 
and rebuffs her because she feels Ella is too young to understand. However, 
Ella still witnesses her mother’s isolation from the world, but unlike Sophie is not 
asked to become a nurturing body or an integral aspect of her mother’s life and 
information is not shared between them.
In ‘No More Yellow’, mental illness is also positioned at a metaphorical 
level as it suggests an underlying disaffection within the community based on 
race hatred and the distance between mother and daughter, Millicent and Ella. 
The metaphor in this context is recognised as such because of the fluidity and 
elusiveness of the origins of mental illness, and it is not made clear whether it is 
the underlying racial tension or the familial relationships that cause dysfunction 
in Ella.
And I keep thinking too much, thinking about 
thinking even. I just can’t get my head to stop.
I’ve forgotten what peace was like. (235)
The novel ends with Ella on the precipice of destruction or absolution, as 
she is shown to be a perpetual mental health patient, whose mental dysfunction 
has had a profound effect on her ability to cope, and at a symbolic level relates 
to regression in intellectual capacity and downward social mobility. The mad
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chronotope here is at a premium as the mental dysfunction is named in the text 
and the sufferance depicted as aspects of life for the protagonist in a way that 
was missing from Danticat’s book purely because the protagonist was not the 
schizophrenic.
In ‘No More Yellow’, Millicent’s trip abroad during the summer break 
amounts to a loss for Ella that she never recovers from. Ella resents her 
mother’s trip to Barbados and her feelings of discontentment with this and her 
relationship with her mother are evident throughout the novel, particularly in part 
two when Ella hallucinates about her mother’s shadow residing in the kitchen 
despite the fact she has not seen her for two years.
I touched it sometimes as it etched its 
Shadowy presence on my formica and 
twice I surprised it in its sleep. (227)
Here, her resentment overflows into delusion and what was a singular 
loss retrospectively reverberates across part one of the novel. There is a sense 
that the mad chronotope truly finds its voice in part two of the novel rather than 
part one, as an imaginary friend can appear to be just a childish affectation 
rather than an aspect of a mental illness. The chronotope in the instance of part 
two fully realises the inconsistencies in Ella’s life as well as the pathogenic 
notions that are part of the textual treatment.
Ella does not fully become aware of the trauma around her until she is 
older. She reads the story of her mother’s sexual relationship with who she 
thought was her grandfather but never fully understands the relationship or 
articulates how this affects her. Secrets are left as secrets, and that critical way
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of seeing adults is blunted by her regression into self-absorption. She
eventually speaks to Stanley, her father/grandfather about it when she is in her
early twenties and has had her son.
“Are you my father?” I don’t know how 
it came out, but it did.
“No no no no no no no. That Millicent.
Always was a liar.” (211)
Stanley’s view of reality is blunted by his need to stay on the good side of 
his daughter as she is one of his few links to the past, so she is not told the full 
story and is unlikely to know it.
There is no community bearer in ‘No More Yellow’ as Ella’s mental 
dysfunction becomes yet another one of the family secrets that is not spoken 
about or discussed in any way. Shared knowledges, the articulation of 
memories, past events or historical happenings, mostly take place off the page 
or within inner genres and the protagonist is left to guess the nature of her 
family relationship with regards to others and is consequently a solitary figure 
with no network of individuals upon which to rely on. It is important to depict 
Ella’s network as disrupted because it positions the secrets of the past in stark 
relief to the anguish of the present.
I didn’t notice the woman until she was right up 
on me but she was the one who looked startled 
to see me. Her hair was being beaten about by 
a tough wind and looked like streaky stained 
yellow candyfloss. Her thin lips were fuschia 
pink. She handed me a leaflet without looking 
at my face. (44)
National disaffection is implied in ‘No More Yellow’ and Bhabha’s rather 
humanist conventions on the matter of nation building suggest coevalness 
rather than the ambiguous nature of race relations suggested in my novel. The
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sense that the rupture in nation is evident in family relationships is implied in the 
novel and is perhaps more an indication of the silence within the family, as is 
suggested by the silent, racist woman handing out leaflets at dusk (see above 
quotation). If the nation building is problematic as there is so much in the 
rupture and silence that is unanswered, it is also problematic as it is, like truth, 
unobtainable. Therefore, the loud shouts of the protestors in ‘No More Yellow’ 
is ephemeral and transitory whereas the silence that indicates an underlying 
obduracy in racial matters lives on. The status quo is maintained.
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Chapter Two: The Language of Madness in Leone Ross’ Orange Laughter
The notion that individuals might intentionally or voluntarily try to forget certain materials, 
particularly those of an unpleasant sort, is perhaps one of the most familiar potential sources of 
memory inaccessibility.
Koutstaal & Schacter in Appelbaum et al (1997)
Human thought becomes genuine thought, that is, an idea, only under conditions of living 
contact with another and alien thought, a thought embodied in someone else’s voice, that is, in 
someone else’s consciousness expressed in discourse. At that point of contact between voice- 
consciousnesses the idea is born and lives.
M M Bakhtin (1994)
Bakhtin’s epigrammatic beginning to this chapter deals unwittingly with 
some of the arena of the mad chronotope. Bakhtin’s ideas on genuine thought 
when transmuted to a schizophrenic mind do not have the recourse of another’s 
consciousness within which the thoughts can be expressed. This is particularly 
true of those schizophrenics who go undiagnosed and live without the confines 
of medical intervention, as the ability to speak to a knowledgeable other is not 
possible. Therefore, the idea is born and lives in the mind of the sufferer, who 
is known not to readily share innermost thoughts and feelings. When thoughts 
are spoken they are, at times, believed as a genuine thought, not given to 
fanciful, delusionary implications. The mad chronotope, in this instance, takes 
on board the notion that there is space for the genuine thought to become an 
idea, but that the arena within which it is realised is disrupted and filled with 
misapprehensions. The mad chronotope, therefore, is open to disruption and 
trauma, the latter instance of trauma seemingly conspiring with its own 
definition to throw more confusion on the matter. Trauma, and its contested 
psychoanalytical definition, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, is described as a 
response to an event, which can be catastrophic, and the recurrent dreams and 
hallucinations that occur as a result of this episode. These hallucinations 
appear real to the sufferer, as if the event is being replayed in the mind and, 
according to W. H. R. Rivers writing in the early part of the twentieth century,
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they are epicritic, which means that they are a result of intelligence rather than 
suppression and can be dealt with through rationalisation (1920: 124-125). In 
Orange Laughter, Tony’s hallucinations occur as a pathological response to an 
event that happened in his childhood and it is its repetition and distortion, as 
well as any biochemical reaction, which induces madness. This madness is 
secured within the strict confines of the underground world that he inhabits, and 
it is the madness’ articulation as monologue that provides the narrative’s focus 
on disaffection. Any rationalisation that occurs appears at the end of the novel 
where, according to Rivers some intelligence is brought to bear on the 
proceedings and Tony begins to use his reason. At this point, the mad 
chronotope is made redundant.
This chapter will focus on Tony’s role as an unreliable narrator of his own 
disaffection/trauma and how the mad chronotope relates to this 
characterisation. This will facilitate a discussion on the mad interlocutor or 
disordered dialogue within the narrative and how this is sustained within the 
mad chronotope. How is the protagonist’s disorder linked to a wider discussion 
on witnessing and implosion? What concept of home does the writer envisage 
for Tony? Is the mad interlocutor dialogically sound or an example of the 
inverted inner speech of the mad chronotope that has no social or moral 
function? Does the addressee (the reader), who becomes the other to Tony’s 
inverted self, facilitate dialogue within the text? How is the “idea” of madness 
constructed in the text through the mad chronotope? I will also be looking at 
my own novel, ‘No More Yellow’, in the context of these questions.
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Madness in its ontological sense deals with what Richard Bernheimer 
calls the “persistent psychological urge [for] impulses of reckless physical self- 
assertion which are hidden in all of us, but which are normally kept under 
control” (Bernheimer 1952: 3). In his discussion on wild men in the Middle 
Ages, he asserts that such men had abnormal qualities that differentiated them 
from the norm and they suffered moments of madness that propelled them into 
a netherworld of fury and abandonment.
That the wild man was a creature of his own habits and habitat was 
essential to the mythology that persisted about him, as was the distinction 
between civilised approaches to societal problems and the aberrant thought 
patterns of the socially excluded. The habitat was a confounding place in which 
the wild man’s search for origins took place, both metaphorically and mentally. 
This search was not always manifested physically, but had the potential for 
reasserting an aspect of home, if congenial, to prevailing circumstances. In the 
case of Tony, Leone Ross’ erstwhile protagonist, his underground habitat 
signals a severe break away from home and its meaning and, perhaps, 
suggests the darker side of the American dream. For, as Romanshyn and 
Whalen note, American literature from Hawthorne to Fitzgerald has defined the 
search for origins as either an escape from beginnings to an elevated sense of 
greatness, or an obsessive cult of belonging (Levin 1987: 207). In Orange 
Laughter, Tony’s self-absorption falls into the latter category and reflections on 
the darker side of what was a traumatised childhood readmit themselves as 
aspects of repetition compulsion, a condition that is seen in “schizoid” 
individuals who have suffered childhood trauma that has affected their 
sensibilities and encouraged them to look inwards (Kalsched 1996: 11). In fact,
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Tony suggests that he doesn’t believe in childhood at all (Ross 1999: 62) which, 
perhaps, has some connection to the physical break from his biological mother 
when quite young and the witnessing of and involvement in the murder of his 
surrogate mother, Agatha. This physical break from a “personal continuity of 
existence” (1996: 33) which Donald Kalsched proposes to be the continued 
relationship with the mother, induces months of muteness in Tony, which in 
itself is relational to a reading of madness. For in his inward strike for an 
existence that carries order in his muteness, Tony shows signs of the 
“archetypal defense” (38) -  that of the drive to keep the personal spirit “safe” 
but detached from body, mind and time/space reality.
The Chronotope of Home
This disembodied time/space reality is articulated in the text by the 
discussion on Tony’s adult persona and articulates aspects of the mad 
chronotope. Childhood mutism, a sign of denial (Kristeva 1989: 47) and what 
Julia Kristeva calls “an assertion of omnipotence” (63), is supplanted by 
hallucinations, inner speech and violence. Madness occurs in Tony’s 
underground home within which he has escaped the outside world and the 
cumulative pressures of being there. In this home under the subway, Tony 
enacts his life in accordance with self-imposed restrictions that become named 
by the trauma and the trauma by them. In this reified atmosphere, the 
chronotope of home is apparent as it forms definitions of time and space in 
specific physical and metaphorical spheres; the underground is, metaphorically 
speaking, a place for madness to reside in and, on a physical level, a place 
where the impulsive occurs, as described earlier in this chapter by Bernheimer. 
That time and space interact in the chronotope is unequivocal and they also
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form a place where bonds in the narrative are unravelled and re-knotted. For 
example, Tony’s foray underground involves the gathering of the 
accoutrements of living; he needs a mattress, electricity and sustenance. The 
distancing from Topside is chronotopical here as the underground relates to a 
specific way of being; Tony’s metamorphosis from normality to a sub-human 
quality becomes apparent while accepting a curious need for home comforts. 
The idea as genuine thought has given rise to a need to live outside of the 
norm, whilst safely using some of its trappings to effect that norm.
The chronotope of home and the chronotopes of threshold, belonging 
and identity have emotive qualities that suggest the notion of ambiguity. That 
the home is a place of belonging for Tony is clear, as the character comments 
on comforting aspects of his underground home, but what is this depicted in 
relation to or as part of? Prior to living underground, he lived with his rich lover 
Marcus in a desirable area of New York and wore Versace. Boundaries of 
identity and belonging are bound here as the notion of comfort becomes 
integral to depictions of real time and space. Tony’s metamorphosis from 
struggling writer to vagrant is a crucial turning point as it accentuates the 
narrative to the point of temporal and spatial pre-eminence. For example, 
temporal and spatial consideration in this context would be the concept of the 
underground as a place of sustenance and nurture which would be dialogically 
opposed to the concept of home above ground, what the character calls 
Topside, and Tony’s relationship with Marcus. The spatial context below 
ground is embedded with presumption and prejudice for the reader, as the 
underground is prefigured as a dark place of foreboding and danger. This 
image is created through allusions to the rats, filth and closeness to the
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electrified tracks but also by the assumptions the reader takes to the text of a 
forbidden and dark world inhabited by transients and the disaffected. Tony 
learns to accept the smells, sights and sounds of the underground, a decision 
made out of necessity rather than any proclivity to such dark and unhygienic 
isolation, and the small cavity that he shares with his girlfriend Chaz takes on 
the semblance of a sustaining habitat. Therefore, the chronotope’s temporal 
and spatial base is diffused with emotional qualities and values, in much the 
same way as the chronotope of the encounter. The mad chronotope 
compliments the chronotope of home at this stage and its disruptive qualities, 
which would undermine any concept of home, come into focus throughout the 
novel. The idea is at least shared by the consciousness of another and this 
places Tony’s “wild man” urges outside of the realm of totally isolated thought 
processes. The mad chronotope, the site for misapprehensions, rupture and 
dissociations is also a place of disclosure whereby the individual meets an 
aspect of the self head on. In relation to the chronotope of home, this manifests 
itself in the journey from Topside to underground and the type of self re- 
evaluation that had to take place in order to think oneself into the new space. 
There are no time lapses in the text, apart from the alternate chapters, so there 
is a sense that this is a continuous look into a madman’s persona and that one 
is reading the voice of an Other looking at himself. This alternate voice is part 
of the mad chronotope as it relays information other than that to be found in a 
sane mind and has a viewpoint that is unconventional. To my mind, Tony’s 
alternate voice embodies his madness and tells the story of his disaffection in a 
far more inviting way than the sane, alternate chapters.
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Each alternate chapter marks Tony’s intellectual regression into his 
childhood in chronological order and suggest a slow, leisurely deterioration in 
social and emotional stability. The monologued chapters are prefaced with the 
name “Tony”, a factor that enforces the words of the protagonist in a jumbled 
arena of both reasoned and unfocussed allusions. Juxtaposed against the 
undiluted “sanity” and comprehensibility of the alternate chapters, the reader, 
fixed between notions of hearing a character speak and the writer write, enters 
Tony’s world with these qualities in mind; when he speaks of the electrified 
tracks, their proximity and their source as electricity for an ice cooler it appears 
that we are being led to believe that such a lifestyle is sustainable underground 
for a length of time. Also, the reference to the underground as a place of 
departure from pressures from the outside world -  “...(Chaz) came down for 
peace and I could relate to that...” (Ross 1999: 17) -  place these chapters in a 
social limbo where they act as a frenzied and disillusioned enactment against 
the expository telling of the alternate chapters. Here, stratified ideas of home 
are placed within the ‘sane’ narrative as a place complicated by outside forces 
-  the Klansmen in the case of the home down South, social responsibility and 
human relationships in terms of the habitat in New York. Such allusions to 
spatial reflexivity inform the social relations within the text with reference to 
home and its underlying catastrophic permeations that are ambiguous. The 
ambiguity within the chronotope of home is present within the mad chronotope; 
however, whereas the ambiguity is something apparent in the textual treatment 
of home for Tony, the indistinctness within the mad chronotope is less well 
defined. Ambiguity occurs at the point when rationalisation meets 
misapprehensions and trauma, and the madness itself is called into question.
In Orange Laughter, this occurs towards the end of the novel and suggests a
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way of not pathologising madness, but of understanding the ways in which the 
mind can rationalise itself out of the tight corner that is insanity.
The notion that the self-made are makers of their own home in their own 
image is an early American concept and one that the Anglo American settlers 
set great store by. A prevalent aspect of this would be the refashioning of 
home as a concept; the self-made would be in the business of re-creating, re- 
honing their image of home in the face of new eventualities. They would have 
no reason to cling to origin or place but find solace in “fashion(ing) (their) 
personality according to (their) own desires” (Levin 1987: 205). This modernist 
evaluation places the concept of home in a precarious position that refocuses 
its meaning and sense of place. The ambiguity in Tony’s regeneration of his 
own image through the concept of home is clear; he rejects the cosy, literate 
world of upstate New York for its uncompromising underbelly just as he 
struggles with forming coherent thoughts on belonging and the violent death of 
his surrogate mother. He turns the underground into a conceptual home; his 
rejection of the norm is supplanted by a residual empathy for that norm -  Chaz 
fits the store cupboard they live in with electricity for the cooler and a mattress 
and Tony accepts this. He re-orders home without stripping it of its essentials, 
yet this is a disembowelled artifice that is distinguished from its Topside referent 
in a number of ways: hygiene, comfort and salubriousness, to name a few. This 
necessitates a fall away from home and from its sustenance. But what Tony 
does is recreate home in the image of Topside life; he and Chaz eat, sleep and 
make love there as if enacting normal life. In re-styling himself, Tony becomes 
the epitome of the self-made yet is emblematic of dysfunction and rupture in re­
sourcing and re-establishing concepts of home. He lives without the tools to re­
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invent his early consciousness of home, spent in the segregated southern 
states of America. Instead, his past restates itself in a pattern of vitriolic mental 
reprisals, from Agatha for his part in her murder, and a self-imposed denial of 
that home that will not re-instate itself in his consciousness. He is homeless, as 
the way that he deals with the past strips him of any conscious realisation of 
perfidy on his part with regards to his socialisation in the past and its effect on 
him. Apartheid America left its mark on him with its fundamental lack of 
assurance and its desultory disaffection for African Americans. He is homeless 
because the very concept of home is problematic to African Americans living 
with the legacy of segregation and slavery; that the past is considered a 
temporal realignment is prominent in postmodernist and political thinking, yet 
the refusal to see the individual casualties of that temporal shift suggests that 
they are without consciousness and live outside of the realms of the American 
concept of home and its insistence on reconstitution. The Negroes’ 
reconstitution at that time would have been anathema to thoughts on the 
advancement of the South with its underlying empathy with belonging and 
identity, and as the African American identity becomes an enquiry into concepts 
of belonging, with particular reference to their relatively new nomenclature as 
“African Americans”, home re-establishes itself as a possibility even in the most 
dire of circumstances. Here, Tony’s enactment of the concept of home mirrors 
the contradictory nature of belonging and its relation to ideology within the 
realms of culture, tradition and history (Gardiner 1992: 126). When that culture, 
tradition and history is unequivocally denied, the ideology becomes unsound 
and reactionary; Tony’s descent into madness and the underground world is a 
legitimate temporal space for his disaffection and, perhaps, for a race’s 
postmodernist state of flux. Here, the mad chronotope positions that
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disaffection at the heart of the narrative and, I believe, admits spatial and 
temporal foci into proceedings. For it is at a spatial level that the underground 
accesses the semblance of home as well as comes to denote the desultory 
manner of Tony’s denouement, and the temporal takes the form of sporadic 
glimpses into the psyche of the mad in the alternate chapters.
The Unreliable Narrator
The chronology of the chapters, that alternates between Tony’s narrative 
denouement in the 90s and his childhood in the 60s, suggests a truncated 
linearity, in keeping with Tony’s loss of focus and reason. The detachment of 
spirit from any time/space continuity is evident in the character’s displacement 
from Topside -  from where he posts his letters to Mikey, his former white friend 
from the South who also witnessed Agatha’s murder, and receives replies from 
a Topside source -  and from his detachment from his own sense of reality. 
What appears to be an act of sufferance on the character’s part as he copes 
with his existence underground could be construed as a mental aberration, a 
breakdown of societal values and ethics within the individual. This reflects 
Bakhtin’s view of the chronotope threshold as being that of crisis and a break in 
life (Levin 1987: 248). It also suggests a fixed break in the dialogue of the mad 
interlocutor which becomes apparent in the monologic chapters dedicated to 
Tony’s inner speech:
it wasn’t hard to find Mikey when I was Topside I followed 
his career found out he’s married to a famous poet ha Mikey 
always was a creative whore and he’s been at Princeton for 
years... I came down here with blankets chump change and 
Mikey’s address... so I wrote the letter... to see if he’ll just 
tell me the story because there’s so much I don’t remember 
just tell me the story of how we came to be pals. (Ross 1999: 18)
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Here, dialogue is deconstructed to the point where, in Lacan’s words, 
speech leads us ultimately to the mind (Hogan 1990:14). However, if the 
psychotic instance is relevant to the subject rather than a representation of 
anything else, Tony’s psychosis is revealed in speech as more than a mere 
symbolism but as language that reveals its cultural, social and political speech 
genres. This could be described as speech performed under the auspices of 
objective psychology (Holquist 1990: 51) as it contends with the supposition 
that the social has something to do with the spoken and is not merely a psychic 
function. Tony’s scatological monologue suggests the culture of the speaker 
and his displacement; one is able to picture an urban socialite that was, with a 
penchant for words on paper and a psychological disorder that affects memory. 
His language is capable of dysfunction and re-interpretability. His genuine 
thought, though ruptured by the mad chronotope’s disfigurement, could leave 
the idea open to the interpretation of language. However, as Daniel Ferrer 
points out, language exists as a means of making sense to the exclusion of 
madness (Ferrer 1990: 5). And if subjectivity is the aspect that detects the 
unreliability of the social, mental and physical manifestations around the 
subject, then is it not clear that language can be uttered with this historicity in 
mind, and given the postmodernist “incomprehensibility” of historical fact? In 
Tony’s case, this historicity comes to the fore as mad-language and with 
regards to Lacan’s idea of a structure-less unconscious (Lechte 1990: 32), and 
in the sense that language ultimately cannot be represented, there is the 
possibility that this unreliability remains to be stated and cannot be heard for the 
alternate voice. This becomes clearer when one takes into consideration the 
subjectivity of the hysteric and how this relates to a self-image and final 
reflection.
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It is clear that the hysteric presupposes an ambiguous nature to 
patriarchy and obtrusive reminiscences, that is, aspects that are socially and 
culturally derived. This is also indicated in African Americans’ relationship with 
hegemonic power relations. What Freud discovered was that any information 
garnered from the patient about her/his disorder was “... falsified by all the 
factors which commonly hide the knowledge of his (her) own state from a 
patient” (Strachey 1962: 191). The patient’s own role in this is telling as it 
reflects on that which is hidden yet cultivated in the language of hysteria, as in 
aspects of home, and makes a distinction between what is normalised or is 
overtly in a state of disaffection. What the patient ultimately reveals is that, 
according to Kristeva, the mirror stage of mother/child maturation is a failed 
stage in the hysteric’s life not only because, as Freud suggests, the patient is 
unable “to identify with either parent” (Smith 1996:124) but also an act of 
doubling occurs making the subject"... both ‘I’ and ‘another’ 
simultaneously’’^  24). This semiotic -  the hidden symbolic nature of the 
subject, both subjectivity’s product and psychosomatic process -  "... gives 
birth to the phenomenon of the hysterical body... that pathologically mimics the 
hysteric’s ‘bisexuality’... Its ‘eyes’ see neither itself, nor the significance that 
produces it, since its true image is to be found in the unconscious” (125). The 
self-image of the hysteric is, therefore, unreliable and conflicting, the final 
reflection a mere mimicking of the body and true self. Doubling, or another way 
of seeing double-consciousness in African American theoretical history, is a 
process that disengages the subject from a single self, reiterating points of 
understanding in another aspect within which to reflect her/himself on to the 
world. This ‘hysterical response’ is reflected in Tony’s (in)articulation of the self
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and his disembodied reaction to his trauma; he becomes another self to his true 
image and tells his story through this other persona. This lends the text its 
dialogic referent as the polyphonic voices of the protagonist and other 
characters converge on what appears to be chapters of monologue but are in 
fact dialogue as they reflect the relationships within the individual voice as well 
as outside of it, as stated by Lynn Pearce in Reading Dialogics (1994: 50). 
Therefore, the mad chronotope lends itself to inarticulation in language and of 
the self whereby the individual does not so much reify himself or herself, but re­
establishes ways of articulating the self as an alternate voice.
Dostoevsky’s ‘underground man’ from Notes from the Underground 
(1864) represents the obsession with the state of being; the knowledge of 
existence below the surface of life. Nina Allan describes his state as that of 
being “frozen” -  unable to relate to anything outside of himself and reassert his 
state of being (Allan 1994:17). Ross’ protagonist relates to the ‘underground 
man’ in the fundamental aspect of his sense of self; his self-analysis and self­
absorption becomes obsessive and alters aspects of compulsion. While 
Dostoevsky’s protagonist holds on to any semblance of memory by becoming 
fixated, Tony’s obsession is clearly to regain what memory has been lost, to 
remember what happened to him in his past with Agatha and Mikey. His state 
of being is lost to him as he struggles with auditory and visual hallucinations 
about Agatha and the legitimacy of existence underground. The loss of 
memory makes it clear that Tony’s dialogues can only be referential in terms of 
aspects of his present predicament and other less volatile times of his life 
(particularly his childhood relationship with Marcus). His subjectivity is marked
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by absence and this in turn makes his utterances flawed. For instance, when 
he has auditory or visual hallucinations about Agatha, she is depicted thus,
... her voice burst through my orgasm and I’m pushing Chaz 
off it’s the bitch she’s in the beams and she’s grinning as 
big as a bus shaking that hair down... Agatha is caressing 
the walls with her long fingers and velvet hair she’s smiling 
at me SHE’S IN THE ROOM she’s talking to the walls like 
they’re new... and her fingernails are chalk on the walls... 
the bitch will take my soul I am convinced of that she will 
watch me and torture me and then when I am sleeping 
she will come to me and peel me... . (Ross 1999: 73-4)
That Tony had a loving relationship with Agatha during his childhood is clear 
from the alternating third person chapters in the text. What occurs in the “mad” 
chapters is the distortion of reality that sets Tony’s utterances into the realm of 
unreliability. He cannot know the whole story because his memory has been 
impeded by trauma and self-implosion that necessitates the self-questioning 
and search for truth in his conscious state. Tony’s role as mad interlocutor 
suggests the problematic nature of truth as it is unutterable. Here the 
fundamentals of the mad chronotope become apparent as the search for truth 
in the irrational mind is attempted and obstructed by the effects of trauma. 
These aspects of the mad chronotope are linked to the misapprehensions 
mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis as it is in both of these instances 
that the search for truth is blighted.
Ross writes Tony’s disaffection in a number of ways: a) through what 
Gerard Genette calls the implied author image’s appropriation of the text 
(Genette 1988: 140); b) through the narrator’s unreliable dialogue as 
questionable and possibly obtrusive, and c) as the utterance as acceptable 
dialogue. Point a has the advantage of the implied author image’s
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omnipresence and precipitates the trauma and the reaction to it by predisposing 
the implied reader to reliable plot, narrative and schema. This takes place in 
the third person chapters that contain the story of Tony’s early childhood in the 
southern states of America during the turbulent 1960s. The author is implied 
simply because her articulation is a direct evocation of the diegesis yet goes 
beyond the form of the work; Genette is uncomfortable with this post­
structuralist reading of the author yet is given to quoting Shlomith Rimmon- 
Kennan who in turn details the efficacy of a position that deems what is 
voicelessly implied far more intelligent than the silent real thing (Rimmon- 
Kennan 1983: 87). In terms of narration, one cannot distinguish between “... 
the narrative T (and) the object of narration (as this may be a) constant within 
one narrative text” (Bal 1985: 126). Therefore there is room for certain 
displacements within the text that alter continuity and inform discontinuity.
These displacements form ellipses set against real time and are inset into the 
narrative. This becomes most evident when, looking at the above quotation 
from Orange Laughter, one is drawn to the loving description of Agatha -  long 
fingers, velvet hair -  seared by the livid language of trauma and the absence of 
a characterisation of Agatha. This characterisation or build up of notions about 
the character occurs in the alternate chapters of the novel yet each of these are 
read as a story within a story, as text discontinued from the trauma-laden 
narrative. Therefore, Agatha’s character can only be a product of the ellipsis or 
the anachrony in the text -  “when I am sleeping she will come to me and peel 
me...” is a break in chronology and disturbs the order-where Tony’s memory 
does not allow for clarity and where the author-image functions on binary 
planes, inclusive of the narrator. This ellipsis is also represented in the mad 
chronotope and the build up of the mad characterisation is also implied. For it
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is with the mad chronotope that the carving out of the madman rests as it is this 
characterisation, as unreliable, disruptive persona that fuels the chronotope, 
accentuates the alternate voice and simulates mad language.
The discontinuity impresses enunciation as imperative as it suggests the 
importance of subjectivity and form in the received language (Adlam 1997: 59). 
What Ferrer calls the language appropriation of the subject and its reversals 
(1990: 5) relates to unreliability in the narrative specifically in the area of the 
utterance (enunciation) as questionable. Such subjectivity releases the 
“hero/linguistic material” (Adlam 1997: 56), that which is an expression beyond 
the form of the work, from a stultifying silence when it comes to author 
answerability, which is informed by form only, and implies that the mad 
interlocutor has meaning external to the mad dialogue. Therefore, in relation to 
the mad chronotope, the mad interlocutor has an existence outside of its 
confines.
The unreliable narrative is unreliable because it details the narrator’s 
questionable value system (101); in the above quotation and in the rest of the 
internal dialogue, Tony’s narration is pitted against the voiceless implied author 
as we can assume that they do not show the same predilection for violence and 
self-censure. The unreliable narrator informs the implied reader of Tony’s adult 
disaffection in terms of the socialising determinants that define his existence 
through the functioning mad interlocutor and those external factors, such as the 
social and cultural make-up of the contemporaneous narrative, that make his 
voice convincing. Utterance is acceptable here as it is implied that the mad 
interlocutor is mocked to lucidity by his own self-aggrandisement and
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unreliability. This is shown by Tony’s monologue once he re-established what
he has done in his own mind:
It was me who pressed the cushion across her face, past 
that skin, those scars, that tale. It was me who saw the 
alarm in her eyes and I know now that her fear was not for 
herself but for us. The price we would pay and the smell of 
our inevitable nightmares. I was thirteen years old. I leaned 
forward and I took the last of her life, and it is my guilt that has 
made her a monster in my mind. (Ross 1999: 225)
The unreliability of the narrator in the alternating chapters and the 
ambiguous nature of the narrative as a whole meets a juncture in the final 
passage from the novel, as Tony comes to a realisation that stops his 
oscillating thoughts and re-positions the narrator’s place in the text. His role as 
subjective narrator is sublimated by the implied author image, that which is the 
result of an exploration of the meaning of the text, not the source of that 
meaning, and can only be inferred as a result of that interpretation (Bal 1985: 
120). This takes into account the efficacy of telling and the systematic function 
of re-telling -  its intradiegetic function. However, before the implied reader gets 
to this passage, the implied author image, or role as it has a function, continues 
to render the narrator unreliable. As does the mad chronotope.
Like Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, whose basement sojourn furnishes 
him with a way to self-enlightenment, Tony’s self-imposed incarceration takes 
him through a subliminal, darkened world that leads him to a point of self 
knowledge that is revealing and answers his own questions about his past 
relationship with Mikey and Agatha. The role of unreliable narrator becomes 
that of storyteller as Tony relinquishes his position to that of conscious, 
subjective narrator of his own life and the part he played in Agatha’s death -  “It 
was me who pushed the cushion across her face...” (1999: 225). The mantle is
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taken away from the subjective or overt narrator as all-seeing interlocutor and 
given over to the mad man made coherent by his own self-confinement and 
obsessive thoughts. The mad chronotope becomes unessential. This revision 
of the unreliable tenet re-writes the protagonist’s errant narrative to that of safe, 
reliable narrator, now equal to the implied author’s omnipresence and authority 
in the intervening chapters. The memory lapse is rendered conditional to any 
sense of sanity and is relied upon, as well as the seemingly ersatz relationship 
with meaningful dialogue, to enable Tony to eventually function as interpreter of 
his own fate. A radical break away from conformity, with little punctuation and 
false commentary in the dialogues, would apparently re-appropriate the text in 
question to that of re-constituted narrative, in my opinion.
Tony’s narrative approximates the distancing of the social pariah from 
enigmatic conversation and drives the witness of social and political dysfunction 
into a defined morass. From this position one can see Tony’s dilemma quite 
clearly as the alternating chapters unravel most of the answers. Yet it is the 
narrator as unmitigated tool of suppression, and antithesis of the implied author 
image, that reveals much about the idea of the witness of repression and 
trauma.
Witnessing and Implosion
Therefore, when the dialogue is disordered the protagonist 
displays much of his own witnessing and the implosion thereafter. In the mad 
chronotope, this manifests itself as dysfunction and unreliability. The witness 
does not necessarily utter testimony itself or become part of an act of bearing 
witness as it can be beyond their knowledge at any particular time. As
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witnessing is a product of rupture in this context, which is, in turn, an aspect of 
the mad chronotope, it is essential to understand the social implications of the 
witnessing to the witness and its relevance. What Shoshana Felman describes 
as the clinical nature of historicity (Felman & Laub 1992: 8) becomes apparent 
when one focuses on the medical incumbency of the text and its social 
meaning. In Orange Laughter; the murder of Agatha is synonymous with the 
legacy of resistance some African American people fought for during the Civil 
Rights era. Her detractors and murderers, the white Klansmen of the town, are 
depicted as an unseen threat throughout much of the story but rise to historical 
significance after the murder. Here the historicity of the text can only reveal 
part of the reason for the testimony, as the historical cannot encounter the 
psychological and social factors that are intimated in the text. Ultimately, the 
witness acts within a triumvirate, as narrator-psychiatrist-witness, and is able to 
bring all aspects into the narrative -  Felman uses the term narrator-doctor- 
witness to describe this process in Albert Camus’ work The Plague and the 
relationship between witnessing and narratology in literature; “doctor” in this 
instance is supplanted by “psychiatrist” as history is depicted as a metaphor for 
madness. It is important to make the distinction between a “real” testimony and 
a fictional one; Felman and Laub relate their testimonies to actual incidences as 
well as the fictional and journalistic, yet it is the implied nature of history being 
recorded that informs Ross’ text. Geoffery Leech and Michael Short comment 
on the unrecordability of realism (1981:151), a concept that has many contexts 
in fiction, and the mock reality apparent in prose, termed here as verisimilitude 
(156). This mimesis thrives on symbolism and illusion, both acting as referents 
for the specification of detail in the text and as aspects of delusion. As delusion 
they are complimentary, becoming markedly real to the implied reader who
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takes the detail and reads it as “lived”. What is clear is that the delusion 
inherent in the mad dialogue is contested by the implied reader in much the 
same way a surreal piece of work would be; the implied reader is challenged by 
the artistic function. The implied reader must suspend any sense of their own 
reality being represented, unless they have suffered psychotic episodes 
themselves, so as to enter the rhetoric and fictional speech of the mad 
interlocutor whose guise is rendered unspeakable. The witnessing of Agatha’s 
death is depicted thus:
The bullets spread red roses across her chest and her
legs. Pushed her back into our arms like a moth, as if
she was light. (Ross 1999: 224)
Tony becomes lucid again and remembers the nightriders shooting 
Agatha and the decision he and Mikey made to take “the last of her life” before 
they do. As a witness and active participant in her murder, Tony’s narrative is 
part confession and his final realisation, just before the novel ends, that it is his 
guilt that has pre-empted the torrid hallucinations about Agatha suggests a 
“confession” of a stubborn illness. This clinical evaluation, as Felman notes in 
assessing Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground (Felman & Laub 1992:
11) can preclude a larger perspective on wider issues other than the illness.
Yet in Orange Laughter, Ross provides a testimony that takes into 
consideration the trauma, including the trauma of survival, madness and 
political oppression that anticipate the clinical response. This begs the question 
of whether the mad chronotope is really the mad “Black” chronotope, since the 
nature of the political oppression is conditional on an African American reading 
of history? I doubt that this would be a useful reading of the issue as political
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oppression of any kind could predict such a response and it is the madness in 
the chronotope that answers the question of testimony and trauma.
The level of implosion implicit in the clinical response and Tony’s 
disaffection is important here. It creates the need for the evaluation of madness 
as a response to trauma and its use as an “idea” of madness. In Madness and 
Civilization, Michel Foucault points out that the mad who were confined in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe took part in an act of silencing 
(1967: 250). Their circumstances mitigated the need for fortresses of 
suppression that told of the fear of their unconventionality, their unreason. This 
act of imprisonment, mirrored by Tony in his own self-confinement, is a process 
external to any self-determination yet is replicated in the phantastical detention 
within the perimeters of the mind. As Kalsched notes, the psyche withdraws 
during certain moments of trauma, the integrated ego splitting and forming 
fragments or “dissociating”. The psyche allows compartmentalisation of the 
trauma to take place in the mind and body, especially “unconscious aspects of 
them” (Kalsched 1996: 12-13). Therefore, usually united elements of 
consciousness, that is, cognition, sensation, imagination, are not able to 
enmesh. Imagination might be disconnected from sensation or from 
consciousness. Behavioural contexts and affects become dissociated. 
“Experience itself becomes discontinuous” (12-13) and the memory of an 
individual becomes filtered by holes, a complete narration interrupted by the 
affects of trauma. I believe that this silencing of real experience and the 
replacement of this with distorted reality is an accepted form of expression for 
the madman of literature, as Lillian Feder notes (1980: 9). Feder goes on to 
claim delusions and hallucinations as acts of recovery through a hostile
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connection as violent hallucinations counter recovery with repression. The
repression of an event or a number of events in childhood can be the result of
the suppression of guilt, shame or anxiety. Howard B. Levine notes,
... memories are now understood to be amalgamations of both historical 
truth and narrative truth -  of what actually happened 
and the subjective interpretations, fantasies and contextual determinants 
surrounding an occurrence and its recall. (Applebaum 1997: 303)
These arrested memories act as moments of understanding for the mind 
as they supplement a real truth with an imaginary one, augmenting a sense of 
replacement or re-filling of the repressed state. Therefore, in opposition to what 
Feder states, memory functions as an outlet of recovery rather than just a 
hostile enigma. Latent realities sit side by side with the inadvertent lie of 
suffering and open up the possibility of external revitalization. Feder is 
concerned with the vituperative state of recall and its subliminal occurrence that, 
while suggesting a recapture of a relationship between people, things, and so 
on, also contorts truth to suggest a revision of aspects of the self. There is less 
a duality of positioning than an all-encompassing rationale of the self that opens 
up limitations and possibilities to external reality, including, as the epigrammatic 
quotation by Koutstaal & Schacterat the beginning of the chapter indicates, acts 
of forgetting. By revealing this “idea” of madness, the critic is able to contend 
with the moments of implosion inherent in the text. These moments are marked 
by Tony’s hallucinations concerning Agatha. His self-mockery and great fear 
create moments open to the reconstruction of self-image and counter-implosion; 
his external reality is challenged but not refuted by his self-loathing and mental 
degeneration. In terms of the mad chronotope, this idea fully accentuates 
certain aspects, like forgetting, that are important to a reading of its premise; 
along with the rupture and dysfunctionality that are the staples of the mad
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chronotope, there are issues of memory that form an essential part of its 
makeup.
Thus, self-implosion and the limitations of a harsh self-development have 
recourse in the emotional environment that the madman finds himself in. In 
Tony’s case, he finds resolution and meets the external head on, placing the 
role of storyteller at the mercy of the newly-lucid mad character.
Inner Speech and the Addressee
Gather around as I become the storyteller.
In the end I told it all. It had to be me. In this hell.
In this heaven, kicking the needles aside. (Ross 1999: 224)
Before we realise that Tony is in fact a representation of the omniscient 
narrator of the third person narrative of the alternating chapters in the persona 
of the implied author, he is assigned the role of the madman as interpreter of 
events. This, as stated earlier in the chapter, provokes notions of unreliability 
and the unsafe, yet there are certain aspects of his life where the madman 
shows real clarity in remembering and representing. The character’s bisexuality 
is celebrated by his mad persona and remains a metaphor for the freedom of 
his Topside existence before delusions took over his psyche. Despite reports 
on malfunctioning in positive sexual identity in bisexual people due to society’s 
rebuttal of difference (Cabaj 1996: 715), Ross presents her protagonist without 
this dilemma forming an integral part of his mental breakdown. In fact, aspects 
of his sexual orientation are articulated in a scatological, confident style that is 
part of Tony’s re-invention of himself underground. Ideas about sexuality do not 
change from Topside to underground whereas ideas about madness become 
complicated by an increase in hallucinations and disorder. As Stephen
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Angelides notes, much queer theory postulates that the role of identity is an 
exclusive and prohibiting position that does little to posit a realistic notion of 
individuality within a given context (Angelides 2001:14). Angelides goes on to 
quotation Diana Fuss and the epistemology of deconstructivist thought on 
identity and non-identity, otherness and exclusion, further removing his thoughts 
from those put forward in the Textbook of Homosexuality and Mental Health 
(1996) and emphasising the fluidity between concepts of being rather than their 
determinants. His reasoning supports the notion that Tony’s self-acceptance of 
his sexuality is a direct result of his non-polarising attitude towards it and its 
function, while Eli Coleman and B R Rosser would argue that this has little to do 
with a positive attitude but relates to his mad persona as prescribed by societal 
indifference (Cabaj 1996: 715). What is clear is that Tony’s role as a 
transgendered individual can be associated with what Dallas Denny and 
Jamison Green note is outside of the binary fields of sexual orientation and 
facilitates discussion on the profundity of identity (Firestein 1996: 84). Yet it is 
telling that during a love-making session with Chaz that Tony suffers with an 
hallucination that forces him to attack his girlfriend. This shakes his sense of 
reality as he has not associated mental dysfunction with his sexuality before this 
occurrence. His sexuality had remained sacrosanct and enabled by his sense 
of positivism and self-acceptance in that context. This further accentuates the 
notion that Tony’s disruptive thoughts are linked to his own repression of the 
past and libido or forgotten material forcing its place in the consciousness 
(Feder 1980: 26).
What Tony eventually comes to realise are thoughts of love for Agatha 
that appear at the end of the novel when he reaches a kind of catharsis about
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his feelings of guilt. As we gather around the storyteller, we learn that Agatha 
comes to bring him warmth and power, strength and resilience. She loved him 
and he loved her. What isn’t clear is the efficacy of using inner speech to 
enunciate his disaffection and its function in the text. Bakhtin refers to inner 
speech as that which enters into dialogue with the outside world, but it does so 
at the level of consciousness, in the reality of “concrete historical human 
exchange” (Hohne 1994: 7). Tony’s references to his sexuality are uttered to 
himself in exchanges that do not always define themselves as real, concrete 
exchangeable aspects of fictional speech. The inner speech is uttered without 
the direct recourse to an altercating Other, implying that mad discourse has no 
social referent apart from the implied addressee. This implication takes the act 
of original thought and constructs a barrier around its intimated confessions so 
that reported conversation can only be related in a distinctly detached and 
removed way. Therefore, when Tony speaks of his discussions with Chaz or 
past encounters with Marcus, one is aware of the chronology of events and their 
distancing through free indirect discourse. The conversation that Tony has with 
himself is less indirect and passive, and is referred to as free direct discourse, 
and is certainly more bombastic. Yet, in retrospect, the suggestive mad motif 
that the narrator encounters renders his conversation with the implied reader 
untenable. This is partly to do with the unreliability of the narrator, as discussed 
earlier in the chapter, and partly due to the significance of the language of 
madness itself, another reading of the mad chronotope.
This language is mediated by aspects of censure and is critically 
symbolic of dysfunction. For example, Tony states:
... I only hit her three times because she begged me
and I told her that I wouldn’t do it again and then I lay
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down and thought about this new secret and I guess I 
am an animal now and I understand why the Creeping 
Man did it no big psychological theory the Creeping Man 
is mad and he could yeah you know he boiled that boy’s 
hands because he could do it and the whole town killed 
those boys because they could do it. (Ross 1999:118)
Here the character ruminates on his increasing violence while relating 
ideas concerning a phantom that supposedly resides underground. The 
discussion of a phantasm suggests the forbidden and unanswerable coming to 
the fore but more than that proposes a fantastical premise to notions of 
madness. This conjugates ideas around reality and transcendence but 
ultimately is unnamed by any one discourse outside of madness. Within the 
mad chronotope, it can only be unreliable and an act of dysfunction -  the 
dialogue itself is a sign of madness that goes beyond the particularity of the 
dialogue itself. If, as Foucault states, language is defined by its infinite 
possibilities and extends even the moment of death to an instance of repetition 
(Bouchard 1977: 61), I believe mad-language must find trauma in its repetition 
and its longevity in the chronotope. Therefore, the idea of madness as a 
creeping wild man who resorts to violence against children is replete in its 
supposition that mad-language omits barriers to inclusion and readmits areas of 
social exclusivity into its boundaries. This readmission is an afterthought, a 
creative rebuttal of all things normal and exclusive. The wild man has 
metaphysical properties that negate any false reasoning that this is a mere 
phantasm; the wild man is Tony’s own reflection reduced in language to the 
metabolics of an animal yet recharged as an aspect of social representation. 
The idea of him is his madness and this extends to an understanding of belated, 
latent repetition within unreason; Tony’s story to himself is a retelling of himself, 
an opening to a censured sense of his condition. In this state of hebetude, the
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external world is rendered obsolete and, as Freud notes, can be a point of 
reconstruction (1986: 565). In his 1924 essays on neurosis and psychosis, 
Freud goes further to identify the non-fulfilment of childhood wishes that make 
up the inception of psychosis and the subsequent loss of reality, as opposed to 
the dependence on reality of neurotic conditions. As fresh circumstances 
precipitate new forms of delusion and reconstructed reality, Tony becomes 
subject to the redefinition of an ultimate wish -  that Agatha was not shot by the 
Klansmen. This reconstruction of his own self as a killer of children merely 
replicates his own participation in her death and extends the phantasm to a 
point of clarity. This part-recovery of fact and reality in delusion readmits the 
frustrated childhood wish to the mad-language of the mad chronotope and pre­
empts the question of Tony’s social and moral function; with dialogic interaction 
between the self and the other as a site of maturation for the self 
consciousness, can Tony be located in the social world?
Another way of reading Bakhtin’s epigrammatic beginning of this chapter, 
which is that an idea comes to fruition only at a point of contact with at least two 
forces of living thought, suggests that the expression of discourse is unutterable 
to Tony within the dominion of the text. His monologues/dialogues are symbols 
of the intractability of human thought to articulate itself into a nameless, 
unanswerable entity, the implied addressee, yet suggest that the language of 
madness in this instance has a limited moral and social function. Tony 
articulates himself to himself and it is only the intervention of the implied reader 
that marks the chronotopic moment as potentially answerable. The mad 
chronotope, with its marriage of time and space, is emblematic here of the 
suspected answerability of the utterance. Tony exists within a space that is
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marked by historical and experiential time. This leads the implied reader to 
other parts of the text to gain an insight into the historical inferences, thus 
relying on the duality of the compromised and non-delusional aspects of the 
narrator’s voice. This underlying binarism allows for the essential answerability 
within the text. Although, on the one hand, Bakhtin contends that “... the ‘other’ 
already exist(s) in the inner speech of the self (Adlam 1997: 34) he also states 
that being, knowledge and expression belong to the conscious dialogue with an 
Other -  that outside of the self (Hohne 1994: 7). This determines that there is a 
place for conversation with the self at the level of discourse but that this is in 
itself an anomaly. What is clear is that inner speech is not acknowledgeable -  it 
resides outside the confines of society and social morality. While it is clear that 
meaning can occur in the individual psyche (Holquist 1990: 49), it is its shared 
referent that is socially inclusive and debatable; without this defining structure, 
meaning is rendered restricted and non-accountable, making the idea 
incomplete. If, then, the individual is socially and morally reprehensible yet 
relates information about the self through thought only, does he have a social or 
moral function? Bakhtin would argue that he does as his accountability stems 
from his otherness and this otherness relates to his state of being-in-the-world. 
There is nothing but shared states -  even the “I” of exclusivity has a condition 
that is not unique (24) therefore the sociality of that state is determinable.
Tony’s social function is thus answerable if ultimately unutterable in the form of 
discourse. Morally, he inhabits the confines of the wild man and thus exists 
external to a religious morality or a social one. In Orange Laughter the “I” takes 
on the duality of a bruised humanity, accessing the implied reader through acts 
of sensationalism, as was common with populist slave narratives, and 
postmodernist “selective memory” -  acts of forgetting as a driving narrative
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force; see Toni Morrison’s slave saga Beloved (1987). Jeanne Phoenix Laurel’s 
discussion on slave retentions in African American women’s writing on madness 
suggests that contemporary African American fiction permits a pre-modernist 
view of tragedy to access its evocation of madness (Laurel 1996). Ross, 
although she is a Black British writer using a male protagonist to take on African 
American themes and responses, challenges this by accepting the idea of 
regeneration within a postmodernist framework of discontinuities and 
fragmentation. Therefore, although slave narratives and witness testimonies 
perhaps share the nomenclature of protest literature, contemporary fictional 
appraisals of historical events take on a postmodernist vacuity and symbolism 
as opposed to literalism. In the slave narrative, inner speech recounted the 
ideological concerns of the ex-slave and abolitionist, rendering what was 
personal to the level of social implication by way of political agency (Gates 
1987:104). Through thematic and social appropriation, Ross inherits the African 
American literary mantle, yet is perplexed by the inaccessibility of mad dialogue. 
The ideologeme, the ideological background of the protagonist, interacts with 
the social heteroglossia (speech) of all of the characters forming a spatial 
tolerance for mad dialogue if not mad utterable speech. This informs the mad 
chronotope as it takes into consideration the fact that there is such a thing as 
mad dialogue, but understands the distinction between this and the unutterable.
Therefore, inner speech plays the role of the inquisitor of the human 
psyche yet is confounded by its social and moral function. As stated before, 
however, there is some contestation as to the role of the addressee as she 
becomes the receiver of information elicited from the text. What was 
contextually unutterable becomes open to the addressee’s interpretation and
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conveyance; the text is answerable but only through intermediacy on the part of 
the addressee, the implied reader. In this context, utterances may be spoken or 
written but, as Holquist notes, the dialogic utterance does not assume the 
notion of free will on the part of the addresser as is apparent in the context of 
the written form (Pearce 1994: 39). Therefore, Tony’s utterances are displayed 
with a prerequisite for restraint. These restraints are complicated further by the 
conditions under which the addresser represents his subject; addressing the 
subject of madness confines the protagonist to a representation of disorder that 
will project certain connotations to the reader. This aspect of polyphony, that 
determines the differences inherent within the individual voice, locates the 
presumed addressee as the other as both object and subject and engages the 
unutterable utterance in interplay. This does not take away from the madman 
as the alternative voice. The language of madness is the definitive 
representation that the author wishes to display, but it is its subjective other that 
facilitates dialogue within the text, and emboldens the sometimes difficult-to- 
read text to a point of recovery.
Thus, the implied addressee, although approached as no one in 
particular, in Voloshinov’s estimation has an informed relationship with the 
utterance (Pearce 1994: 40). Tony’s deliverance of his “social purview” -  that 
which is directed in a culturally specific way -  informs the language and pretext 
of the piece and emphasises its social context. As Feder notes, the mad 
persona is capable of representing aspects of dysfunction in things cultural, 
personal and psychological to the point of fragmentation or survival (Feder 
1980: xiii). At the end of Orange Laughter, Tony is proposing a visit Topside to 
visit Mikey. His suggested survival comes with the drawn-together fragments of
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his memory making a place for them to reiterate the past in lucid form. His act 
of forgetting redefines itself as a point of recovery and articulates itself in real 
time without the run-on cadence of mad-language. In this way, Tony finds 
redemption in remembrance and, perhaps, salvation from crisis in Topside. 
Resolution is by no means final, as it is merely a re-evaluation of events.
A Relational Reading of ‘No More Yellow’
If I had known I would break up like this 
I would have taken the time to label me, so 
that I could put all the right pieces back in 
the right place. (213)
In ‘No More Yellow’, a child’s fertile imagination becomes the arena for 
adult madness as depicted in part two of the novel. Ella’s language maintains 
its eloquence throughout the novel; however, by part two she is subject to a 
“break up” of everything she holds dear. Throughout the novel, her speech 
gives way to a flatness of feeling that she absorbs through her thought 
processes and this becomes clear when she articulates matters concerning her 
son. “He was dead to me”(218), she says, yet she means that she no longer 
has feelings for him that are maternal due to her state of mind and the 
psychosis she suffers. Here, the idea is genuine thought that becomes part of 
the individual’s psyche; though not uttered to anyone else, it is an idea that lives 
and as such lends itself to personal appropriation. Ella is aware that it is 
through rationalisation that she gets rid of thoughts like these, but their 
recurrence and her lack of patience with the vituperative qualities of memory 
tells her something else. At times her language is colloquial and fast, 
suggesting that she is rambling a little and slightly incoherent. She has yet to 
find a way out of her madness and, as a result, has regressed in her speech
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pattern in some chapters of part two. She has yet to formulate a way of coping 
successfully and is lonely despite her friendship with Dot -  “I liked Dot in the 
way that I liked all of the people that I liked, in small doses”; although Ella feels 
Dot is useful as a friend, Ella does not have the depth of understanding she had 
always thought necessary in a friendship. Unlike Tony, Ella is in search of 
something she has never had.
In ‘No More Yellow’, the state of flux is less bound by the chronotopic 
split between a Topside and an underworld, but by a sense of unbelonging on 
the Avenue as opposed to the relative comfort and ease of the Gardens. For 
Ella and her mother the move to the Avenue is catastrophic; their concept of 
home is shattered by their enforced move from one to the other, and matters of 
space, scale and sound in the new place prove to be reflections on their own 
sense of disaffection. The chronotope of home for Ella is, however, a shifting 
experience, as the move from the Gardens to the Avenue and then to 
eventually set up home with Profitt figure as moments of change that challenge 
the protagonist’s perceptions of her surroundings and place. The fluidity of the 
chronotope in this instance may suggest that the movement in perception is 
drastic yet transitory to the young Ella and irrevocable to her as an older 
character. The finality of her perceptions, if this is evident, becomes marked by 
social and mental regression into a character who does not trust her mind or 
her ability to function properly, and upon whom a measure of chronotopic 
stagnation has occurred.
The best trope with which to describe Ella’s condition is the mad 
chronotope. In ‘No More Yellow’, it is Ella’s role as unreliable narrator that 
positions the character within the temporal and spatial framework which
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governs the text and her place in it. As stated previously, the book is split into 
two parts and it is in the second part that Ella’s mad persona comes to bear. 
Therefore, there is an ellipsis in part one of the novel where Ella’s overactive 
imagination is described. This ellipsis in time is also marked by a change in 
spatial matters; Ella moves away from the Avenue in part two of the novel and 
lives with her husband and son in another part of the borough. This break in 
proceedings and the marked ellipsis provide mad chronotopic moments of 
disclosure that place the unreliable narrator at odds with any rational plane of 
thought and name her as an alternate voice. Ella finds it difficult to secure 
information from those around her and have a discussion about it. What 
information she does have is partly uninterpretable to her, as it is not 
communicated to her in any open discussion -  Stanley’s diary, for example -  
“The bit that said he was my father didn’t seem to match with the bit that said I 
wasn’t his granddaughter. I tried to make them make sense.” In part two of 
the novel, Ella’s madness is defined by a sense of uncommunicativeness. She 
socialises with some of the people at her group meetings for depressives and 
has made an effort to form a relationship with Profitt, but these associations are 
not fulfilling and she has difficulty in finding her own voice. There is not the play 
with conventions of narrative speech as in Orange Laughter, but there is a 
sense that the character speaks conventionally only because she has no other 
way of articulating herself. Mad language is used in a much more subtle 
context in ‘No More Yellow’ than in Orange Laughter. As mentioned earlier, 
there is a sense that the language around Ella is uninterpretable by her. Her 
role in society is measured by her madness, and her role as a mother is also 
definable by her breakdown. This is shown by her inability to communicate with
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her acquaintances on a meaningful level and her general regression from 
articulate, imaginative teenager to, at times, barely lucid adult.
They say that people start hearing voices when 
there is a void in their lives and hearing is the 
only thing that can fill it. I don’t know if that is true 
but I can remember the date and time that they 
began for me and I wasn’t looking to fill anything. (229)
Ella’s “confession” is complicated by the fact that she does not know 
what she is confessing; the protagonist knows that she is ill but does not know 
enough about the illness to define it or articulate what could have been 
underlying problems. The fact that she is an unreliable narrator complicates 
things even further, because as a witness to trauma she has little to confess 
that is as dramatic as Tony’s disaffection, yet does not have the language to 
articulate the slights of childhood and her own alienation from those around her 
without feeling compromised.
The “idea” of madness is indeed a moment of implosion, as for Ella the 
sense of alienation in her formative years comes to a head with the break up of 
her relationship with Profitt. Ella’s madness is equally about a process of 
remembering and an act of forgetting; it is about how those things we choose to 
forget reassert themselves as delusion and irrationality. Therefore, the idea of 
madness in ‘No More Yellow’ acts as the link between the moment of implosion 
and the recovery of the recalling of events, the latter being an aspect not fully 
realised for Ella.
The implied reader needs to fill in the gaps in Ella’s knowledge with their 
own and the ellipses in her description of her “mad” episodes with their own 
imagination, as she cannot fully articulate her denouement. The implied reader
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facilitates dialogue in much the same way as she does in Orange Laughter, 
although without the two versions of events running alongside each other and 
having to be interwoven by the discerning addressee.
The mad chronotope, though not open to a discussion on a discourse as 
I believe there is not one in relation to madness, makes room for the alternate 
voice in proceedings. Ella, having had her gaps filled in by a perceptive 
addressee, is open to interpretation as an unreliable narrator both in the first 
and second part of the book. As she looks over that summer of 1981 from the 
position of an adult and watches her teenage self go through changes and 
configurations that she feels she could not cope with as an adult, I think that it is 
important to note that, unlike for Tony, there is no resolution for Ella in the 
uncovering of something forgotten. There is only the inescapable fact that she 
will not become anyone else unless rationalisation takes hold.
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Chapter Three: Utopian Madness in Toni Morrison’s Paradise
But I hear voices in everything and dialogic relations among them.
M. M. Bakhtin (1986)
The Other is always “mad.” Insanity is not merely a label (any more than is geography or skin 
color). It exists in reality. But the Other’s “madness” is what defines the sanity of the defining 
group.
Sander L. Gilman (1985)
It is as though we have to call on the “healthy” function of ideology to cure the madness of 
utopia.
Paul Ricoeur (Taylor 1986)
As I have discussed previously regarding the representation of madness 
in fiction, the chronotope is an element of Bakhtinian theory that presupposes 
the link between geographical space and chronological time as they appear in 
works of literature. This is best described as the inseparable nature of time and 
space within a literary context -  both supposedly move at the same time over a 
certain distance and it is possible to invoke a literary genre within this, as in the 
adventure novel, for example. The chronotope was not discussed in any great 
detail by Bakhtin, but in applying it to text, as he did in terms of Dostoevsky’s 
work, amongst others, one can begin to appreciate his evaluative reasoning as 
it relates to plot and time, space and setting, of which both instances are 
interchangeable. Within this thesis, the link between the representation of 
madness and the geographic and chronology has been clearly a moment of site 
evaluation and time relevance, so that in the piece on Danticat, the chronotope 
provides a useful space from which to evaluate nation and belonging during a 
certain time in history, whereas in the discussion on Ross’ work the chronotope 
is more useful as a metaphor for ideas on the American home over a range of 
historical time. This metaphoric relation is particularly useful as a figurative
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motif as the metaphor has the capacity to both elucidate and challenge and, in 
the case of a reading of Morrison’s novel, take on multi-layered reasonings.
Paradise is about a small, self-sufficient black town, population 360, out 
west in Oklahoma, settled by fifteen families -  or fourteen, if one is to believe 
another representation of the story. Seventeen miles from the town lies a large 
house that had been a smuggler’s den and a Convent and which eventually 
houses five women, Consolata, who had been brought to the Convent by the 
original Mother Superior who dies at the beginning of the novel, Mavis, Gigi 
(Grace), Seneca and Pallas -  all have stressful stories to tell and rely on the 
Convent’s serenity and obscurity to allow them time to reconsider their 
positions. The book’s title suggests that alternatively Ruby and the Convent are 
no ordinary place, but that utopian idealism, present particularly in the town, 
conforms to patterns of myth-making that are ultimately irresolvable. Because 
of this irreconcilability and the nature of self-sufficiency, it is possible to come to 
the conclusion that elements of madness, in its ontological sense of abstraction 
and as a pathological insight for the reader, feature on a number of levels that 
myth-making and mere phantasms (in the town’s spiritual founder) cannot 
function within. Therefore it is possible to consider the spiritual and 
mythologizing as outside of conventional aspects of madness.
I will look at Paradise in relation to three specific points of literary theory: 
in The Mad Chronotope and its Place in Utopia, the text -  using a 
poststructuralist reading of the term “text” as being a sign that is relational to 
other signs and beyond any taxonomical hierarchy, more “web-like” in its 
complex construction (Eagleton 1996: 114) -  undergoes a relational
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examination of reason and insanity within the confines of “bad” utopia and 
suggests chronotopic moments of understanding, using the work of Anthony 
Appiah and Christine van Boheemen-Saaf; in Dialogics and Dialectics, the 
argument is extended to examine the Bakhtinian enterprise within a slightly 
wider context -  the relevance of dialectical “language” that supports the 
Bakhtinian notion that the unconscious is far from “nothing” is related to further 
chronotopic moments and discussed through the work of J. Brooks Bouson; and 
in the final segment, the concept of African American double-consciousness is 
explored within the theoretical context of mimesis -  an action to which Ruby- 
esque utopias tend to concede -  using the work of Sandra Adell and Samuel 
IJsseling. As is clear from this brief summary, the chronotope appears 
paramount to this understanding of the text as a means of isolating such 
contexts within a textual framework. It also becomes clear that a reading of my 
own novel, ‘No More Yellow’, within these contexts will provide an interesting 
juxtaposition between the two texts.
What I have termed as the mad chronotope, as the term suggests, 
denotes mental dysfunction and discontinuities in narrated events as unreliable 
aspects of narration and takes the fixed terms of relative sequentiality within the 
abstraction of space and time and re-orders it. The mad chronotope figures the 
relevance of interrelated psychotic planes of thought and applies their 
signification in the narrative, marking this point of rupture, which is not always 
exclusively psychotic, with the relevance of space -  setting, site, contestation -  
and time; place, plot and (dis)order: of course, time and space are not usually 
split within the chronotopic moment, but as is clear by the denominations placed 
in each context, they largely overlap. Once these associations have been
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figured in the text, the mad chronotopic foundations transform the distinctive 
form of psychosis; rather than being solely a relational phase of language, the 
psychotic becomes positioned in plot, characterisation and theme in a way that 
belies its abstractness and non-sequentiality.
What Christine van Boheemen-Saaf describes as the “mimesis of loss” 
(1999: 11) inscribes the writerly process with conscious self-revision that allows 
for the appropriation of the past and its traumatic heritage, a rich location for the 
initiation of the mad chronotope and its inscriptions. Through self-evaluative 
repetition -  which is as relevant to the psychotic as the sane -  that reasserts 
the “... hollowness of the experience of the loss of linguistic interiority into the 
heart of the specular copy” (11) -  a process that allows the somewhat vacuous 
nature of the language of remembered experience its remnant in the presence 
of image -  van Boheemen-Saaf suggests that a specific form of literature can 
be developed that can “... narrate the present as a form of contemporaneity that 
is always belated” (Bhabha 1990: 308) -  an insight also made by Bakhtin 
(Emerson 1986: 3). An example of this can be found in Morrison’s Song of 
Solomon, a novel that relates the preoccupations of 1970s urban African 
America with an underlying attestation to the belatedness of such concerns in 
the face of co-current history or heritage. This in itself conveys aspects of the 
mad chronotope; it places trauma at the heart of loss, with loss describing the 
unreliability of traumatic representation. This is, of course, problematic for the 
narrative, as it challenges the very notion of language and thought transmitting 
corresponding reports that are recognizable and, therefore, reai, despite the 
underlying abstract nature of thoughts. It also correlates the repetitive nature of 
past traumatic instances as emblematic of self-revision; repetition and the mad
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chronotope are linked by the arbitrary nature of time and space and the 
philosophy of truth as reconstituted. This sense of truth has an inherent 
abstract reasoning that is forever volatile for the bearer and listener as it refers 
to other adumbrative elements such as being, knowledge, power and 
experience that, as in representation, circles back on itself in ways that repeat 
and readmit (Flynn 1993: 149). This “circling”, in itself an articulation of 
repetition and aporia, recognises the lapses in modernist thinking and post­
modernist conceptual actualisation, and, as such, refigures the truth of the 
subject as unpredictable. The subject, reconstituted by the character’s 
repetition and having reinterpreted events ad nauseum, conspires to relate such 
attentiveness to the nature of self-review. This self-review, in this context, is not 
always wholly possible -  we think, but then reinterpret events at either an 
excruciatingly pedantic level that suggests the mechanics of order taking 
precedence, or the creative element admits its priority and becomes 
transformational.
The Mad Chronotope and its Place in Utopia
Near the beginning of the novel, Mavis Albright leaves her twin babies in 
her husband’s car for a few minutes on a hot day and they suffocate. All of the 
chapter headings are women’s names, and Mavis’ chapter opens with her being 
interviewed by a reporter, her remaining children surrounding her. The 
character expresses feeling unsafe around her children, particularly a girl 
named Sal and on escaping the house one dawn, imagines that Sal and the 
rest of her children have left traps for her. On reaching her mother’s house in 
the stolen Cadillac, she tells Birdie Goodroe that her children are trying to kill 
her.
99
““Tried how? What did they do?”
“Sal had a razor and they was laughing and watching me.
Every minute watching me.”
“What did Sal do with the razor?”
“She had it next to her plate and she was looking at me.
They all was.”
Neither woman spoke about it again, because Birdie told 
Mavis she could stay if and only if she never talked that 
way again.” (Morrison 1998: 32)
The mad chronotope, appearing in this context as paranoia and 
repetition, captures the overwhelming nature of schizophrenia when considered 
by a sane, yet uninformed, mind. That Mavis repeats this episode to her mother 
and, it may be suggested, sub-consciously goes over events at different sites 
during her subsequent travels throughout America, creates a chronotopic 
moment other than her home life with her husband and children but in keeping 
with a contested sense of reality. Mavis’ explanation of “imagined” events are 
told to her mother a week before the physical journey that leads her to the 
Convent. Her mother’s house, ostensibly a site of nurture and acceptance, is a 
direct trajectory from the home she attempts to escape from, that is, a place 
where the validity of mother/father, daughter/nurturer roles is paramount. Birdie 
Goodroe cannot answer the feeling of acute paranoia that is exacerbated by 
Mavis’ sense of shame and guilt; Birdie Goodroe’s thoughts are, pragmatically, 
with the welfare of the living children and Mavis’ role as a nurturer/giver rather 
than as the bereaved. Mavis, hyper-aware of her feelings at this point, throws 
herself from one contested site -  which houses her often drunk, sexually 
libidinous husband and needy children -  to another: her mother’s severe 
simplicity in a place of supposed nurture; the open road with all its 
malfunctioning travellers therein; the Convent and the intrinsic clash of 
personalities within a multi-peopled household. The narrative, in this instance,
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provides each new site with extended moments of lucidity that would seem to 
belie her initial psychotic state, but instead sequentially exhumes it.
It was amazing how they changed and grew. They could 
not hold their heads up when they departed, but when she 
first heard them in the mansion, they were already toddlers, 
two years old. Based on their laughter, she could tell 
precisely. And based on how well integrated they were with 
the other children who chased about the rooms, she knew 
how they grew. Now they were school age, six and a half, 
and Mavis had to think of age-appropriate birthday and 
Christmas presents. (1998: 258)
Far from being an over-simplistic contested site like her mother’s house 
where conversations are closed quite forcibly, the Convent proves in part to be 
that confrontational place of transformational qualities that Bakhtin refers to in 
relation to Rabelaisian carnival, and includes another voice within itself (Lechte 
1990: 106); this suggests a comment within a comment, an utterance within an 
utterance -  multilayered reasonings. In this place, the repetition of past events 
and their eventual correlation into another way of seeing has its place -  even if 
it is not entirely catered for. Bhabha’s reference to the contemporaneity of 
belatedness in theoretical exposition that van Boheemen-Saaf relates to the 
self-referential nature of loss in the narrative is considered in the relationship 
that Mavis has with her dead children. Her auditory hallucinations appear to be 
in keeping with the psychotic; her planes of thought permit the unreal and distort 
past events within a chronotopic moment that tolerates the admittance of 
imagined growth in the ages of the dead children. All this occurs while the 
characters exist within a place that allows for trauma -  the effects of trauma are 
tolerated by the other women in the Convent, particularly Consolata, and the 
past is considered in its postmodernist sense rather than a nostalgic one; that 
is, the past is a place where irony foreshadows the contemporaneous rather 
than reveres it for the lessons the past may hold. Indeed, in referring back to
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sites of contestation, the Convent establishes itself as a place of loss; its 
original manifestation as a swindler’s mansion, then, after lying derelict for a 
number of years, a school for Arapaho girls run by nuns, attests to losses of the 
previous inhabitants -  the swindler’s expensive, vulgar furnishings are trashed 
by the nuns and, as seen in the quotation above, the Arapaho girls supposedly 
leave behind their laughter having fought disease and disillusionment. The mad 
chronotope allows for this contemporaneity and loss by exposing the voice 
within to historicity whilst challenging any sign of conformity; Mavis hears, 
responds, and evaluates what she hears within the context of the Convent’s at 
once lush, then devotional, history and her response is yet another utterance to 
add to its unconventionality -  in Bakhtinian terms a very heteroglossic moment 
that suggests a multiplicity of voices in one site.
In Mavis’ instance, her social function as a mother remains, for her 
and for at least one of the other women (Consolata), as something real despite 
her estrangement from her living children and the death of the twins she still 
hears and imagines. It could be suggested that the acceptance by another of a 
psychotic’s discourse can extend the moment of psychosis and also safely 
forestall reality, given a nurturing environment. The sequence of time that is 
permitted for Mavis’ delusion to function, over six years, is quite extensive, and, 
as mentioned in the above quotation, is inclusive of a full narrative being 
supplied by her for the dead twins. That the mad chronotopic moment for Mavis 
occurs at length within two sections and at both ends of the novel, the second 
section being a part-repeat of the first, and in between she is characterised as a 
multi-functioning, lucid, if at times cantankerous, woman, creates a narrative 
temporality that suspends her illness. This permits the illness to run its course
102
without censure within the Convent; it is, in fact, the Convent women who refer 
to the townswomen, who travel the seventeen miles outside of the town’s realm 
on various occasions, as mad. This temporal suspension is exacerbated by the 
tales of the less fortunate women and men of Ruby; within this textual “space”, 
a deferral of condemnation takes place that allows Mavis her hallucinations and 
provides a fitting backdrop to the more traditional notions of refractory madness 
that unconsciously exist in Ruby. And it is within this deferral that what Marc 
Connor calls the “dialogue between cancelled and continuing possibilities” 
(2000: 114) in fiction occurs; the text suggests withdrawal from a woman’s 
madness that is real and visceral to a spiritual realm that allows for supernatural 
happenings -  in Dovey’s hallucinatory moment described later, for example. 
However, one of the continuing possibilities open to reinterpretation is the fact 
that this small black town exists as an outsider and, in so doing, permits its own 
rules of exclusion and scapegoating; while it would allow the myth-making 
quality of the town’s inception, with “sightings” signalling the end of the 
founders’ journey, the women’s dysfunction mentioned here and later in this 
chapter would be considered “Other”, as Gilman states in the epigraph, in order 
to validate the town’s inception story and endorse Ruby’s utopian status. 
Therefore, the suspension of the depiction of Mavis’ psychosis is not only a 
narrative ploy in the sense that it opens the way for a broader examination of 
madness, but it suggests that such a deferment allows alterity, in terms of 
suppressed madness, “allowed” spirituality and utopian idealism.
African American literary theorist Anthony Appiah notes that, in keeping 
with ideas mooted by Bakhtin and Voloshinov, amongst others, our utterances 
represent our reality and beliefs (1986: 16) and goes further to suggest that our
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mental state at any given time determines what these utterances will be. Given 
this explanation of the “assertion condition” (17) and taking into consideration 
Bakhtinian theory on the role of conscious utterances and the presumed 
addressee that insists on the other to validate what is spoken, Mavis’ role as 
agent provocateur, in terms of the mad chronotope’s temporal frame and her 
narrative character, appears to be questioning aspects of truth as espoused by 
the 8-rock founders of Haven and Ruby. This becomes clearer once a reading 
of the events leading up to the naming of the town centrepiece is described as 
this provides an insight into the townspeople and the otherness of the women at 
the Convent.
The first town came into being after a group of dark-skinned men and 
women came upon “The Disallowing”, an incident that occurred when they 
reached the established western all-black town of Fairly and were refused entry 
because of their complexion. They create their own town of Haven and build 
the Oven; a communal meeting place inscribed with the phrase “the Furrow of 
His Brow”. Haven becomes dishevelled and run down during the Second 
World War, and the veterans decide to move to a new place, which is eventually 
named Ruby after a dead townswoman. The Oven is packed up, brick by brick, 
and resituated further west within Oklahoma territory in the new town of Ruby 
where, by the 1970s, the young and old argue about the inscription and what 
truth it is supposed to hold. It is at this juncture -  and bearing in mind the 
paranoid tendencies and confused sense of truth related by Mavis at the 
beginning of the novel -  that the grand utopian narrative that establishes the 
town of Ruby is thwarted by contestation. As part of the phrase has worn away, 
elder members insist it initially read “Beware the Furrow of His Brow” whilst the
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younger men consider it to be “Be the Furrow of His Brow”, both deeply 
religious utterances that specify the town’s attendance to a Christian theology. 
To the male founders of Ruby, the latter inscription suggests a lack of morality 
and social rectitude that belies their truth and their understanding of 
righteousness. This moral tone and reflections on it form the “official” basis of 
the utopian ideal that, in turn, is parodied by the unofficial nature of paganism 
and non-hierarchical order as espoused at the Convent, despite its Catholic 
inheritance.
The notions of heteroglossia and the unofficial utterances of the people 
have natural links to the mad chronotope in this instance, as the chronotope is 
marked by spatial “absence”, in relation to Mavis’ delusion being narratively 
forestalled. Appiah’s claims regarding utterances and the link to mental state 
and Bakhtin’s theory on the conscious utterance rely on the “sane” mind and 
the craving for lucidity of the mad; in the town utterances are paramount as the 
town is unchartered territory and concedes only to spoken mutuality. Ruby’s 
inception therefore, which, if one proposes Friedman’s classification of utopia, 
stems from shared disillusionment and, then, consent at proposing a resolution 
agreed on by the collective (Goodwin 1982: 86), needed the oral agreement of 
the founders:
... if they stayed together, worked, prayed and defended 
together, they would never be like Downs, Lexington,
Sapulpa, Gans where Colored were run out of town
overnight. Nor would they be among the dead and
maimed of Tulsa, Norman, Oklahoma City, not to
mention victims of spontaneous whippings, murders
and depopulation by arson. Except for a crack here, a
chink there everything in Ruby was intact. There was
no need to wonder if moving the Oven had been a
mistake; whether it needed its original soil as foundation
for the respect and wholesome utility that was its due. (1998: 112)
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Ruby is depicted as a town losing its fight for survival from encroaching 
change. It exists, like any utopia, on the periphery of society, and creates order 
through traditional societal methods -  instituting doctrines, values and hierarchy 
-  and without others, such as any law enforcement agency but that of the state. 
The black elders are in negotiations with the male youth to restore the 
contested motif engraved on an Oven that has monumental ideological 
significance to the founders and their families. Culturalist Zygmunt Bauman’s 
idea that diversity should not be irreconcilable with notions of hierarchy and 
dominion within utopia (Shepherd 1993: 47) is suggestive here of a part 
compromise between the Bakhtinian idea of utopia, which insists on a “dynamic 
one, always remaining confrontational, unpredictable, and self-mocking” 
(Gardiner 1993: 37), and the Bloch-ian enterprise which queries the vicissitudes 
of hope, and is an idea which some of the elders seem to struggle with. This is 
renounced by a telling few, and the mad chronotope re-emerges to function 
within the narrative not only as a source for psychotic language within the town, 
but as a part representation of the timelessness of the unconscious; if there is 
no temporal or connective point of the unconscious prior to language and 
culture, which Freud (Taylor 1986: 144), amongst others, suggests, and this is 
reflected in this lack of connectedness, then language, in this instance that 
which is known by the townspeople, is also forestalled in the narrative by 
limitedness that is inexpressible.
If timelessness, as part of the realm of the unconscious, is part of the 
construction of the mad chronotope as it perhaps becomes represented in 
sequentiality in language and cultural forms purely because of its absence, what 
is obviated by its absence, or perhaps left “open-ended” to suggest non-censure
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in the narrative tends to become legitimated by that very absence. Therefore, 
the unutterable nature of absence, in this instance the limitedness of language 
among the 8-rock families concerning the otherness of the women’s lives at the 
Convent, permits the abhorrent to become justifiable in ideology. That the type 
of utopian ideal espoused by the people of Ruby cannot justify otherness and 
difference in the grand scheme of things is made clear by the outcome of the 
discrepancy in opinions regarding the Oven and during the eventual plotting and 
killing of the women at the Convent. The notion of utopian idealism as a 
concept that supports ideology as a social function (Taylor 1986: 9) that has no 
constructed place for societal dysfunction is relevant here. Apart from meetings 
held by the elders to discuss disputes -  there are no legalised formalities except 
those affecting the bank -  Ruby becomes a place in which conditional 
madness, detailed by women like Dovey and Arnette, and recognisable by its 
pariah status, is shaped. Sightings and barely conceivable happenings are 
legitimised through the town people’s history of folklore and superstition, which 
through time forms the semblance of tradition; Haven was built on a site found 
for them by the mystical sighting of a man with a satchel and the nearby 
trapping of a heavily plumaged guinea fowl -  the bird suggesting wealth -  and 
the inscription on the Oven preferred by the elders was said to be read in its 
original form by a five year old townsgirl called Esther, one of the few survivors 
of the original Haven families. This magical realist reading, which is more often 
read in African Diasporic literature from Africa -  for instance Ben Okri’s The 
Famished Road (1992) and Amos Tutuola’s The Palm-Wine Drinkard (1952) -  
confirms the notion that ideology is limitless in its taxonomy and its socialising 
function and, once spoken can, in turn, become traditionalised. The original 
fifteen families from Haven who support this telling of the founding of Ruby
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create a conscious connection to a phantasm that was not confirmed by the 
townspeople before their journey, but, if we take the metaphor literally, was 
formed as a consequence of co-existing hope -  quite a Bloch-ian utopian 
reading. Further, as the text also suggests that there were fourteen rather than 
the stated fifteen families -  Patricia Best lists fourteen families in her genealogy 
of the town, the narrator states fifteen -  it is possible that the unreliability of 
history and memory, as well as the subjective, contested nature of written texts, 
whether historical, fictive or a mixture of both, is being acknowledged. Referring 
back to Appiah’s link between utterance and mental state, one is led from this 
conclusion to question the validity of the utterance even at inception due to its 
“invented” quality and, despite the shared disenchantment of the original 8- 
rocks, interrogate their commitment to each other and the new town, and its 
lack of “original soil”. As stated previously, Mavis’ character provides this 
questioning quality as she is the “original” mad interlocutor and creator of an 
illusion.
The town only knows death through war overseas and therefore has no 
cemetery; like Garcia Marquez’s novel One Hundred Years of Solitude (1970) it 
is implied that the people of the town are living an illusion which competes with 
reality on a number of levels, but it is not until the death of Sweetie’s child Save- 
Marie and the women at the Convent that the townspeople are shaken from 
their complacency and seek reconciliation with the outside world. Therefore the 
questioning aspect that is mooted as madness or superstition on one hand, 
spirituality or pariah status on the other is forever negotiable and, ultimately, 
appears to be truth. This questioning aspect, whilst refuting the illusion, also 
submits to the idea of truth being dialogic, then, as it accepts the
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multidimensionality of experience, knowledge and being and is conversational 
rather than monologic. It is also not solely the product of the conscious mind, 
as it is in the unconscious that the timelessness and absence of conscious 
thought becomes apparent in the transference of content from one source to 
another.
Van Boheemen-Saaf relates the psychoanalytical notion of transference 
as that which "... is the spilling over of unconscious content beyond the frame of 
the individual self... it subverts the distinction between presence and absence, 
presence and past, real and imaginary” and is presented to an addressee in 
reality (1999: 50), giving it its Bakhtinian dialogic reading, as an addressee is 
always presumed. The narrative interpretation of this term in Paradise does not 
always allow for the addressee as real, or for a conclusive truth to be realised. 
Yet the transference, with its notion of subversion and filled-in absences that 
suggest the un-real provides a dissident dialogic, as apparent in the mad 
chronotope and the psychotic language therein. This marks the lives of 
characters like townswomen Arnette and Dovey, who purport notions of the 
illusory whilst displaying the dual aspects of the transference model and display 
the mimetic function of representation through displacement, an aspect of which 
is discussed in the latter section of the chapter.
Thing was, when he came, she talked nonsense.
Things she didn’t know were on her mind. Pleasures, 
worries, things unrelated to the world’s serious 
issues. Yet he listened intently to whatever she said.
By a divining she could not explain, she knew that once 
she asked him his name, he would never come again.
Dovey (1998: 92)
The girl was wearing white silk shoes and a cotton 
sundress. She carried a piece of wedding cake on 
a brand-new china plate. And her smile was regal.
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“I’m married now,” she said, “Where is he? Or was 
it a she?”
Arnette (1998: 179) 
Previous to her marriage to KD, Arnette becomes pregnant. She 
attempts to persuade Consolata to abort the baby, and, after being refused this, 
finally succeeds in doing so herself. After the event, Arnette tells her husband 
KD and certain townspeople that during her brief stay at the Convent, the 
women who live in the Convent aborted her baby. The articulation of this loss is 
countered in the text by the Convent women’s rendition, spoken amongst 
themselves -  including the statement from Gigi that Arnette is a “psycho”.
Given Arnette’s return to the Convent, wedding cake in hand (see above 
quotation), and the women’s response to it, it is clear that this transference of 
the unconscious thought, steeped in trauma, is fully realised. The conscious re­
telling of events does not afford the addressee the actual happening, but 
accesses the reconstituted truth as viable -  Arnette even asks for the gender of 
the baby. In this way, the character can become repositioned in the text 
because of her act of survival; despite her initial action being a response to her 
ambivalence towards KD, it also centres her character as one of the town 
victims of the women at the Convent. This shift enables further resistance in 
the town to the Convent women’s presence and signifies the ambivalence of 
loss at its most fundamental level. For if loss, in this instance, readmits the mad 
chronotope at an established site, the Convent, and yet reinvents itself as truth 
to the addressee -  the townspeople and her husband believe her -  Arnette 
subverts the truth and, through traumatic “reasoning”, succumbs to and 
reshapes that loss. But as the underlying premise is that she believes her own 
subversion and has transformed her position in the town through this dissent, it 
provides yet another example of metaphysical delusion. J. Brooks Bouson goes
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so far as to state that “In accusing the Convent women of killing her child, 
(Arnette) transfers onto them her own disavowed guilt and shame” (2000: 203). 
But, perhaps, matters are slightly more ambiguous than that, as Arnette does 
not merely scapegoat the women, but reasserts herself in the context of 
becoming a “good” wife and mother to future children. Her guilt and shame, 
however it is perceived, become meaningless to her as the truth has been 
supplemented by a lie based on delusion that distorts her unconscious, and her 
feelings are not merely of shame in its debasing sense, but of survival. In 
Arnette’s instance, the mad chronotope insists on the site of the Convent as 
ambivalent contestation; it represents a transitory place of both internal and 
ideological conflict as well as nurture, and positions Arnette as emblematic of 
the town’s “madness”, according to the Convent women, and as one of the 
accusatory symbols of the men’s violence -  what they eventually do at the 
Convent is partly in her name. Her role as a wife of an 8-rock descendent 
complicates this, as she is, in terms of the town, representative of reproduction 
and longevity -  the cyclical order of reproductive continuity. As such, the 
charge made by Arnette against the Convent women responds to the proposal 
that she fulfil that cyclical order as her position in the town demands it.
Dovey’s experience is unspoken and hallucinatory. It is not a delusion to 
pass on as, yet again, the character needs to survive it, not live within the 
confines of shame. Dovey sees a young man walk through the grounds of an 
old house, previously foreclosed by her husband’s bank, that she and Steward, 
her husband, are hoping to buy in town as presently they live further out on a 
farm. She sometimes goes to the foreclosed property to relax and get away 
from the politics of the town. During one of these moments she first catches
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sight of the man, who she calls Friend, who she speaks to and tells a series of 
nonsensical happenings. This continues throughout the summer and beyond 
and, despite her obvious confusion, which she attributes to forgetting, Dovey 
does not tell another person in the town or Convent about his visits. There are 
no new people in town that she can identify him by, and each visit is marked by 
the nonsense that she speaks and his intent listening, then his disappearance 
through the trees in the grounds -  he does not appear anywhere else.
Dovey’s survival does not suggest a particular traumatic event as 
emblematic of her madness, as certain trauma theorists might propose. 
However, her situation displays aspects of the mad chronotope that play with 
sequentiality whilst describing Bhabha’s notion of contemporaneous 
belatedness in its limited terms; limited by the confines of what Gardiner calls a 
“...’bad’ utopia” (Shepherd 1993: 25), or one that does not commit to diversity, 
but by its own deferment. Dovey’s description of Friend appears in a chapter 
headed “Seneca”, a character from the Convent; the chapter also includes 
sections with Deacon (Steward’s twin brother), Sweetie (a townswoman), 
Steward and Soane (Steward’s wife), as narrated in the third person. Dovey’s 
loss, her confidence in Deacon, her husband, and loneliness, is placed within a 
multitude of narrative voices, which suggest the progression of the narrative 
rather than a disjunctive lapse -  as in Mavis’ case. The site of Dovey’s 
hallucination is stagnant; as noted above, Friend appears in one place and at a 
time of inertia for Dovey. Her loss, though a present consideration, presents 
itself as deferred in the sense that she accepts it at this given time rather than 
recognises it prior to this. This is suggested in the text by Dovey’s newly wed 
worries regarding her husband’s food; she doubts herself as a woman as he
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always has a comment to make about her cooking. Her concern is voiced to 
her sister, Soane, but as the text leads us through a time shift and 
contemporary reading of her apprehension including the fact that she thinks of 
her husband as a man of losses rather than (financial) gains, and opinions, for 
example those concerning the youth of the town and segregation, that are 
repugnant to her, it becomes clear that what she described as a worry about her 
cooking was in fact an unease about his opinionated stance and her place, as a 
woman, in utopia.
The nature of the relationship between herself and her husband suggests 
that he has little time for listening to her thoughts outside of those generated by 
the town’s well being and their position in the town. She creates, as one 
commentator put it, a man in her own image; Friend is someone who listens, is 
courteous and reliable. Friend resides outside of the town’s ideology of mutual 
socialisation; he does not discuss issues that affect the town nor is he part of it. 
Her delusion, in psychiatric terms defined by a lack of sensory input and 
“internal and external sources of stimulation” (Archer 1999: 131), replicates the 
sighting at the town’s inception in idealism only; her act of survival would be 
considered madness if told to the townpeople as it is without utopia’s social 
formation -  it is neither for the group or of it. Missy Dehn Kubitschek sees 
Dovey’s delusion as a point of departure, of escape from her present 
predicament (1998: 175), whereas it seems that Dovey’s discovery is not 
merely that she is maintaining the faculties of the escapist, but that she can see 
outside of the town’s prescription of utopia and find her own representation of 
stability, if only in the type of delusion/illusion that is part of the town’s myth­
making quality. Ruby’s utopian ideal, that which stalls contradictory interests in
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the name of shared mythologies, mores and customs of a religious and 
patriarchal cultural sphere and one that imposes hierarchy, is an antithetical 
proposition to the utopia of a Bakhtinian enterprise, which is a “dynamic one, 
always remaining confrontational, unpredictable, and self-mocking” (Gardiner 
1993: 37), which is important to a reading of Dovey’s character. In Ron David’s 
explanatory notes on the works of Morrison, he draws much from biblical 
references and, in particular, a Gnostic reading of the Convent women as gods, 
chiefly with reference to Consolata’s female/male appearance in divinity which 
also bears some relevance to Dovey’s “sighting”. The importance of myth­
making occurs to the critic, but is secondary to such possible biblical 
connotations. Yet it is the adherence to the traditional and exclusive, that which 
eschews the “self-mocking” irreverence of the town’s youth and, instead, dotes 
on a notion of history that refutes, or sidesteps, confrontation and dynamism -  
except that which got them to start a new town in the first place -  that advances 
the primary illusion/myth-making motif. Whilst religiosity remains an established 
emblem of the illusion motif, it leaves little room for the alterity and madness of 
the Other necessary for the multi-layered reading of myth that Paradise 
requires. In a poststructuralist sense, Dovey represents the rupture of the 
conventional. Linearity, even if thought fraught with the unexpected by the 
founders who subvert reality through sightings to provide a racialised and, at 
times, codified ideology, becomes a part of the town’s myth, recited by 
schoolchildren at the Christmas fete through a retelling of the town’s inception 
which bears much resemblance to a re-telling of Exodus. Dovey’s break from 
tradition is that she sees an image that is outside of acceptance, outside of the 
ideology that the construct of utopia feeds from and is, therefore, an individual 
instance of madness. Although clouded in the respectability of spirituality and
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concordance with the Convent women’s alterity, the phantasm can clearly be 
seen as an aspect of delusion that manifests itself not solely through some 
alternative view of the spirit world, but as an expression of madness.
Arnette and Dovey appear to resist reality at a certain level yet persist in 
their maintenance of their societal roles. What could be construed as their 
adherence to their roles is, as stated in the first section of this chapter, an act of 
survival. The dialectical is marked by the dialogic at a concurrent level as the 
simultaneity of the real/unreal and seen/unseen is challenged by the dialogue of 
acceptance; neither woman attains total survival but tolerates their reality. That 
this dialogue is in no way literal, particularly in Dovey’s case, is accentuated by 
the characters’ inquiries into the realm of the unreal. Their point of advocacy is 
limited; their stance, that which prefers mental breakdown to particular aspects 
of reality, confirms their status within the town. Their roles are defined by a 
society that they shun, and they, and the other townspeople, are complicit in the 
actualisation of these roles. Their mental disorder suggests that the dialectical 
nature of their existence, as stated by themselves, the men of Ruby and their 
patriarchal society, proposes only certain interstices from which Arnette and 
Dovey can relate their subversion -  here, subversion relates to madness as an 
ultimately subversive act, not as an empowering process; it is too debilitating for 
these women for that to be the case.
The mad chronotope suggests dissension within its (dis)order phase, yet 
also places the vacuity of memory within such disorder; Dovey’s memory in a 
figurative and, ultimately, unreliable sense, proposes a reason for the phantasm 
-  loneliness. This vacuity, if one can suggest the proposed emptiness of the
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unconscious in this context, does much to re-figure the dialogic moments in the 
text in terms of the simultaneity of van Boheemen-Saafs transference model as 
anticipated by the mad chronotope and dialectical relevance.
Dialoqics and Dialectics
“Why is that child crying here?” (Sweetie)
They denied it, of course. Lied straight through the 
weeping that sifted through the room. One of them 
even tried to distract her, saying:
“I’ve heard children laughing. Singing sometimes.
But never crying.” (Mavis)
The other one cackled.
“Let me out of here.” Sweetie struggled to make her 
voice shout.
“I have to get home.” (Sweetie)
“I’m going to take you. Soon as the car warms up.” (Mavis)
Same sly demon tones.
“Now,” said Sweetie.
“Take some aspirin and eat some of this.” (Gigi)
“You let me out of this place now.”
“What a bitch,” said one. (Gigi)
“It’s just fever,” said the other. “And keep your mouth 
shut, can’t you?”
(1998: 130)
Arnette and Dovey’s “disorders” are not the only representations of 
dysfunction in the text. Sweetie Fleetwood, a descendent of an 8-rock family, 
walks the road to the Convent having spent years looking after her sickly 
children; it is suggested that they are sick due to in-breeding. She is consumed 
by thoughts of escape to the “immoral” Convent yet, whilst there, insists on 
berating the women, in her own mind, for their demon-like qualities and 
ultimately demands a way out ‘“You let me out of this place now. (Sweetie)” 
“What a bitch,” said one (Gigi)’. When her husband and a townswoman, Anna 
Flood, come to return her to the town, she tells them that she was “snatched” by 
the women at the Convent in an act that Brooks Bouson calls a deferred wish.
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Whilst in the Convent, Sweetie hears a baby cry, “Why is that child crying 
here?” She is answered by Mavis, and it is in this dialogical exchange that 
Sweetie finds the possibility of the utterance where neither Dovey nor Arnette, 
except, perhaps, in her limited conversation with Consolata, had opportunity. 
Sweetie’s response, to state that they are demons, indicates the mad 
chronotope’s insistence on the dialogic response; the utterance of the other, 
though concrete as the other is real, is considered unreliable, therefore can only 
be recognised as that in relation to the mad chronotope. Sweetie, her thoughts 
distorted by the trauma of having sickly children and having to care for them, 
can hear unreality, in the baby’s cry, but cannot respond, in any way that would 
suggest a reasonable dialogue, to Mavis’ answer. That Mavis suggests that 
she can hear children in a place that there are no children and is in some way 
responsive to Sweetie on a level that Gigi, the other woman in the room, cannot 
be, does not give Mavis the option of a Bakhtinian dialogic response that 
suggests the dialogic’s societal function -  to utter and to be, at once, 
understood in the other’s “conceptual horizon” and responded to (Gardiner 
1992: 32). Sweetie believes Mavis “Lied straight through the weeping...” and it 
is interesting to note that, while at home in Ruby, she appears not to hear her 
children cry at all. The unheard/heard dialectic is posited within the mad 
chronotope as a narrative explication of setting and site; the Convent remains a 
contentious site for the women, and men, of Ruby, always other as it is outside 
of utopia’s realm, yet remaining a psychic draw for those in emotional anguish. 
Whilst the setting of 1970s African America, with its backdrop of highly 
politicised references to Africa -  as seen in Reverend Misner’s character 
observations -  and authorial overt references to magic realism, suggest an 
African spiritualist perspective to proceedings. This seeing through another
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culture, and the unreliability of the ideological environment discussed above, 
proposes the underlying fallibility of the conceptual horizon, as it can never be 
fully recognized; even in the sane mind, opposing cultural information can be 
misunderstood and interpreted from a polarised, uninitiated position.
The dialectical possibilities of the seen/unseen and heard/unheard begin 
in the mad chronotope, as the time/ space dynamic is open to re-interpretation. 
That the town’s inception is marked by a phantasm and Dovey’s hallucination is 
implicit in this as an answer to “bad” utopia -  Friend is perhaps a representation 
not only of her husband, Steward, but of the way the town should look on 
outsiders -  confirms the relevance of positioning the mad chronotope within the 
text. Sweetie’s madness, like Dovey’s “dream state” in which the town’s illusion 
is played out, and Arnette’s manic, euphoric outburst to give them psychological 
nomenclature (1987: 27), displays aspects of psychotic language within another 
context. Sweetie leaves her home, which no one has seen her leave in six 
years, and is watched by Deacon, one of the administrators of the bank and an 
8-rock.
After considering letting Poole wait and driving on to 
catch up with Sweetie, Deek cut off his motor. July, 
his clerk and secretary, was not due until ten. There 
should be no occasion when the bank of a good and 
serious town did not open on time.
(1998: 114)
Deacon’s sighting is discussed between Anna Flood and Reverend 
Misner later in the text, and Anna expresses her concern that Deacon did not 
ask Sweetie any questions as she walked towards the Convent. The sighting 
occurs in a chapter with many narrative voices, as discussed earlier, and 
appears to be relevant to the sighting at the town’s inception, Dovey’s
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hallucination and the death of Soane’s sons during the Vietnam war. Deacon’s 
decision, on the surface a rational, reasoned explanation for his action, is 
actually wrought with his own inflexible thoughts on the value of Ruby to himself 
and the fellow 8-rocks. He waits to open a bank which administrates the 
monies of the town rather than help what he thinks may be a distressed woman, 
from an 8-rock family, on the road towards the Convent. He waits for another 
woman, July, as he is early. July is open to the work of the bank. She helps 
Deacon and Steward with the administration in a way that a woman like Sweetie 
could not do. July meets his rationale, to a certain degree, as she accepts the 
timing of the bank’s open doors and adheres to it -  he is there to check that she 
does. Sweetie cannot fit into the equation because it has its own set 
boundaries and inflexibilities of time and consequence; to be “good and 
serious”, what amounts to a reasonable, leading townsperson, does not allow 
for the interruptions or rupture of an unseen history, that of a woman who 
spends her demanding married life looking after sick children. The sighting of 
Sweetie suspends the ordinariness of order in a way that suggests underlying 
madness; it causes consternation, unsettlement and frustration whilst the scene 
suggests the reason of ideology -  without Deacon’s forthrightness and 
understanding of the concept of “good and serious”, there would be no 
dialectical opposition between reason/madness, a factor prevalent in the mad 
chronotope.
The mad chronotope, which places sequentiality at the heart of 
(dis)order, is limited to the “mechanics” of narrative unless one couples it with 
the multiple reasonings of the dialectic; Louis Mackey notes that the 
philosophical dialectic becomes discursive in the narrative (Flynn 1985: ix)
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which suggests that the limitedness of the chronotope can find flexibility in the 
anecdote. As Brooks Bouson contends, “Sweetie refuses to take ownership of 
her own wish to walk away from her damaged and silent children” (2000: 203) 
and it is in this deferment that one is drawn to the suggestion of the nothingness 
of the unconscious, as discussed earlier in relation to Dovey and Arnette, in its 
dialogical sense. Kimberlyn Leary understands that, in psychoanalytical 
discourse, as opposed to the deconstructionist view, the unconscious has 
presence, albeit only accessible under certain conditions (Abend 1996: 280). 
Indeed, in Lacanian terms, the unconscious has dialectical reference points and 
is a "... ’language’ of becoming, which insinuates proleptic 
narcissism/aggressiveness and Desire/Law modalities into all human events 
and interactions” (Ragland-Sullivan 1986: 110). That this “becoming” is not 
merely a result of the stated simultaneities of transference but goes some way 
to suggest the intersubjective conditions by which the transference mode is, 
perhaps, “articulated” places the human dialectical at odds with monologism. 
Such definitions provide the unconscious with relevance in dialectical terms that 
indicate the use of an official language in its explication, a language that we all 
would comply with and have access to. In Freudian terms, the unconscious “... 
is no more than the expression of a dissident voice” (Pearce 1994: 33), and 
suggests an alternative in the conscious mind, providing an indication of alterity 
to the dialectical question that Lacan perhaps suggests. Yet Bakhtin refers to 
the Freudian idea on the unconscious as “the unofficial conscious”; a reference 
that anticipates the compliance of the two realms rather than their alterity -  it is 
suggested that without this agreement, inner speech could not become 
articulated speech (Shepherd 1993: 11). As Leary suggests, deconstructionists 
believe in the nothingness of human objectivity and that there is no referent
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before the dialectic of language insists itself (280). This appears to contradict 
Bakhtin, in particular, as his suggestion is that there is fusion between the two 
elements that permits language rather than just a conscious realisation in just 
one realm.
“What you doing way out here? We couldn’t get 
through all night. Where is your mind? Lord, girl.
Sweetheart. What happened?”
“They made me, snatched me,” Sweetie cried.
“Oh God, take me home. I’m sick, Anna, and I 
have to look after the babies.”
“Shh. Don’t worry about that.”
“I have to. I have to.”
“It’s going to be all right now.”
(1998: 130)
The mad chronotope, in its narrative function, allows the dialectic its 
referent in dialogue in a way that permits the unconscious a language. A 
Bakhtinian thinker, who would count the nothingness of the deconstructionist’s 
unconscious as unofficial, would recognise that it cannot connect the 
unconscious motive to the consciousness of language and, therefore, speech, if 
there is a lapse, a distance between the two that restricts the spoken. These 
two factors, the reflection of the chronotopic in dialogics and the break between 
drive and utterance, have relevance in terms of the text and the representation 
of madness. In the above quotation, Sweetie is collected from the Convent by 
Jeff, her husband and Anna Flood. As soon as they arrive, Jeff asks Sweetie 
where her mind has gone. She answers that the women at the Convent “made 
me, snatched me”. That the site of the Convent responds to contestation is 
reflected in the chronotope; madness is at once allowed and reviled, as shown 
in the previous quotation, and, once that site is removed, becomes performative 
-  Sweetie’s utterance on leaving the Convent has an effect on the decision of 
the men in Ruby who eventually congregate to commit a violent act. In
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Bakhtinian terms, there is a lapse, a gap in which the consciousness of 
language, speech, is constrained, and it appears in the text as the character’s 
dissociated state; Sweetie retains a sense of reality that, in paranoia, somehow 
suits her social position, in terms of family, rather than any sense of actualised 
autonomy. The motive and utterance that are broken with no reconcilability are 
reflected in Sweetie’s call for her babies who, in essence, she had left the town 
to escape. Therefore, dialogics, at its most basic level, clarifies the dialogue 
within the text and the mad chronotope instructs it at a dialectical point. It is 
also interesting to note the use of the term “made me, snatched me” as it could 
also be construed as a point at which Sweetie possibly recognises the site for 
its re-constitutive qualities; the option is implicit in the utterance.
The representation of the dialogic and dialectical interaction in Paradise 
is clearer when placed in the context of race and Black thought, particularly in 
relation to double consciousness, the psychological equivalent of the language 
dialectic. It becomes clear at this juncture that the transference mode 
discussed in the first two sections of this chapter becomes transformed by acts 
of displacement that are inherent to mimesis’ re-presented role. Double 
consciousness goes some way to describe the mimetic function in this context 
and the representation of loss in African American literature.
Double-consciousness. Mimesis and Loss
W. E. B. Du Bois’ concept of double-consciousness is particularly 
seminal to African American literary and political thought, and suggests to a 
contemporary readership that African American people, in the early twentieth 
century and now, are considered by a society’s measure that is at odds with 
self-perception. Sandra Adell, writing in Double-Consciousness/Double B ind-
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Theoretical Issues in Twentieth-Century Black Literature, raises this issue in 
relation to Hegel and his interpretation of consciousness. She contends that 
Hegel, who considers self consciousness as duplicated within itself and a 
contradictory being -  an Unhappy Consciousness (1977: 126) -  provided the 
basis for Du Bois’ ideas on double-consciousness. If consciousness is not a 
certain entity yet it is suggested that it is always striving towards a “true self- 
consciousness” as an attempt to reconcile itself with its Other, double­
consciousness in Du Bois’ theory relates to the incompatibility of that striving in 
a racial context. Adell notes that Hegel’s interpretation of the Unhappy 
Consciousness -  “... the gazing of one self-consciousness into another, and 
itself is both, and the unity of both is also its essential nature” (1994:18-19) -  is 
relevant to an understanding of double-consciousness. For Du Bois insists 
that double-consciousness with its distinct racial element is without true self- 
consciousness. That the societal measure that Du Bois refers to is based on 
race appears obvious, as considered without this classification the comment 
would be deemed a natural part of socialization. In a novel in which the author 
admits to attempting “... first to enunciate and then eclipse the racial gaze 
altogether” (Lubiano 1998: 9) one can safely assume that this, if it was an 
expectation, was not achieved. For, within the madness of Dovey, Arnette, 
Mavis and Sweetie, lies that society’s inveterate gaze that permits a limited 
notion of self-consciousness, if one at all, based on concepts of race; the town 
of Ruby is born of African racial exclusivity.
Sometimes, if they were young and drunk or old and 
sober, the strangers might spot three or four colored 
girls walk-dawdling along the side of the road.... Their 
eyes crinkled in mischief they drive around the girls, 
making U-turns and K’s, churning up grass seen in front 
of the houses, flushing cats in front of Ace’s Grocery Store.
Circling. (1998: 12-13)
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Racial and gendered antagonisms are central to Paradise. The towns’ 
inceptions were based on a utopian ideal of exclusion, and race in its 
essentialist figuration forms the bedrock of the text. The above quotation 
relates to race at its most fundamental -  white strangers harass the young black 
girls and sexually antagonise them. The townsmen look on and “Smile 
reluctantly and in spite of themselves because they know that from this moment 
on, if not before, this man, till his final illness, will do as much serious damage to 
colored folks as he can” (13). In Du Bois’ terms, the world of the other is 
recognisable as a dominant force that acts as an obstruction to a sense of true 
self-consciousness and in the black-governed town of Ruby, the inhabitants are 
aware of its encroaching menace. Despite their seemingly independent political 
and social nature, the townspeople are aware of the town as a site of otherness 
to the outside world. Indeed, the madwomen who facilitate the semantic 
qualities of the mad chronotope, exist as more than mere examples of double­
consciousness and stalled self-consciousness, but as truly incalculable aspects 
of utopian idealism -  the madness within.
The gaze of the “disciplinary double” (1994: 85), as Homi Bhabha puts it 
in his reference to colonialism, is interesting when looking at Paradise as it 
suggests that there is a mimetic reference -  an imitation that is an act of 
displacement; this mimesis is reflected in the smile of the townsmen who, on 
encountering the menace, with its semblance of secular otherness, regard this 
otherness as threatening yet a necessary evil. Displacement and its mimetic 
function refer to the real displaced by shared subversion in this instance. 
However, as a tool of transference displacement is most suited to the idea of 
the disciplinary double being conjugated at a dialectical level that suggests
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confrontation in the subliminal. There is room for the “narcissism/ 
aggressiveness” to agitate and make the reader aware of underlying role' 
reversals, unlawfulness and antagonistic yet unsuccessful controlling 
mechanisms. The idea of control, and lack of, is important here as it is clear that 
the racial exclusivity of the utopian ideal is not feasible and that the ideology 
permits this lack of recognition. It is clear from Ricoeur’s suggestion (see 
epigram) about the “healthy function of utopia” that utopia is the unrealisable -  it 
depends on who in society is speaking about it and its label -  and that it is a 
“mad” concept because of this; though others, like Bloch, would suggest that 
hope has its place in this conclusion. In Ricoeur’s view, only ideology, with its 
preservation of order, suggests that utopia has a function as it is already 
realized. The ideology behind Ruby permits the notion that utopia is, in fact, not 
feasible, as the men may police their own borders, but they cannot stop anyone 
or anything from coming in or out. The displacement evident in the premise of 
mimesis, according to Samuel IJsseling, has spatial and temporal elements that 
link the idea of the town’s inception with the policing of borders; this seemingly 
chronotopic reading of mimesis suggests that the link is illusory representation, 
and that this is exacted by the presence of cultural and racial contestation.
Richard’s thoughts about these men were not generous.
Whether they be the first or the last, representing the 
oldest black families or the newest, the best tradition or 
the most pathetic, they had ended by betraying it all. They 
think they have out-foxed the whiteman when in fact they 
imitate him. (1998: 306)
As mimesis has immutable ties to loss in the sense that it inscribes 
difference yet refutes it, the creation of a black town, first Haven in 1850 and 
then Ruby in 1950, suggests a crisis in representation. That one of the black 
towns the founders went to rejected them and Haven, and eventually Ruby,
125
were formed on the basis of exclusion and patriarchy suggests that the 
townspeople’s perspective was skewed by an act of mimicry, a place in which 
representation struggles with original thought. The act of rejection, the 
Disallowing by the people of Fairly to accept the founding families into their 
town, as well as the racial politics of the respective eras, leads them to console 
themselves with essentialism and selectivity. It could be said that, in these 
instances, representation in this context is named by loss. Richard Misner, the 
subject of the quotation above, is one of the town’s newest reverends. His 
thoughts on the elders of the town disregard their pomposity and “old hatred” 
(1998: 306) because he feels that their exclusivity, in terms of complexion, fails 
them as does their slavish loyalty to history. His reference to the elder’s 
mimicry, in co-opting western values, is suggested in the narrative on a number 
of levels; in the characterisations, which have an ambiguous relationship to 
reality and suggest that the copy is problematic because of this, for example 
Dovey’s “psychotic” response to the difficulties in her relationship with her 
husband, and in the relational aspects of religiosity/paganism. Misner is 
supported by his Christian faith yet challenged by its inefficacy. He is relatively 
safe in the town as his faith names him as viable. However, paganism and the 
shamanistic quality in a ceremony carried out by the women at the Convent 
under the tutelage of Consolata, create a site for an unorthodox spirituality to 
take place outside of the mimetic function. The dual representation of 
spirituality supports the notion of double-consciousness by accepting a dual 
purpose to spirituality/religiosity. In this context double consciousness, which 
would have some semblance of self-consciousness if race is to function as a 
referent, allows for an open-ended premise within which to account for the 
limitedness of binaries that have more resonance in their multi-vocality than in
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strict classifications. The other is forever present in the consciousness of the 
individual and, in terms of the town of Ruby and its outskirts, the elders are 
insistent on examining that gaze and, in some instances reifying it -  perhaps 
readable in the institution of an All American-style bank. The act of betrayal 
contended by Misner in the above quotation relies on the dialectical to express 
his annoyance at the elder’s mimicry; the first/last, oldest/newest, best/most 
pathetic have little relevance if mimicry at its most fundamental takes place. 
Reverend Misner speaks from a point of African revivalism, in terms of the 
return to roots and an understanding of African Diasporic history, elements of 
black political thought that are referentially prevalent in the African American 
metropolis, and from where he had travelled to before his settlement in Ruby, 
yet in an act of mimicry, subscribes less to the women’s act of African 
spiritualism than to a formal Christian ideology. The reasons for this, and for 
the final consecration of Consolata as what appears to be an hermaphrodite 
deity in Gnostic terms, creates more than a dialectical relation between 
paganism/religiosity as contemporary African Diasporic worship needs a much 
broader reading. Misner’s gains in the town, in terms of security, are assured 
as he aspires to a legitimate theology despite his wayward views; the women’s 
losses are emblematic of the town’s failure to accept otherness and to the 
ultimate failure of mimesis, under the auspices of utopia, in Ruby. Failure is 
suggested as mimesis can never be a complete representation of ideology at its 
origin and, as such, is flawed. As such, mimesis acts as an illusory concept that 
even displacement in its dialectical mode cannot fully answer.
Loss, and what Marc C. Connor calls"... paradise ... (as) a wonderful 
image for what we might call the suspected loss” (2000: 121) reflects the
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utopian ideal’s predicament; it concerns itself with selectivity and elitism yet is 
prescribed by otherness (2001: 16). In Ruby, this is clear in the depiction of 
tradition and how it is problematized. What some of the elders consider being 
unalterable decisions, the wording on the Oven, for example, is refuted by the 
challenge of alternative views by the youth of the town. The men suspect the 
loss of their position in the town and are antagonised by thoughts of change; 
they feel that they need to secure that tradition. There exists among the 
founding families of Ruby a sense of embattlement that names their selectivity 
and eventually leads to the murder of the women at the Convent. It is clear, 
when considering Fairly’s act, that mimicry has a place in Ruby. For as Bhabha 
notes, the mimetic quality, in this instance,"... mocks (history’s) power to be a 
model, that power which supposedly makes it imitable. Mimicry repeats rather 
than re-presents” (Bhabha 1994: 88).
There is a sense that the early twentieth century notion of double 
consciousness meets the post-colonial discourse on mimesis at the point where 
otherness is reflected. Utopian idealism in Ruby subsumes that otherness 
whilst repeating an act of mimicry that allows for tradition, with its phantasmic 
qualities, but refutes acts of madness. The notion that “The Other is always 
“mad””, with regards to Sander Gilman’s epigrammatical quotation, plays with 
the idea of madness and the definition of “sanity” in a way that characterises the 
madness in Ruby, its outsider status and the sanity of the chimera.
Madness must have an audience and a language; much of its debilitating 
factor in acute psychotic disorders is that the audience and language are lost. 
The chronotope of madness suggests that this audience or language may not
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be considered real or concrete, or particularly relevant -  although there is 
always a social narrative present that can refute this. That Bakhtin claims to 
hear dialogic associations between “voices” in the epigrammatical quotation is 
clearly relevant to linguistics rather than psychoanalysis, yet, in the context of 
Paradise, the dialogics of the mad narrative has relevance to the depiction of 
insanity. It is clear from the text that madness lies at the heart of Ruby rather 
than just as a sub-area on its outskirts, and it is in the implosion of the women 
and the explosion of the men.
The Relevance of Madness to ‘No More Yellow’
In ‘No More Yellow’, the idealised, utopian state is merely mentioned 
as an ironic aside; the place name Eastham is actually based on a place called 
East Ham, and in giving a mythical quality to a poor part of East London, there 
is the loaded suggestion that anything fantastical or out of the ordinary could 
take place. For Ella, the out of the ordinary happening is her madness that, 
unlike the instances in Morrison’s work, is not afforded a spiritual element or 
any protracted fantastical factor but implies that the real and the ordinary has 
equal place with the unreal and the extraordinary.
“Once, by the fountain, I took off my top and laid it out as if drying it then 
put on the blouse I had put in my bag. People stopped and stared, but I didn’t 
care.” For Ella, the society she lives in is looked at askance as if it were 
something she was not really a part of. Any subversive act is confined to this 
society that she cannot relate to, such as undressing at the fountain on the high 
street (see quotation above) or screaming when with a group of children at a 
MacDonald’s birthday party. Moments of lucidity become indistinguishable
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between moments of insanity simply because she does not have the tools to 
question her illness or the way that it manifests itself. Any dialogic response is 
thwarted by the lack of discussion she has with her husband, son or mother 
about her illness. Like Dovey, she hallucinates, insisting that there is a shadow 
in her kitchen that is her mother, yet there is no reciprocal dialogue or act of 
listening between herself and the shadow in the way that there is with Dovey 
and Friend. As with Arnette and Dovey, the role of wife and housekeeper is 
Ella’s lot in life as she has only had a handful of jobs outside of the home and it 
is suggested in the text that she is suffering from a breakdown in confidence. 
She too resists reality but without really knowing what it is she is resisting; there 
has been no overriding case of trauma in her life that has brought her to this 
point, yet she is rightfully confused about the gaps in knowledge about her 
family history. In terms of the mad chronotope, Ella is depicted with the 
structural ellipsis evident in the portrayal of Mavis, yet her youthful 
“strangeness” depends on the strength of dissension evident in her adult years. 
There is a point at which Ella can appear confoundingly sane, however, and it is 
in the ellipsis of telling that the reader must suggest the anarchy of her mind.
“Then I had had my say. Though I didn’t say much, looking back, at least 
I said something. Now I just let what happens happen. I don’t fight for my say 
anymore. I just let the others talk while I listen.” The language of madness in 
‘No More Yellow’ is one articulated to Ella by Ella and is not permitted a dialogic 
response. The points at which she is open to a dialogic interaction, by the 
fountain and in MacDonald’s, are expressed within the confines of her purview 
that permits an idiosyncratic view of herself and keeps social interaction out. 
There is a sense that the utterance is suspended for Ella, as if all is animated 
about her but without the vibrancy of speech that could enrich her. There is a
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suggestion that her friend Dot is able to hold her together somewhat, but this we 
have to take with a pinch of salt as Ella would have a less charitable attitude to 
a woman like Dot than is portrayed; it seems as if Ella is using Dot and that is 
not the same as being supported by the woman. Dialogic interaction at any 
meaningful level is limited and the process of elision appears to be more 
appropriate for discussion than any form of communication.
Race and how it was perceived in the early 1980s plays a part in how 
Ella confronts the world. Certain sections of youth culture of the time were 
insistently racist and exclusive in terms of what was worn by the group and what 
music was listened to. Looking in on that culture, the alienation Ella feels is 
partly as a result of the subtle nature of double consciousness, if it can be 
placed in a black British context; the small group of people who make up her 
immediate family and friends are not vigilant enough in terms of stamping out 
the effects of racism to even warrant being told about certain incidences that 
happen to Ella. Double consciousness can act as either a barrier to self- 
consciousness or a willing aid to a certain self-reflexivity that encourages self­
reflection and a particular abstraction. In Ella’s instance the former action of the 
barrier is primary with the latter instance of abstraction taking a secondary, 
submissive aspect. The younger Ella’s speech does not reveal the true 
profundity of her disaffection as she does not have a backdrop of political 
agitation and self-congratulatory independence that the Ruby women have and 
does not have an outlet from which to voice her opinions in any strong manner. 
When she is older, this outlet is stymied by the overbearing mannerisms of 
others (Dot) and the intransigence of her family. For Ella, the madness within is 
a solitary matter, not a shared phenomenon or one that is articulated before
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others from a spiritual level, as in Paradise, and it is this introverted aspect of 
the illness and Ella’s alienation from society and family that prove instrumental.
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Conclusion
I have stated in the Introduction to this thesis that two concepts are 
important to the thesis -  the issue of the chronotope and the articulation of 
madness in the three texts. It is, of course, important to draw conclusions from 
my findings in the corresponding chapters and look at the ways in which the 
chronotope and madness feature.
In Chapter One, I looked at the issue of the mad chronotope in 
conjunction with trauma. Trauma, as indicated by Cathy Caruth, suggests that 
there is a belated element to an experience which is the return of the encounter 
at a later stage in memory. This is what Martine, the protagonist’s mother, 
suffers with in Breath, Eyes, Memory and as such is emblematic of the trauma 
visited on each of the protagonists of the three novels under discussion. The 
rupture of trauma and its inherent disorder add another dimension to a reading 
of madness in the text and suggests a wider remit being apparent than that of 
just madness. Trauma in the context of madness is an important aspect of 
mental disorder that goes hand in hand with the madness itself, so it was 
important to posit the notion of trauma quite early on in the thesis. That this 
trauma manifests itself in bouts of delusion and hallucination for Martine and 
bulimia for Sophie provides an instance of the variability of mental disorder and 
perhaps suggests how difficult it is to provide a definition that fits all instances of 
madness described in these three texts. Another aspect of madness along with 
the adumbrative trauma that is evident in each of the three novels is the 
relationship between misunderstandings and madness to the domestic setting. 
These misapprehensions are evidence of the momentary indefatigability of 
delusion and hallucination, as witnessed by Sophie in her relationship with her
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mother, Martine. The ellipses or breaks that become evident because of this 
estranged relationship with reality are a strong indication of what is omitted due 
to madness, on the one hand, and what is made clearer. For the ellipses are 
places where elucidation can take place and, in the case of Martine and Sophie, 
does so when they break their silence and begin to communicate again.
Therefore, madness has a strong correlation with trauma and the ellipses 
in the text. It is in the depiction of madness that the mad chronotope becomes 
viable and instructional, and in Chapter One is able to demonstrate certain 
patterns in the text. For example, the linear time span associated with Tante 
Atie’s depression is then juxtaposed against the political agency of the country 
at that time. This reading of the mad chronotope suggests an open-endedness 
to the proposition of the chronotope as it can be associated with a number of 
subjects at a number of junctures in the writing. It seemed to me that the mad 
chronotope worked well as a system of evaluating the depiction of madness as 
the constraints of time and space are also open to endless possibilities. These 
possibilities may seem limited by the remit of the chronotope but it is certainly 
the case that they are reappraised once seen through the time/space continuum 
of the chronotope.
In Chapter two of the thesis, the notion of the unreliable narrator 
becomes important as Tony narrates his side of the story whilst in the midst of 
delusion and hallucinations. As in Christine van Boheemen-Saaf s relating of 
transference, there is a “spilling over of unconscious content” (1999: 50) into the 
real, lived experience that suggests a blurring of lines between real/unreal, 
presence/absence and present/past. The unreliable narrator, with the need for
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self-deception paramount, is able to provide an alternate view of life from that of 
the reliable narrator posited in alternate chapters that tells the back story. The 
unreliable narrator uses repetition to provide the story of Tony retelling the story 
to himself, which in itself is an act of witnessing implosion. This act of 
witnessing implosion is clear in the dialogue/monologue between Tony and 
himself and becomes part of a social and historical construct. Therefore, the 
question of whether Tony can be located in the social world is not only about 
the unutterable and what is left unsaid in madness but also about whether he 
can have an impact on those around him. I came to the conclusion that Tony’s 
social function is answerable if ultimately unutterable in the form of discourse, 
and as such definitely has a moral function also. Therefore, the moral and 
social function of the unreliable narrator is apparent in the text.
In Chapter Three of the thesis, dialectics and dialogics become important 
to the relaying of the lives of women in the town of Ruby and beyond. The 
dialectic of the heard/unheard becomes apparent in Sweetie’s story as she 
thinks she hears a baby crying when there is no baby in the Convent. We know 
that this is a phantasm as Sweetie admits to not even hearing her own sick 
children crying at her own home in Ruby. This focuses the reader on the point 
that the Convent is a psychic draw to the emotionally challenged like Sweetie 
and Mavis and the other women (and men) who visit and come to stay. The 
dialectical opposition between reason/madness becomes apparent when these 
people encounter the Convent and their back stories become evident. What is 
clear from this encounter is that those weakened by circumstance in the town 
become stronger and confrontational at the Convent, and this in turn leads them
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to become less reliable at relating their trauma as they turn against the women 
at the Convent.
The mad chronotope, with its sequentiality and timelessness important to 
a reading of unreliability, is a point at which ideas about the novel and the thesis 
interact. Ideas about implementing some of Bakhtin’s concepts came early on 
in the thesis planning whereas ideas on the mad chronotope came later. With 
the novel, which had already been started before the beginning of this course of 
study and which had to be adapted to meet the needs of the course objectives, 
ideas around the unreliability of the narrator and the chronotope became 
paramount. In the thesis, madness, with its concern for chaotic intervention and 
despotic rhetoric, immerses itself in language through chronotopic relevance. In 
“Trauma and Madness in Edwidge Danticat’s Breath, Eyes, Memory” the 
chronotope has many faces that are revealed by the time/space dialectic as well 
as fear and loss and their psychological elements. Death emerges in its 
chronotopic framework as metaphor here for nation, history and politics and, as 
such, calls into question the historical violence of the nation state and its 
aftermath, rape victims being one of its after effects. In Chapter Two, “The 
Language of Madness in Leone Ross’ Orange Laughter” , the chronotope is 
afforded a particular site and home, and differentiates between alternative 
concepts of home and its effect on the protagonist’s identity. In an act of 
belonging, the protagonist, Tony, makes the underground his home that, as a 
chronotopic moment, suggests a suspension of belief for the reader that belies 
the chronology of the chapters; Tony’s life is resistant to yet plays a part in the 
interplay of home life and relationships prevalent at Topside (above ground).
His ambiguous feelings towards normality and sanity have an affect on the
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chronotopic moment as it is forever realised outside of the scope of Tony’s 
reasoning, in the alternate chapters, and suggests the unreliability of the 
narration and madness itself. In Chapter Three, “Utopian Madness in Toni 
Morrison’s Paradise”, the chronotope is fully realised as a site for madness in 
which its resonance as a marker of time and absence is identified. These three 
readings of the chronotope suggest more than just time and site relevance but 
provide a chronology and spatial moments in which madness can displace 
reason and convey how it manifests itself.
I mentioned in the thesis that I don’t believe that there is a discourse of 
madness. Let me clarify that. I don’t believe that there is a discourse that can 
take into consideration the unutterable and unreliable in madness and remain 
true to the madman or woman who speaks or thinks it. It is not to say that there 
is no discourse on madness whatsoever; the rather institutionalised treatment of 
the subject by Foucault suggests that there are ways to look at the scientific 
notions around madness and discuss them in relation to the mad person, but 
that does not suggest that there is a way of defining the unutterable or the 
unreliable. All of the mad characters in the books studied for this thesis have 
moments whereby their madness is unutterable to anyone and is clearly 
delusional; this state of affairs leaves room for the true or false statement within 
discourse to be uttered, but does not elucidate on silences, thereby negating 
the premise altogether. Therefore, the mad cannot speak, and any discourse 
drawn from this thesis would concentrate on those words “uttered” by a novelist 
writing the mad and making them readable.
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Contemporary black literature is diverse in its treatment of madness in 
literature. Looking at the three novels discussed in the preceding chapters, it 
has become clear that these novels relate to their respective traditions in a way 
that complicates the notion that there is a tradition for all. Edwidge Danticat’s 
Breath, Eyes, Memory complicates matters even further by straddling the 
Americas, from the Caribbean to the east coast of the North American 
continent. The novel manages to encapsulate the absolution and defiance of 
“mad” characters found within the contemporary African Caribbean women 
writer’s tradition yet touch on the destructive elements traditionally found in 
African American fiction from the 1940s through to the 1970s. In Orange 
Laughter, Leone Ross takes on an African American subject from a black British 
perspective; Ross’ treatment of the subject of madness is certainly not in the 
tradition of contemporary African American women’s writing on the subject in 
the way that Toni Morrison’s Paradise is, as it does not “normalise” incidences 
of madness but accentuates the feeling of heightened awareness and is 
motivated by a certain sense of the pariah status, as found in the works of 
fellow black British writers Caryl Phillips and Joan Riley.
‘No More Yellow’, the novel written in conjunction with this thesis, sits 
comfortably within the black British tradition as it neither normalises nor rises 
above the madness depicted. Instead there is a sense of crisis rather than 
outright absolution. Its point of originality is that it discusses ideas around 
madness in more detail than in literature of the tradition from the 1980s and 
makes madness its central theme. In ‘No More Yellow’, the mad chronotopic 
moments are revealed fully towards the end of the novel and as such leave a 
number of ellipses in the text that suggest areas of lucidity and normality for the
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main protagonist. This was essential to give the impression that there was a 
slow, incremental creep of madness, starting in adolescence with changed 
perceptions and behaviour and ending with full blown psychosis.
In the introduction to this thesis, I mention the fact that the following 
chapters would be concerned with mad discourse and language having given a 
substantial description of what was meant by discourse in this context. This 
idea came about having read some Bakhtin at first degree level and from having 
a growing interest in what madness means in contemporary society. Among 
the interest in Bakhtin’s concepts of polyphony and hetereoglossia, both of 
which are mentioned in this thesis, there was the idea of the chronotope. And it 
was here, I thought, that madness and language could meet.
The concept of the mad chronotope is an important one, as I believe that 
it suggests a point of originality within this project. There have been very few 
books on the subject of madness or psychoanalysis and the black novel,
Claudia Tate’s last book being one of them, and little if nothing on the subject of 
madness and language and the black novel. By looking at Bakhtin’s rather 
vague terms for the chronotope and using them decisively within the context of 
madness, there has been a new way of looking at madness and the language in 
a novel by any writer.
The diverse nature of writing madness in different traditions and the 
usefulness of the chronotope to mark madness were conclusive in this study. 
This diversity positions the texts within a cultural context, one that speaks out of 
representation and identity as well as an historical sense of congruence. This
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congruence takes into consideration the historical matter that makes up black 
literature -  that which is of the history of a people from different traditions and 
the contexts that bring them together. One of these contexts is the chronotope, 
which opens up possibilities for the reading of the texts within a far wider 
cultural and historical framework.
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